

**GEOPOLITICS OF INDIA AND MYANMAR : ITS IMPACT ON  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MIZORAM**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  
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**In partial fulfillment of the requirement of the Degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy in Geography of Mizoram University, Aizawl**



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### **Certificate**

This is to certify that the thesis entitled “Geopolitics of India and Myanmar : Its impact on Socio-Economic Development of Mizoram” submitted by Lalmalsawma Ralte for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Geography and Resource Management, of Mizoram University, Aizawl, India, is a record of original investigations carried out by him under my supervision. He has been duly registered and the thesis presented is worthy of consideration for the award of Ph.D. degree.

The present thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. As per the Ph.D. regulations of Mizoram University, he has fulfilled all the requirements. The thesis is the result of his own research. This thesis has never been submitted to any other university for any research degree, either as a whole or as part of it.

Place: Aizawl

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**CANDIDATE'S DECLARATION**

I, Lalmalsawma Ralte, hereby declare that the subject matter of this thesis is the record of work done by me, that the contents of this thesis did not form basis of the award of any previous degree to me or to do the best of my knowledge to anybody else, and that the thesis has not been submitted by me for any research degree in any other University/Institute.

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## Abbreviation

ACD	-	Asia Cooperation Dialogue
AEP	-	Act East Policy
ARF	-	Asean Regional Forum
ASEAN	-	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BCIM	-	Bangladesh, China, India & Myanmar
BIMSTEC	-	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BRI	-	Belt and Road Initiative
BTA	-	Border Trade Agreement
BTU	-	Build Transfer and Use
COP	-	Conference of Party
CW	-	Cold War
EAS	-	East Asia Summit
EXIM	-	Export and Import
HEP	-	Hydroelectric Project
IWT	-	Inland Waterway Terminal
KIA	-	Kachin Independence Army
KMMTTP	-	Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project
LDP	-	Lawngtlai - Dingtlang-Parva
LEP	-	Look East Policy
MoDONER	-	Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region
MGC	-	Mekong, Ganga Cooperation
NCV	-	Nalkawn Chamdur Valley
NER	-	North Eastern Region
NLD	-	National League for Democracy
PWD	-	Public Works Department
RITES	-	Rail India Technical Economic Services
ReCAPP	-	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed against Ships in Asia
SLORC	-	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC	-	State Peace and Development Council

TAC - Treaty of Amity and Cooperation  
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNSC - United Nations Security Council



## **CHAPTER-1**

### **Introduction**

Geopolitics is the generic term for the study of how geographical considerations affect political systems. It refers to a nation's politics as influenced by its location. Between the two world wars, Germany developed the political use of this geographic idea. The phrase geopolitics originates from the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1898) in which he introduced five phrases to label key features of the state. The other four did not strike root but geopolitics did. With this term, pointed at three geographical features of a state, namely, the location of a state in relation to other states, the form of the territory of a state and the surface and the physical characteristics of this territory.

It is impossible to study international relations without a solid understanding of geography. Throughout recorded history, populations have increased and decreased, natural resources have been discovered and used up, political systems have frequently changed, empires and states have risen and fallen, and technologies have developed and devolved. However, the locations of continents, islands, seas, and oceans have not changed significantly. Great nations who do not understand geography do so at their peril. Since the state is seen as a living entity, its boundaries are changeable. They evolve throughout the state's existence. In other words, when a state's strength is increasing at the expense of an older state that is declining, the state expands its area. The evolution of the political organism is determined by its environment.

Throughout the seventeenth century, there was a substantial shift in the geopolitics and geo-economics of Asian history. Geopolitics is a subject that requires explanation in terms of its background, development, present trends, and applicability to the task at hand. This is true since the concept underwent alteration during World War II and has really seen a revival since 1980. However, as Hepple (1986) accurately points out in his essay titled "The Revival of Geopolitics," "geopolitical analysis of both global and regional problems has become more

prevalent" during the course of the previous 10 years. There must logically be a decline from an earlier phase of activity before any resurrection. to investigate the idea of geopolitics in light of its emergence, fall, and revival, and to combine all of these.

However, it wasn't until the First World War specifically, Kjellen's essay receives serious academic consideration. Kjellen (1898), a Swedish political scientist coined the term "Geopolitik" in German. In this essay, Kjellen discussed the German national anthem. During the wartime excitement, he freely proclaimed his support for the German country. Kjellen's geopolitical works and views, as well as the term Geopolitik, were highly well-liked in Germany as a result of this covert scientific support for German empire. Geopolitics is the "science that conceptualises the state as a geographic organism or as a phenomenon in space," according to Kjellen. According to him, "wars, territorial expansion, and violations of international law are not the result of some fatalistic and deterministic force standing outside men, nations, and their leaders.". Kjellen attempted to develop a "system of politics" by examining the state as a way of life within the confines of its territorial space (geopolitik), economic environment (oekopolitik), population (demopolitik), social order (sociopolitik), and constitutional framework (kratopolitik). His equating of the two is based on his presumption that "the nature of the state is ultimately power" and that "the law is its servant." According to Kjellen's political philosophy, the main objective of governmental activities was to maximise power.

The German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1897), who developed the idea of the state as an earthbound organism is considered the real founder of geopolitical thought in Germany (and the modern world). Kjellen may have coined the term "Geopolitik," but Ratzel is credited with developing the idea. Ratzel used the idea of evolution via adaptation to the environment and the battle for survival as the main organizing principle of his *Politische Geographie*, which signaled the birth of a new field devoted to the study of the state as a living entity. The need for space is at the heart of the battle for life in the plant and animal kingdoms, and the history of countries may be seen as a struggle for political territory.

The state is a unique type of spatial organism, an earthbound organism made up of

a piece of humanity and the earth, according to Ratzel's theory of political geography. According to Ratzel, both the state's territorial and political expansion exhibit "The peculiarly characteristics of a body in motion that expands and shrinks alternately in regression and development." This movement's ultimate objective has always been the conquest of space with an eye towards the founding of States. He and others have continued Cohen's groundbreaking work on the geopolitical possibilities for a multipolar world, which was initially put forward in 1963 at the postwar geopolitics' lowest point (Cohen, 1982).

A second, somewhat unrelated area of study is the development of "behavioural geopolitics," which develops behavioural and statistical models of the transnational spread of wars and conflicts. This tactic is being developed by political scientists and geographers alike (O'Loughlin, 1986). O'Sullivan mixes a study of global geopolitical difficulties with historical and policy-oriented research, further behavioural work on linkages, diffusion, and game theoretic methodologies, as well as other factors.

A third group of individuals has been influenced by Marxist or neo-Marxist thinking. Their theoretical framework gives them a vantage point from which to critique past geopolitics and rebuild contemporary geopolitics based on economic links, particularly the role of capitalism in the global economy (Taylor, 1985). The counterargument is Wallerstein's "world-economy" and "world-systems" viewpoint on the development of capitalism and its local expressions. Using this technique, Taylor (1985) rebuilt the theoretical underpinnings of political geography. According to Taylor, 'in world-systems theory, geopolitics is about competition for imperialism's hegemony over the periphery (currently North versus South) in the centre (now East against West)'. Radical geographical analysis has made room for geopolitics as focus has shifted from solely economic to the role of the state and the political superstructure.

The question of how truly separate the political is from the economic base has come under scrutiny in recent years. According to Skocpol (1977), Wallerstein neglects to consider the importance of "geopolitical situations" and "geo-political circumstances" in his analysis of European capitalism. However, Lacoste and his colleagues on the publication *Herodote* have acquired the most persistent geopolitical interest in France. Numerous national, international, and regional geopolitical concerns have received considerable attention from Lacoste and his coworkers in their 1976 publication *Herodote*. Numerous of these works demonstrate how carefully connecting in-depth spatial study to historical and political studies may shed light on geopolitical issues. Speaking about geopolitics in terms of superpower rivalry and wars between nations has become less and less surprising in the post-World War geopolitical context. 'Expansion of influence' has taken the role of 'territorial expansion' in the context of contemporary nation-states. The concept of "the ultimate goal of geopolitics" is no longer valid. 'A fairer and better distribution of the world's living space, and control over that space: a fairer distribution made in accordance with the numbers of each group, and their capacity for achievement' (Haushofer,1944).

The issue of regional geopolitics has gained traction in this circumstance. The reason for this is that under a federal or quasi-federal state, one can readily imagine the need for regional geopolitics since the regions are political and geographical ensembles that are ruled and administered by elected officials who have actual authority in respect to the central government. Due to the lack of an appropriate research framework, this study is based on neo-geopolitical ideas that are mostly centred on regional geopolitics. As was already said, due to its war guilt, geopolitics became a neglected field of study and was tarnished for the majority of the 40 years after the conclusion of World War II. However, during the past several decades, the term 'geopolitics' has slowly returned to usage, and geopolitical analysis of both global and regional issues has grown increasingly prevalent. The word 'geopolitics' or 'geopolitical' has been used often in the media and in political discourse since 1980, and it has been the focus of several academic and policy-related studies. Numerous studies on geopolitical views on global strategy have been published

since the late 1970s. An International Institute of Geopolitics was established in Paris in 1982, and publications like 'Geopolitique'.

Zoppo & Zorgbibe (1985) conducted a study and evaluates "classical geopolitics" and considers if they still hold true in the nuclear age. Leslie W. Happle claims that this literature tends to take a rather limited view of both traditional geopolitics and "geographical factors," tending to limit them to physical configurations and space while ignoring human distributions. Traditional geopolitics excludes the Germanic tradition and limits itself to global issues. Additionally, it often equates geopolitics with "power politics," gives technology a dominant role, and assumes that geopolitical interactions develop "naturalistically" without the interference of social and political structures and ideologies. Jay (1979) offers a different viewpoint that is more geographical, stating that "Geopolitics is, definitionally, the art and process of managing global rivalry". However, connects this to local politics by stating that 'good regionalism is good geopolitics, and bad regionalism is bad geopolitics' (Deudnay, 1983). (Chaliand & Pageau's, 1983) states that geopolitical which starts with a discussion of geopolitical worldviews, and Freedman's (1985) atlas of global strategy which also starts with a discussion of geopolitics, are some other studies. The majority of geographers' contributions to geopolitics focus on the geopolitics of international strategy, as in O'Sullivan's highly critical study of the geopolitics of deterrence (O'Sullivan, 1985). Lacoste's investigation into the geography of the Euromissiles (Cruise & Pershing) and the danger of "decoupling" European Both geopolitical studies and regional studies place a lot of emphasis on cultural differences. Many of these works use intricate spatial analysis to connect historical and political studies to geopolitical problems. German geopolitics, near eastern geopolitics, maritime geopolitics, and Islamic geopolitics are some of the more recent topics.

Political scientists in India have mostly conducted geopolitical research on superpower competition and how it affects India. Except for Sen's book on the "Basic Principles of Geopolitics and History," there haven't been many books with

the phrase "geopolitics" in the title. Parihar U.N.U. (1989) studied on the topic of 'geopolitical ideology and trends. 'Geopolitics of North East India' is the subject of geopolitical research conducted in North East India. Regional geopolitical studies by geographers in India are few, with the exception of Bhattacharyya (1991).

North East India is one of India's most strategically significant and vulnerable areas, and its strategic position is a key geopolitical tenet. Borderland or a frontier is an area that is located on the perimeter of a nation and offers protection while allowing for trade. Every border consists of three zones: two are on the edges of the neighbouring states, and the third is in the middle, known as the borderland, where the two nations mix. The length of India's land borders is roughly 17,700 km, of which North East India shares 5200 km with China, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Assam borders Bhutan, Arunachal Pradesh borders both China and Bhutan, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram border Myanmar, and Meghalaya and Tripura border Bangladesh since all seven North Eastern states are border states. North East India holds a particularly vital position due to its extraordinarily lengthy land border. A small foothills-filled passage in North Bengal connects it to the Indian continent. This corridor is around 33 km wide on the eastern side and 21 km wide on the western side, and the link occasionally has delays because of severe rain and flooding. One of the main reasons for alienation of its inhabitants is the region's terrestrial position, which transforms it into an isolated enclave.

North East India has tertiary mountains and hills as its topography. The area is a remote area made up of Archaean plateaus, river valleys, mountain basins, etc. The Brahmaputra River, numerous rivers, and the region's extensive monsoon forests are only a few examples of the terrain features that have a significant impact on the geopolitics of the area. The Brahmaputra River, numerous rivers, and the region's extensive monsoon forests are only a few examples of the terrain features that have a significant impact on the geopolitics of the area. A predisposition towards separatism among the populace is favoured by the region's arid physical terrain and its incredibly inadequate transportation and communication infrastructure. In composite Assam,

there has really been a long history of hostility between the hill and lowland tribes.

The Mizoram-Myanmar border region is uncontested and quiet. With the Mizo hills, Manipur, and Naga hills on the Indian side and the Chin hills, Kachin state, etc. on the Myanmar side, the boundary line of this border travels through densely wooded mountainous regions. The Yandaboo Treaty of 1826 required the British to draw this border. With rice as the primary crop, agriculture is practised on a shifting basis. Mizoram's border region is hilly. The 404 km boundary is entirely made up of trees. Rice and tea are both grown on certain hill slopes. The government must provide the underdeveloped frontiers of North East India immediate attention. Smuggling and the influx of unauthorised foreigners have been frequent occurrences near the border between Myanmar and Mizoram. The region's remote position appears to be impeding industrialization and urbanisation. The traditional residents of the area had seen the formation of a centripetal force as a result of topography as well as history. It turned into a linguistic melting pot for several ethnic groups, including Tibeto-Chinese, Austro-Asiatic, and others, and a form of Mongoloid civilization emerged there.

**1.2 Scope of the Study** The surrounding geography serves as a representation of the area's overall natural state. The combined study of geology, relief characteristics, drainage, soil, climatic conditions, and plant cover can be referred to as the physical environment. Despite the fact that man has the ability to drastically modify the physical landscape, the environment places some limitations on how man may live. Understanding how physical elements and human habitation interact becomes important as a result. In order to understand the nature of the physical framework in relation to location, geology, topography, climate, soil and plant cover, and associated phenomena in a spatial context, comprehensive examination is required. However, the agriculturally based economies of the British era were unable to facilitate extensive cross-border cooperation. Additionally, the British placed a higher priority on security than regional development. After the independence from British, the security perception of India and Myanmar did not give room for border trade agreement although cross border trade was going on in the borderland between the two countries due to its socio-cultural linkage. However, with the conclusion of the Cold

War and the growth of East Asian nations, the situation altered. This was also the beginning of globalisation. Therefore, border regions are seen as an economic corridor and a space for expansion and development. The Indo-Myanmar Border Trade Agreement, which was signed on January 21, 1994 by the governments of the Republic of India and the Union of Myanmar with the intention of formalising border trade practises, was a significant step towards engaging the Myanmar Junta both politically and economically in light of the enormous trade prospects between the two countries (Bezbaruah, 2007).

Focusing on the geopolitics of India and Myanmar and its impact on the socio economic development of the border areas of Mizoram which lies immediately adjacent to Myanmar, the principle objective of the study is to highlight the geopolitical dynamics of India and Myanmar and its relevance to socio-economic development of Mizoram. The study also aimed to suggest appropriate policy for socio-economic development of the borderlands of Mizoram-Myanmar. India and Myanmar have the potential for commerce because of their strong socio-cultural and economic ties and shared geography.

**1.3 Objectives of the Study** The study has been undertaken with the following objectives:

- 1) To study the geopolitical dynamics of India and Myanmar and its relevance to Mizoram.
- 2) To examine the impact of geopolitics on socio-economic development of the villages located along the borderlands of Mizoram.
- 3) To suggest an appropriate policy for socio-economic development of border lands.

**1.4 The Study Area** For the present study fieldwork was conducted in the borderlands of Mizoram along Myanmar viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah &



Lungbun villages. The areas have been chosen due to its location factors as the four villages are in border areas of Mizoram-Myanmar and carry out border trade activities. The areas also provide a comparative study in their types and nature of goods traded as the two towns have a significant tribal concentration but under different resource distribution and geographical setting - the former being a plain and the latter being a hilly area. The current study examines a few of the concerns emphasised in the objectives in this context.




Fig 1.1 Map of study areas of border between India - Myanmar

**1.5 Methodology** The methods used for the present study include household schedules through which preliminary data on socio-economic background of each household was collected. For collecting household data, simple random sampling technique was used in which 30 percent were drawn from the four villages of Mizoram viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah & Lungbun villages which borders Myanmar. The data collected includes family member's name, age, sex, education, family size, monthly income, migration, means of livelihood, livestock, service sector, assets, types of house, social structure, culture and custom and trans- border trade between Mizoram and Myanmar.

Table 1.1 Sample size of the study area

Area	Thingsai	Zokhawthar	Zochachhuah	Lungbun
Total household	461	728	89	167
Household study	152	336	60	90
Simple random sampling of 30%	32.97%	46.42%	67.41%	53.89%

### 1.6 Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary data were used for the present study. Socio-economic scale was developed by the investigator to find out the socio-economic development of the villages located along the borderlands of Mizoram. In cases where they are relevant to the research's objectives, secondary sources such as books, periodicals, articles, journals, census reports, government papers, and others have been studied.

### 1.7 Data Analysis

The primary goal of data analysis is to make judgements about certain data. These findings help researchers formulate conclusions about their research. For the present study, descriptive and qualitative method was employed using percentage.

**Chapterization Scheme** Given the circumstances of the existing border landscape wherein the peripheral ethnic groups share greater cultural affinity than it does with the mainstream it increases the scope of interaction significantly. Therefore the study attempts to shed light on geopolitical dynamics of India and Myanmar and how it has influence the socio-economic development of the borderland of Mizoram.

**Chapter-1** The first chapter deals with the introductory, scope of the study, objectives of the study, methodology, about the study area, sources of data and data analysis. This chapter extensively explains the meaning, method and theoretical concept of geopolitics.

**Chapter-2** To provide a geopolitical framework of the study, previous studies and reviews were incorporated. This chapter deals with trans-border trade and development, Look East policy, Act East policy, Kaladan multi modal transit transport project and all about the socio economic ties between the borderlands of Myanmar and Mizoram.

**Chapter-3** Traces the historical compulsions of the British entry into the region and the policies formulated thereafter to gain access into the strategically significant region. This chapter highlight the geographical background of the study areas of the borderlands of Mizoram-Myanmar such as Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages in which their location, landscape, climate, natural vegetation and livestock and agriculture are briefly discussed. Chapter 3 also discussed the socio-economic development and cultural background of the study areas.

**Chapter-4** A case study of socio-economic development of the study areas viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages are discussed in this chapter. An attempt has been made to analyse the impact of the geopolitics on the socio-economic development of the borderlands of Mizoram. Socio-economic scale of interaction is given in which the family member's name, age, sex, education, family size, monthly income, migration, means of livelihood, livestock, service sector, assets, types of house, social structure, culture and custom and trans-border trade between

Mizoram and Myanmar are discussed.

**Chapter-5** Geopolitical policies and its implications and prospects are discussed. This chapter also includes the summary and findings of the study areas. Findings from the field study of selected sample villages have also been incorporated in this chapter.

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## **CHAPTER-2**

### **Literature Review**

Review of literature gives us insight into earlier research that has been done in a given area of study. The summary of earlier research gives a feeling of the knowledge gaps that aids in drawing connections between the study and other publications. Using a strong study design and a workable technique is also beneficial. The outline of previous studies provides a sense of knowledge gaps that helps draw the relationship of the study with other works. In addition, it helps to adopt a sound research design and methodology that are feasible. In this chapter, literature is reviewed on different subjects 'matter that are related to sustainable livelihood, trade and its connotation to development vis-a-vis livelihood promotion, issues in cross border interactions, on the Act East Policy (AEP), and lastly on Indo-Myanmar border trade. Border trade's conceptual understanding was also emphasized, especially to distinguish it from other sorts of commerce like cross-border trade, unofficial cross-border trade, and so on. The Act East Policy, formerly known as the Look East Policy (LEP), has been the subject of a review of the literature since it is believed that the North Eastern Region (NER) of India relies heavily on bilateral border commerce. We evaluated earlier research on border commerce between India and Myanmar that concentrated on various elements of trade within the larger context of its effects on the people, economy, and way of life in the region. This chapter ended with a subsection that highlighted the gaps in the main part of literature.

#### **2.1 Geopolitics: A Geostrategic Explanation**

The Swedish political scientist Kjellen (1898) is credited with creating the word "Geopolitik" in the German language. Kjellen discussed the concept of the German war-euphoria and blatantly expressed his support for the rights of the German people. Kjellen's geopolitical works and views, as well as the term "Geopolitik," were highly well-liked in Germany as a result of this covert scientific support for German empire. According to Kjellen, "geopolitics is the science that conceptualises the state as a geographic organism or as a phenomena in space. Kjellen argues that no external

fatalistic or deterministic force acting on behalf of people, states, or their leaders causes wars, territorial advances, or violations of international law. Kjellen had a keen interest in the geographic processes that cause the earth's surface or particular regions of its territories to transform from straightforward geographical regions into well-articulated cultural-political regions, each with a distinct personality and a deeply ingrained instinct for survival, self-preservation, and propagation. Each region gained continuity, solidarity, interaction, loyalty, and nationality as a result of the socio-cultural alteration of each location, which Kjellen referred to as the development of a country with "a geographical instinct".

Singer (1961) provides more thorough explanations at the systemic level; realism explains the structural justification of India's overtures to Myanmar. The international system restricts the alternatives that states have in world affairs. The instability that the end of the Cold War (CW) brought about in the previously anarchic international order led to the emergence of a unipolar power. Emerging powers will attempt to counterbalance a hegemon (either friendly or hostile) if there is a unipolar power by internally and/or externally balancing to equal the hegemon's capabilities. The result of the systemic upheaval was the "rising of China," which aimed to dominate the area and eventually challenge the USA on an equal footing. Therefore, the revised power distribution predicts that India would have structural imperatives to pursue new partnerships with states to improve its capabilities relative to China in ordering the international system.

Geopolitics, according to Cohen (1973), is the relationship between the geopolitical environment and global political power. Despite rejecting the terms geopolitics and geopolitical analysis in France (George, 1964: "The worst caricature of applied geography in the first part of the 20th century has been geopolitics," Lacoste, 1981), George published *Geopolitique des Minorités* in 1984, making the case for a geopolitical analysis of minority issues. The research conducted in the setting of Central America by the geographers Foucher (1982) and Sanduer (1981, 1985) demonstrates how a geographic foundation may enlighten geopolitical analysis.

Numerous national, international, and regional geopolitical concerns have received considerable attention since Lacoste et al. (1976). Numerous of these works demonstrate how delicately relating historical and political studies to comprehensive geographical study may shed light on geopolitical issues.

Skocpol (1977) in the context of his investigation of Wallerstein's "World's Capitalist System," contends that Wallerstein's concept of European capitalism specifically ignores the relevance of "geopolitical situations" and "geopolitical circumstances." Skocpol goes on to say that as focus has shifted from simply economic to the function of the state and the political superstructure, geopolitics has found a place in radical geographical analysis. The question of how really separate the political is from the economic foundation has been the focus of debate. However, Lacoste and his colleagues on the publication *Herodote* have acquired the most persistent geopolitical interest in France.

According to Jay (1979) managing international competition is the art and practise of geopolitics, but it also has a relationship to local politics. Good regionalism is good geopolitics, and bad regionalism is bad geopolitics, he argues.

In order to analyse foreign locations in the state's interest, Gaddis (1982) develops the concept of "strategic interests" of the state as a geopolitical code to define the map of allies and enemies. This typology undoubtedly helps in understanding the variety of geopolitical representations that discursive analysis addresses, despite the fact that it has not (yet?) gained much traction and is unlikely to do so because it ignores the common meaning of two terms that are already well-established (geopolitical codes and geopolitical visions).

Geopolitical worldviews are discussed at the outset of both Deudnay's (1983) and Freedman's (1985) atlas of global strategy. The majority of the contributions made by geographers to geopolitics focus on the geopolitics of global strategy, as in O'Sullivan's (1985) extremely critical examination of the geopolitics of deterrence.

Classical geopolitics are evaluated by Zoppo and Zorgbibe (1985) to see if they are still applicable in the nuclear era. According to Leslie Happle, this literature tends to have a relatively constrained understanding of both conventional geopolitics and "geographical factors," often limiting them to spatial configurations and physical features while excluding human distributions. Traditional geopolitics restricts itself to global challenges and ignores the Germanic tradition. Furthermore, it frequently conflates geopolitics with "power politics," emphasizes technology, and claims that geopolitical interactions arise "naturalistically" without the influence of social and political institutions and ideologies.

Morgenthau et.al (1985), in their study on politics among nations: *The Struggle for Power and Peace* discussed conflicts in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Central Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Balkans, involving demography, energy, water, and food, and highlighted the major geopolitical issues confronted by the American "hyper power" as well as those of Europe, Russia, China, India, Japan, and Brazil.

Girot & Kofman (1987) studied on *International Geopolitical Analysis, A Selection from Hérodote* is an ensemble of artworks that seek to reinvigorate geopolitics in the 1970s and offer an emancipatory perspective to geography and politics, since the term "geopolitics" disappeared from academic and public discourse after World War II.

Huntington (1993) argued that In the post-CW era, a state's adversaries and friends are determined by its religious background. The greater idea of civilisation, including culture, influences whether there will be cooperation or war between states. In this case, religion rules and shapes a state's identity and culture. Although this concept has received much criticism, it nevertheless offers insightful information, especially when one considers the causative mechanism: there may be a high degree of ideological affinity between nations that share the same religion. States with shared religious beliefs or cultural ties perceive themselves as having a common identity, which helps to lessen the "us versus them" dynamic in the international system. Foreign policy decisions are likely to be influenced if a state considers religion to be fundamental to its identity (Warner & Walker 2011).



Dodds & Sidaway (1994) worked on 'Locating critical geopolitics, Environment and Planning: Society and Space' and to explore how geographical thinking is used in statecraft and the study of geopolitics as a discourse and also deconstructs policy writings. The project is a part of critical geopolitics and connects to critical work in geopolitical studies of economics and development.

Malik (1994) argues that it is crucial to emphasise the strategic significance of Myanmar's coastline border with the Bay of Bengal. There are important Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) that can be useful for foreign powers strategically, and a lot of trade travels along the path that passes via the Malacca Strait south of the Bay of Bengal. When India learned about alleged military buildups in Myanmar in the 1990s, China's strategic objectives came to light. China was building information collecting facilities on the southwest coast of Myanmar, close to the Indian territory of Andaman and Nicobar.

Tuathail (1996) conducted a study and traces the introduction of critical thinking into geography. In particular, the politics and power dynamics that underpin the discursive practises of statecraft intellectuals are exposed through the research, which develops a unique technique for geopolitics that tries to disclose geographical presuppositions in geopolitical discourses. The research also combines the writings of Yves Lacoste, Michel Foucault, and to a lesser extent other French philosopher like Jacques Derrida and Jacques Baudrillard to bring geopolitics, political geography, and geography to the fore and politicise it. It delves further into the history of geopolitical thought while seeking to analyse issues like ecology, drug trafficking, and global terrorism.

According to Tuathail & Dalby (1998) the concept of geopolitics has shifted towards postmodernism after the end of the Cold War. In researching popular geopolitics at various research scales, a focus is placed on critical geopolitical approaches that take the impact of the media and the opinions of civil society into account.

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Dodds (2000) considers Huntington's technique "anti-geographical" and accuses him of attempting to reinvent geopolitics "as a political science." He also criticises Huntington's civilizational viewpoint, which downplays the location-based particularity and spatial uniqueness of conflicts. The book analyses how the international order is evolving from a geopolitical perspective and illustrates the intricate geographies of world politics.

Egreteau (2003) opines today's the British Empire in South and Southeast Asia included Myanmar. It has been governed as an autonomous entity since its formal independence from British India in April 1937, acting as a tactical buffer to protect the Indian heartland during World War II. Burma lost this position after the war. The independence of India and Pakistan in August 1947 further weakened its significance to the British empire. On January 4, 1948, Burma officially declared its independence, but unlike Pakistan and Ceylon, it chose not to join the Commonwealth. India and Burma have close bilateral ties immediately following independence. The authorities of both countries placed a strong emphasis on their shared cultural and religious history.

Bassin (2004), stated that while in foreign policy studies geopolitics often refers to a conservative, realist perspective of international relations, geopolitics in geography encompasses critical approaches to foreign policy practices and representations.

Agnew (2004) conducted a study on a research on the approach taken by geographers when using the term "geopolitics" and making it the major topic of their academic work. In addition, he offers his own geopolitical theory, which emphasizes the value of placing geopolitical acts within historical contexts and maintains that thinking and acting "geopolitically" is a fundamental component of modernity.

Tuathail et al (2006), highlighted the theory and practise of geopolitics as a contest for power and evaluate national power by highlighting the connections between geostrategic positioning, the relative economic and technological prowess of states, international public opinion, international law and morality, international government and diplomacy, and the regional and global balance of power.

Beck (2006) analyzed the many geographical conceptions of Basqueness in Basque nationalist rhetoric and political practice, creation and reproduction, and explored the Basque geopolitical discourse inside the imagined nation-state.

Colin (2006) establishes a framework for comprehending geopolitics based on a process-and-feedback model that explains how geopolitical tension may lead to conflict and whether or not such conflicts can be resolved in a fair and permanent manner. A consideration of the geography of terrorism is also included in the text.

Lall (2006) examined on 'Indo-Myanmar relations in the era of pipeline diplomacy' and suggested that India and Myanmar barely have any interactions over the years. This was largely brought on by India's antiquated conception of Nehruvian principles in the creation of its foreign policy. However, recent study suggests that Indo-Burmese ties are changing. It also examined the causes of the change, setting them in the broader context of how India's foreign policy goals were reframed during the BJP-led NDA government's tenure in the late 1990s. Since the 2004 elections, the government, which is dominated by the Congress, has maintained these new goals. According to the article, this shift's fundamental motivation was economic as India re-evaluated its regional and global standing, placing economic linkages at the core of its foreign policy formulation and giving rise to India's "pipeline diplomacy". It examines in depth the geopolitics of energy and how South Asian foreign relations are now significantly influenced by energy security. The subsequent part discusses India's energy requirements, with an emphasis on gas, which led to the development of pipeline diplomacy and its growing interest in ties with countries that are gas and oil-rich. It concludes by analysing the potential effects of India's pipeline diplomacy on the larger Southeast Asian area, with a focus on ASEAN.

Lall (2006) opines that many nations are interested in Myanmar's abundant oil and gas resources. Long ago, there was competition for exploration and exploitation rights. In reality, a new form of "pipeline diplomacy" that was implemented in the 1990s and early 2000s was largely dependent on Myanmar's capacity to serve as a natural gas supplier to an India that was becoming increasingly energy-hungry.

Singh (2007) conducted an analytical review on 'India's Myanmar Policy: A Dilemma between Realism and Idealism' and concluded that be it traditional, non- traditional, or even energy security, Myanmar is definitely an important component of India's security management system. Engagement with Myanmar is, therefore, logical for India. The problem before India is what should be the nature of engagement with one of the most brutal regimes in the world. India recently decided to supply arms to the junta in order to address its immediate security concerns but it seems unlikely that this would pay off for India in the long run as the junta has previously used the military hardware provided by India for suppressing pro-democracy activists and ethnic minorities. As a consequence, the perception of civil society in Myanmar has recently turned negative towards India. Consequently, India might face adverse conditions, if and when democracy makes a comeback in Myanmar. The country then would be open neither to China nor to India but to the US, because of the latter's support for a resolution against Myanmar's military junta in the UN Security Council. Myanmar could be the next country in Southeast Asia to come under the security umbrella of the US. This might be a cause for concern for both India and China. Therefore, in order to engage with a country like Myanmar which is very sensitive and strategically significant, India needs to reach a delicate balance between its immediate requirements and its long-term interests. India should engage Myanmar but in such a manner that the sentiments of the people of Myanmar are not compromised. India should increase cooperation with Myanmar in the area of the economy and trade, especially under the framework of BIMSTEC, MGC (Mekong-Ganga Cooperation), but military cooperation should be limited. BIMSTEC is definitely an opportunity for Myanmar to boost an economy that has been destroyed by western sanctions. Therefore, in order to court the junta, India should prefer economic engagement with Myanmar, instead of involving itself in the race with China for supplying arms to Myanmar. It is, in any

case, not possible for India to reduce Chinese influence with either the Myanmar military or the junta simply by supplying arms because China with its veto power in the UNSC is more important than India for Myanmar. India has been facing a dilemma between idealism and realism since the establishment of military rule in Myanmar in 1962. However, neither approach on its own can serve India's interests. India should adopt a realist policy but with a blend of idealism. This idealism is not against the national interest of India and would definitely pay off for India in the long run.

Anushree (2008) conducted a study on 'Linking Southeast Asia to India: More connectivity, Better Ties' and argues that India's 'connectivity diplomacy' represents an undeniable strategic shift in its interactions with Southeast Asia, and it is anticipated that this would enable India to capitalize on the enormous development potential of this vibrant economic area. Trade and investment activity are projected to grow significantly as Free Trade Agreement (FTA) discussions between India and ASEAN continue. The need for regional construction of border trading posts, international airports, weather-paved roads, and integrated railway networks will rise as a result. Roads and railroads will enable regional integration and increase the mobility of individuals who act as intermediaries for the interchange of products and ideas. There are two ways to understand India's desire to connect with Southeast Asia.

Wagner (2009) states that India's foreign policy has never placed a strong emphasis on advancing democracy overseas, and it still only has a little role to play now. Instead, since the 1950s, India's foreign policy discussions and decisions have been governed by the concept of non-interference. However, concrete efforts on the part of India to promote democratic reforms in Myanmar have remained limited, save from providing shelter and aiding exile radio broadcasts. India's appraisal of the situation shifted in the early 1990s. With Myanmar's military rulers firmly in place and pressing issues like energy security and the violent uprisings in India's northeast, India started its policy of "constructive engagement" and has largely refrained from calling explicitly for a transition to democracy since then.

Narayan (2009) states that the prospects for India have been harmed for years due to inefficient decision-making and inconsistent policy. Government-owned firms from India were not well-prepared to succeed in the challenging international bidding climate in Myanmar.

Islam (2009) mentioned that in 2005, a tripartite gas pipeline project from Myanmar to India via Bangladesh placed New Delhi in a precarious position. India lacked a plan for a different method of transit as Indo-Bangladesh ties deteriorated and the pipeline's chances dimmed.

Ganguly & Pardesi (2009) states that the fundamental upheaval that followed the CW prompted India to alter its foreign policy to one that was more aggressive and "self-help" focused. They concluded that in India's foreign policy, 'Nehruvian idealism' lost way to reality. The "Look East" policy (LEP) was put into place during the post-CW review in an effort to balance the region and thwart China's growing regional dominance (Batabyal, 2006). India strengthened its strengths by externally balancing China through the formation of strategic partnerships. In order to offset the threat that China posed to its national security, geostrategic position, and economic rivalry, India had to pursue Myanmar. According to neorealism, India and Myanmar's cordial relationship is a result of how the international system is set up in the area. It provides concise and illustrative justifications for some results. State choices need to be explained in greater detail, and constructivist theories may be appropriate for this.

Chenyang (2010) states that Myanmar acts as a barrier between China and India and as a key land bridge connecting South and Southeast Asia. Chenyang goes on to discuss Myanmar's strategic significance to India. Myanmar has a coastline extension into the Indian Ocean and access to the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh, China, and India's unrest-ridden Northeastern states are all connected by its western and northern boundaries. Additionally, the Nicobar Islands of India are not far from its southeast coast. Given its location, China and India are likely to compete with it for influence. India is concerned that a growing China would restrict it by fortifying regional ties.

China will be able to invade India's northeast and take control of the Bay of Bengal because to its influence in Myanmar, left India vulnerable to attack from the east.

Kanwal (2010) states that gaining significant economic sway in Myanmar would offer India latent power it might use to challenge China's modernization aspirations with military force. For this reason alone, Myanmar is essential because of its wealth in natural resources. India should support the infrastructure and technology needed for exploration and development of these nearby natural resources.

Bouquerat (2011) had stated that the end of its non-alignment approach was signaled by the strengthening military ties between China and Myanmar. As a result of Deng Xiaoping's "good neighbourliness policy," which replaced Mao's interventionist approach of aiding the local communist guerrillas, China was able to enter Burma first.

Routray (2011) conducted an analysis on 'India-Myanmar Relations: Triumph of Pragmatism' and opines that the international connections between India and Myanmar contain both paranoia and friendliness. Myanmar is important strategically for India, particularly in achieving the aim of its Look-East Policy. India must have friendly relations with Myanmar's non-democratic military rule in order to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia and due to internal security concerns of its north-eastern states, which are frequently attacked by many rebel groups. The key drivers of this article's assessment of the pragmatic shift in India's policy towards Myanmar are the growing Chinese influence in Myanmar and India's need for energy. India is worried about China's military links to Myanmar since China is a big economic investment in that country. The article also discusses concerns about India's relations with Myanmar.

Abraham (2014) states that the political uprisings have been common in India's northeast. It was stated that the Northeast is a sensitive zone with China and is home to "Mongoloid" people whose loyalty to India is ambiguous in order to interpret the tension in geopolitical terms. He made a connection between an internal security

conflict and a geopolitical dispute on the outside. Following the acquisition of Tibet, it was thought that India would be at risk from the east, and Chinese imperialism posed a threat due to India's tenuous control over the region's northeast, which appeared to lack a strong central government. In order to stop Chinese influences from spreading in the area, India had to fortify its northeastern border. When the Northeast is viewed as a geostrategic zone involved, relations with Myanmar are significant in this regard. Myanmar's contribution to the regional insurgency's suppression is essential to preserving India's territorial integrity. India has carried out cross-border surgical strikes in Myanmar since the policy change. India also aims to 'connect' the Northeast with its neighbours by land and water in order to boost the region's economy by fostering long-term peace and stability that would deter insurrections.

Yhome (2014) argues that India's strategic interests in the area are directly impacted by Myanmar's political stability and improved reform implementation. As Myanmar's reforms advance, they not only address the external role concern but also open up more domestic actors in a democratic setting, presenting multiple domestic actors that India can engage with and preventing the possibility of a single actor dominance whose domestic and foreign policy orientations could negatively affect India's interests there. A good example of this was the junta in the past.

Ryon (2014) states that it is significant to take into account that China has a long-standing claim to the Northeastern border-states of India, including Arunachal. The border areas of Myanmar are also abundant in natural resources like gas and oil. For instance, the borderland province of Rakhine has enormous reserves of natural gas and oil, amounting to 11 trillion and 23 cubic feet, respectively. Myanmar was referred to as a "Sleeping petroleum giant" by a North Petrochemical Corporation (Myanmar) Ltd. representative from China.

Haidar (2014) mentioned that bilateral ties between India and Myanmar appear to be at a crossroads. It's possible that India may have fresh possibilities to pursue its interests and steer clear of the dangers and traps that have dogged its policy towards Myanmar for many years as a result of the political changes in Myanmar and its



apparent willingness to diversify its foreign policy. The "enlightened national interest" underlies the pragmatic and non-dogmatic foreign policy stance of India's president, which is firmly focused on Myanmar and India's near vicinity.

Litner (2015) opines that China and Burma were able to legally start cross-border commerce when the communist conflict in 1989 came to an end. China understood that Myanmar's strategic location offered access to the Indian Ocean and trade routes to Yunnan's island regions. India changed its strategy to one of logical cost-benefit analyses for choices, building on a realism outlook to become more powerful than China. It turned away from its prior strategy of assisting democratic groups and began working with the military dictatorship. India continues to have relations with the current quasi-civilian administration despite its indifference to the Rohingya catastrophe and human rights abuses.

Yhome (2015) mentioned that Myanmar is of enormous importance to the health, stability, and security of India's eastern region as a direct neighbour. Myanmar is India's gateway to the East, sharing a long land border with it as well as a marine border with it in the Bay of Bengal. The political, economic, and cultural ties between India and Myanmar have long been shaped by this geographic fact. However, over the years, the bilateral relationship has fluctuated, going from "close friends" in the post-independence era to "estrangement" when the military came under the control of the military junta, and then entering a "pragmatic" relationship in the 1990s. However, this does not change the reality that India and Myanmar have no genuine differences. Since Myanmar started a democratic transition in 2011, the two countries have been in their present phase of cooperation, which includes cordiality' and 'mutual respect'. Geographically, India's northeast is landlocked. Surrounded by Bangladesh to the south, Bhutan to the north-west, China to the north and Myanmar to the east, it is linked to the rest of the country by a narrow stretch of land known as the Siliguri Corridor. Given its central location, the northeast region's internal stability and security are vulnerable to external links. Numerous ethnic minorities in the northeast have engaged in some of the longest-running insurgent movements in the world against the Indian State, with objectives ranging from outright independence to autonomy. India and China have an unresolved boundary issue in Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides of the

border are home to ethnic groups including the Mizo and the Chin. Rebels use the racial connections across the permeable border as a cover for their armed activity. The northeast area is still under development in terms of nation-building, which raises additional security issues.

Engh et al. (2016) states that China and India are competing with one another to become involved in Myanmar's economic and geopolitical landscapes. According to published literature, Myanmar is the scene of a competitive geopolitical game between the main world powers.

Leitner (2016) conducted a study on 'The Geopolitics of Change in Myanmar' and concluded that since a new administration came into office in March 2011, significant changes have been made to both Myanmar's internal and international policy. Myanmar has cut ties with China, which was once its key commercial partner, ally, and source of military hardware, while Western countries have degraded their relations with and put sanctions on Myanmar's military government due to its appalling record on human rights. The following context should be considered when discussing the release of political prisoners, increased press freedom, and the freedom of political organisations to operate: Myanmar's officials were concerned that their nation would lose its independence because China's influence had grown too strong. To enhance relations with the West, reforms were required. Expectedly, the West and India have reacted warmly to Myanmar's new democratic government, which they were worried about China's influence in.

Yiwei (2016) conducted a study on 'The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)' and opines that China's BRI initiative aims to foster connection in 5 important areas: policy coordination, infrastructural connectivity, trade facilitation, financial cooperation, and interpersonal relationships.

Bhaumik (2017) observes that an oil-gas pipeline and railway link to China's Yunnan state will begin at Kyaukphyu port. China, which has a competitive advantage over India, meets Myanmar's strong demand for manufactured products. India has been granted the right to construct, run, and utilise the offshore hub for Myanmar gas in the oil and gas sector. It had already lost out to China in the bid to acquire the offshore gas resources of Myanmar in the state of Rakhine. The Kaladan multi-modal project's Sittwe port, which is scheduled to open in 2020, will serve as a sea-river-land link to India's distant northeast. However, the project has had several delays, similar to many others, because of a lack of cooperation among various implementing agencies, insufficient monitoring, and other factors. Furthermore, protests and security risks also act as roadblocks to the projects' construction. India's bilateral trade with Myanmar has grown gradually but 'connectivity' lags behind China with its massive investments and first-mover advantage in the country. Domestic politics played a less influential role in relations with Myanmar as a prominent moral element to foreign policy was absent. Morality was side-lined in India's conduct with Myanmar.

Han (2017) conducted a study on 'Geopolitics, Ethnic Politics along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar' and argues that a great chance to evaluate the shifting dynamics in bilateral relations has been provided by the militarised ethnic conflicts in the Sino-Myanmar borderland area and the responses they prompted from the Chinese government towards the Myanmar government. As demonstrated by the comparative case studies in the paper, Beijing urgently needs to convey its determination to safeguard Chinese national interests in Myanmar and to show that it is capable of keeping an eye on Myanmar's internal ethnic politics along the border. This strategic uncertainty was brought about by abrupt changes in Myanmar's foreign relations with the United States. The study argues that how specific nationalist items, such as the issue of overseas Chinese, can be effectively mobilized by Beijing to signal its resolve with regard to its concern of border security between the two countries. By allowing domestic nationalist sentiment toward Myanmar to build, the Chinese government effectively bound itself to act tough toward its southern neighbour. Through such comparative analysis, the paper thus presented a consistent portrayal of the changes in China's diplomatic approach toward its southern neighbour. Having said that, one also needs to note the possibility that the leadership change in

China when Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 could have played a role in China's tougher positions toward Myanmar. Indeed, Xi's government has been credited with being more aggressive diplomatically in disputes with China's neighbours, especially regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In fact, Xi's increasingly aggressive approach in foreign relations are overlapped with a push for more strident nationalism domestically, for example in his government's promotion of the Chinese dream campaign. This is indeed consistent with the analysis presented in the paper that nationalism played a crucial role in Beijing's foreign policy signal toward Myanmar. The Kokang issue illustrated the special place the overseas Chinese issue can play in generating domestic nationalist pressure on the Chinese government, especially when it was publicized and politicized. Ever since the Kokang conflict in 2015, there has been high amount of awareness of the situation of overseas Chinese in Myanmar. This means future bilateral relations between the two countries could be further complicated by the rising public awareness and interests shown by domestic nationalist netizens toward Myanmar. Because Myanmar has now entered the radar of domestic nationalists, it means that future dealings between the two countries would be under closer scrutiny, and would introduce more complexities to how China and Myanmar figure out their bilateral relations in a fast-changing geopolitical context in Southeast Asia.

Macaes (2018) states that China's rise has significantly changed the global political and economic scene. China is keen to advance the objectives of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) both domestically and abroad. The BRI is viewed as a means of replacing the current system, which is headed by the United States, with a new Chinese global order.

Bhat (2019) opines that in recent years, China has intensified its information gathering in the Bay of Bengal and now often dispatches military ships there. It was seen as a significant breach of Indian sphere of influence given that China now poses a danger to India's north and east. Concerns over the "Tibetization of Myanmar," which would allow China a route for invasion, led to an increase in tensions between India and Myanmar after that.

Chakma (2019) conducted a study on ‘the BRI and India’s neighbourhood: strategic analysis’ and stated that through land networks and marine trade routes, the Chinese project seeks to link China with coastal regions in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe as well as with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and East Africa. Footnote<sup>3</sup> Beijing has created supporting international financial organisations, such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund (SRF), to finance the infrastructure and connectivity projects. Beijing has designated six key economic corridors to establish the BRI networks. Further, a project of this size will undoubtedly have a huge geo-economic and geo-political impact. The BRI still has the possibility of changing the current structural arrangements in Asia and beyond if Beijing is successful in putting its plan into action. As seen by their responses to the BRI, various regional and international countries are concerned about the likelihood of such an outcome. While several nations, most notably Russia, have supported the Chinese plan, a number of powerful nations, including the US, Japan, India, the European Union, Australia, etc., have opposed it. They all share the worry that China is vying for more power in world affairs and intends to change the current political, economic, and strategic frameworks to further its interests at their expense.

Balachander (2020) in a research titled ‘A Geostrategic Explanation of India-Myanmar Bilateral Relations since the 1990s contends that geostrategic interests—rather than identity, local politics, or ideas—dominate the relationship between India and Myanmar. India's interests in Myanmar are examined via realism and constructivism perspectives to establish this case. In doing so, a description of the framework for level of analysis and a discussion of the realism viewpoint in the geopolitical and economic landscape of Myanmar is made.

Doungel (2021) conducted a study on ‘The Role of Mizoram as a Significant Actor in India’s Act East Policy’ and concluded that the goal of India's Look East Policy, which was rebranded Act East Policy in 2014, is to improve diplomatic and business connections with Southeast Asian nations. However, because to their geographical proximity to Southeast Asian nations, the Northeastern states may be essential to the

achievement of the stated aim. The Kolodyne Multi Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) Road and the Kolodyne Hydro-Electric Project II (HEP II) are two Act East policy projects that have been started in the state of Mizoram. A Land Customs Station has furthermore built in Zokhawthar. This article examines Mizoram's relevance in the continuing Act East Policy and determines whether or not the switch from "look" to "act" actually activates the policy and the project at the ground level.

Shahriar (2022) conducted a study on 'India's Economic Relations with Myanmar: A Study of Border Trade' in which analysing was done about the nature of border trade between India and Myanmar. The study reveals that India is a growing nation with a rapidly expanding economy, vast territory, abundant natural resources, and a diverse people. It has shifted its foreign policy and economic priorities towards its neighbours in South East Asia, notably Myanmar. But in 2013, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative, a worldwide plan. The paper examines the geopolitics of the conflict between China and India in light of the world power structures and interstate economic interactions. Additionally, this research applies a case study for the Moreh-Tamu border commerce throughout the Indo-Myanmar cross-border region. The findings show that India and Myanmar's bilateral trade and economic involvement are growing. The major elements impacting border trade between India and Myanmar include, but are not limited to, India's North-Eastern border issues, ASEAN connectivity, the BCIM economic corridor of the BRI, India's neighbourhood policy, as well as the geopolitical dynamics. The main barriers preventing border trade along the Moreh- Tamu border region are the Sino-Indian rivalry, limited border infrastructure, and ethnic insurgencies. According to the study's findings, India and Myanmar are working more closely together economically and doing more cross-border commerce.

## **2.2 Socio, Economic & Political Relations**

According to Sukhwal (1971), the length of the border between India and Myanmar, which forms the triangular intersection of the borders of India, Myanmar, and China, is approximately 1,450 km. Deeply wooded hill area forms part of the boundary, with

the Chin Hills, Naga Hills, and Kachin State on the Myanmar side and the Mizo Hills, Manipur, and Nagaland on the India side.

According to Appadorai & Rajan (1985), Myanmar and India share a border that is around 900 miles long and flanks India's north-eastern region. Aside from the comparable ethnic strains that exist on both sides, this physical closeness has given rise to numerous deeply ingrained ties. Trade lines by land and water have long been established, and India has always had a profound effect on religion, culture, and the arts.

Chatterjee (1985) mention that when the Chin-Lushai expedition took place in 1889–1890, that the British Army took possession of the Chin Hills. But the Chin Hills district's precise location was unknown to the Myanmar government. A border commission was established in 1893–1894 by the Chief Commissioner of Myanmar to define the Manipur Chin hills boundary. Throughout the winter of that year, Carey and Porteous worked on the project, eventually demarcating the line that is today known as the international border between India and Myanmar.

Prasad (1987) states that prior to the British colonization of the region, Mizoram's history is unclear. Since the Chin Hills of Myanmar are the same location from which Mizos came to the current region, they had close ties to the tribes residing there. In addition, they shared linguistic, ethnographic, and cultural traits with the tribes residing in those regions.

Singh (1994) mention that the border line begins at the intersection of India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar at Keokradong. Following the Rengtlang, the border travels to the Varunglui's source before coming together with Kolachaung (Sakullui/Sekulhlui), which rises from the north on the side of Dumzotlang. The river Wabling flows eastward and meets the Kheimu stream before joining the Boinu (Kolodyne) river. From there, it flows along the middle of the Boinu (Kolodyne) river until it intersects with the Tiau.

Barua (1995) states that the population has racial and cultural affinities with those who reside across the border. Despite being separated by a boundary line, they were unable to completely break the previous connection. Many people have their own families. There are many married people. Economic transactions are also conducted.

Tirtha (1996) states that it is 960 kilometres long. The boundary between India and Myanmar, which essentially follows the watershed of the Brahmaputra and Irrawaddy river systems from where the Himalayan mountains finish southward, was very recently established. The boundary runs through a hilly region populated by a number of indigenous tribes, including the Nagas and Mizos. These tribesmen, who are distinct from the Brahmaputra Valley's plains people in terms of culture, language, and race, have demonstrated a high degree of independence from both Indian and Burmese authorities and occasionally used Burmese territory as a staging area for anti-Indian activities, which were frequently supported by communist guerrillas in Myanmar. As has been mentioned, the Indian government gave in to political pressure and established the state of Nagaland in 1963 as a cultural and political "homeland" for the border regions the Nagas, and the centrally administered territory of Mizoram in 1972.

Sakhong (2003) observes that the groups referred to as Lai, Zomi, Lushai/Mizo, and Lakher/Mara are among the overlapping memberships and shared traits between the separate identity categories of "Mizo" and "Chin." The full examination of how Chin and Mizo identities are constructed is outside the purview of this page, but it has been researched by other academics. Both identities are unique from the countries in which they were born, namely India and Myanmar. Both are composite identities that attempt to unite several constituent groups in cultures that value extreme pluralism. 'Mizo' and 'Chin' are other disputed nomenclatures. The Mizo identity is comparatively more unified, and both the identity and the Mizo language are understood across the state.. Three districts of Mizoram, the Lai, Mara and Chakma Autonomous District, are governed on the basis of an alternative ethnic identity. Here, and among some communities elsewhere in Mizoram, there are efforts to encourage ethnic languages, though Mizo remains the lingua franca. Due to the lack of a shared language and widely agreed common terminology, Chin identity is much more contentious. People from Chin State and individuals who identify as Chin in other parts of Myanmar,



notably Sagaing Division, are both referred to as "Chin." This is consistent with how the UNHCR handles claims for refugees from this area. Many individuals who identify as Chin, however, define themselves in other ways, whether as a more local identity, an alternate umbrella identity, or both.

Khilnani (2004) drew the Chin Hills into Burma and Mizoram into India. Nevertheless, despite differences in physical characteristics, languages, and cultural practises, both groups acknowledge a shared ancestry. Many Mizo and Chin groups have an origin myth about rising from a cave in Sinlung or Chhinglung. Mizo history mentions migration from the Chin Hills.

Son & Singh (2016) mentioned that Mizoram and Chin State's recent political histories both share experiences with colonization, missionization, strife, and insurgency. For commerce and immigration, this boundary has proven permeable. Mizoram was engulfed in a violent conflict from 1966 to 1985, and many people fled to safety in Myanmar across the border. The flow of people was mainly in the other direction once the Mizo Peace Accord was negotiated. At the beginning of the 2000s, Mizoram was home to an estimated 100,000 Chin - 10% or more of the State's total population.

Chakraborty (2019) conducted a research on 'The socio economic status of Indians migrants' in Myanmar in the colonial years (1824-1948): An overview' and suggested that the migration of Indians to Myanmar had been taken place since the ancient era due to Myanmar's proximity to India, but had gained prominence during the colonial era. The British governments' policy had resulted in the large scale migration of Indians to Myanmar. The huge influx of Indians had overtaken the original Burmese population in few pockets of the country and also had slowly occupied the economic activities, administrative position as well as petty workers under British government. Although the Indian population had enjoyed a better livelihood and social status, there also had several problems during those times due to the rise of anti-Indian resentment and xenophobic for foreign migrants of Chinese and Indians. They had also faced severe repatriation in the post-colonial years, as well as later period of colonial rule.

### **2.3 Trans-border Trade and Development**

A border trade agreement between India and Myanmar was formed in 1994, and the 1,643-kilometer frontier now has two functioning border trade points (Moreh-Tamu and Zokhawthar-Rhi). The opening of a third border trade point at Avakhung-Pansat/Somrai is suggested. Cotton yarn, auto parts, soy bean meal, medicines, sugar confectionery, chemicals, and associated products are the main goods Myanmar traders purchase from the Indian side. Various products, including fertilisers, two-wheelers, and other items, have reportedly been smuggled. Betel nuts, dried ginger, green moong beans, turmeric roots, resin, and medicinal plants are the main exports from Myanmar to India. It was decided to upgrade Border commerce at the existing sites to Normal Trade during the third India-Myanmar Joint Trade Committee meeting in October 2008 in order to enhance bilateral commerce between the two nations. Both parties have sent out notifications to this effect.

India's Northeastern region forms the gateway to Myanmar. Any trouble at the gate will adversely affect the bilateral relations. A stable and cooperative Northeast region is necessary if New Delhi and Naypyidaw want to expand their relations. There are high stakes involved in the plans to expand trade and to construct a pipeline from Myanmar through the region. All these prospects would be jeopardized if the region remains unstable. Hence, it is imperative that the local people are involved in the process and share the benefits of the improving relationship. The region should not be seen only as a conduit for transit of goods but also as a stakeholder in the efforts to improve ties with Myanmar.

Border Trade Agreement between the governments of India and Myanmar was signed in January 1994 with the goal of formalization of border trade practices and setting up such activities in a congenial model. The agreement specified that trade should be conducted through the designated customs posts i.e. (1) Moreh (Manipur state in India) and Tamu (Sagaing region in Myanmar), (2) Champhai (Mizoram state in India) and Rih (Chin state in Myanmar), (3) Other places that may be notified by mutual agreement between the two countries (MOC 2010). The cross-border point between

Moreh and Tamu was opened, paving way for the opening of four check posts including Pangsau Pass, Paletwa, Lungwa- Yanyong, and Pangnyo between the two countries in 1995. In 2004, with the construction/upgrading of Rih-Tiddim and Rih-Falam road sections in Myanmar, Zokhawthar-Rih border points has been operationalized (Anushree 2008). Agreement has also been reached on setting up a third border trade point at Avakhung-Pansat/Somra.

Das et al (2005) deal mainly with the status, problems, and potentials of Indo-Myanmar Border Trade. Various authors contributed chapters to the edited volume, among which Das and Thomas analyzed the economy of Myanmar and its implications for border trade with India's northeast. Border trade was left out of the policy radar initially and geo economic potentials of the border region were overlooked for geo political considerations. Though the northeast region enjoys favourable trade across its cross border, Myanmar's economy is more integrated with the economies of Southeast Asia. As such, India suffers from a negative balance of trade with Myanmar. In another chapter, Khajing narrated the historical components of Indo-Myanmar border trade and terms of agreement under it, and held out towards facilitating better infrastructure and trade routes. Linking border trade with India's Look East Policy, authors like Mero, De and Kumar hold that the geographical handicap of the northeast could be further affected by trade across its border as it share most of its border with international borders. The policy has opened up a corridor linking with the economies of the third world thereby generating growth impulse through exploring its rich resources for export in the line of horticulture base products, tourism, mineral based industries and agro-based products. Singh argued that though border trade could be the lifeline of both the regions across the borders, yet the proliferation of informal trade and other no security threats minimize the economic imperatives created by such opening of borders. In another chapter, it discussed the linkage between trade and development, political economy of trade, mechanism of trade and the routes of trades.

Newman (2003) uses the concept of 'power' to build a theoretical frame work around borders and argues that power relations are of great importance to understand the dynamics of borders and bordering. Further, the study also attempted to set an agenda for border research by expanding the notion of border beyond its traditional territorial

sense to include the many other notions of border which enclose groups and identities.

We live within a world of hierarchical borders, each of which defines the diverse set of affiliations and identities to which we belong. Our ability to cross these borders is fraught with difficulty, although globalization provides us with some of the mechanisms which make that crossing process easier to negotiate. The perceptions, the management mechanisms and the semantics which we use should constitute a focus for a new generation of border studies which will take us well beyond the traditional description of territorial boundary delimitation and demarcation. Perhaps the most important question concerning borders is the extent to which they function as barriers to movement and interaction, or as an interface where meeting places and points of contact are created.

Jailly (2005) suggest that the agency and form of borders and borderlands are influenced by local cross-border culture, political sway, market pressures, commercial flows, as well as a plethora of government initiatives. Originally, borders were used to delimit the territorial possessions of sovereign states, and the work of social scientists served the purpose of rulers who were eager to picture the boundary line demarcating their possessions. In short, borders became central to the nationalist agenda and the development of nation states. At the core of such constructs is the fact that boundaries result from international agreements that are established by mutual understandings between states. These create complex, intermeshed networks of government policies and functions that interact to form international boundaries delineating sovereign spaces.

Herzfeld (2005) notes that “nationalism is directly predicated on resemblance, the pivotal idea is that all citizens are, in some unarguable sense, alike”. A corollary to this can be that when designated ‘outsiders’ closely resemble the insider community, great efforts are made to minimize that resemblance and avoid a claim to belonging, typically by identifying and emphasizing markers of difference. These are Migdal’s ‘virtual checkpoints’, and the comment above – from a Mizo woman – indicates some of the most common checkpoints used to distinguish Chin from Mizo, including

Nationality, appearance and perceived criminality. The most common Mizo term used to describe Chin is “Burma-mi”. The literal meaning is “from Burma” or “Burma people” but the phrase is laden with other assumptions (of inferiority, poverty, stupidity) and is perceived and often intended as an insult. The label of Burma-mi is ironic for the Chin, the vast majority of whom reject an identity as “Burmese”. Its prevalence in Mizoram underscores the continued importance of the border and the boundary between citizen and foreigner in asserting a sense of difference between the two communities.

Newman (2006) mention that one of the most vital mechanisms for identifying nations and structuring international politics are boundaries. Interstate relations, geopolitics, and security have typically centred around them. Over the past several decades, the study of border concerns has evolved into an interdisciplinary field, and border studies have expanded to a more global scale.

Delanty (2006) observes that borders have diverse implications and consequently there is an absence of a single explanatory model or theoretical framework to study the cutting-edge issues of their borderlands. Different kinds of societies have different conceptions of their borders, some viewing it has open and expanding, and others as historically determined by geography.

Kabra & Singha (2006) discussed the border commerce in Mizoram: current developments and outlook. The benefit of having a border with Bangladesh and Myanmar gave the landlocked area a competitive edge. Although the opening of borders to commerce has only marginally improved official trade, it has not been able to stop the influx of illegal trade. With a few notable exceptions, the lack of large-scale enterprises acts as a barrier to exporting goods that are required on the other side of the border. Since most imported goods come from the third world, development does not percolate as expected and planned. As a result, only a small number of local merchants benefitted from such commerce. However, in light of the flow of products and services, locals in particular are given the opportunity to engage in trade-related activities, which account for a significant portion of their means of subsistence. Border

commerce provides potential to develop border areas, which are often positioned distant from the mainland, highlighting the strategic geolocation. To help a small state like Mizoram's economy grow, important factors that must be considered include the export and import of locally available goods across the border, market renovation to make it more customer-friendly, infrastructure development, easier access to credit, and monitoring the effects of illegal trade.

Dauvergne et al. (2008) virtual checkpoints are also found in names, language, accent and pronunciation, dress, hair and physical appearance, i.e. the 'tells' used to distinguish a genuine insider from a similar outsider. The most significant virtual checkpoints recognized as such by both Mizos and Chins center's on laws and norms. This is a familiar story, established in a large literature on scapegoating and the production of migrant illegality. Rumours and labelling are central processes in defining the 'other', and frequently centre on alleged deviance and criminality to establish an essential incompatibility with the host community.

The world is recognizing the benefits of linking India's Northeast to ASEAN. The governments of India and Myanmar as also international organizations and academic institutions have recently stepped up the pace of chalking out plans for greater connectivity and increased cross-border trade between India's Northeast and Southeast Asia. While it will be a boon for the region, there is this to consider: that the consequences of increased trade will differ in the different states of the Northeast, depending on the local political and economic situation and inter-ethnic relations. A case in point is the recent interaction between Mizoram in India and the Chin state in Myanmar contiguous territories that reveal the complexity of interactions between communities and nation-states.

Jailly (2022) conducted a study on 'Cross-border cooperation: a global overview and argues that global coordination and collaboration across regional borders. Two queries are posed: Does cross-border connectivity originate from economic or functional interdependency when commerce predominates? Second, do economic ties between countries get stronger when institutions and politics moderate cross-border interactions? Do local-central networks of government institutions and people manage these processes when they occur, specifically? This work focuses on cross-border

interactions in different regions of the world with a primary focus on the function that trading relations or local-central ties would play in building cross-border networks bridging an international boundary in order to answer those two concerns. In an era of globalisation, increased commerce between nations and areas of the world appears to have specifically strengthened cross-border cooperation, albeit it has taken several forms, ranging from close business ties to the subsequent institutionalisation of cross-border cooperation. However, the causes of such types of cross-border collaboration in different parts of the world are not the same: The point made here is that regional drivers dictate types of interactions, from no ties to heavy commerce and government-like forms of collaboration. This is for the purpose of a comparative examination of cross-border relations. The main force behind cross-border connections, trade, does not always equate to increasing border-spanning government involvement, and government cross-border institutionalisation does not always equate to increased economic integration, as stated below.

Pulipaka (2022) state that, the people of Myanmar's Chin Hills are often referred to as 'Chins' and people of Mizoram's Lushai Hills are referred to as 'Mizos.' Many in Mizoram believe that Chins and Mizos belong to same ethnic group, and that the Chin-Mizo distinction is essentially a colonial construct that was used for administrative purposes. According to them, then, the present international border between India and Myanmar is also a recent construct, which has divided members of same ethnic community. Based on the ethnic similarity, there have been demands for the unification of territories populated by the Mizos and Chins in India and Myanmar respectively.

Given the geographic contiguity and shared ethnic identities, there have been multiple migrations across the India-Myanmar border along the states of Mizoram and Chin. During the 1950s and the 1960s, people moved from Mizoram to Chin state. For the Mizos, at the time Myanmar was a land of opportunity that was more easily accessed than the rest of India. The migration patterns altered in the 1990s as the political crisis in Myanmar deepened and the economic situation in Mizoram improved due to massive financial assistance from the Indian government. It is estimated that, 10% of Mizoram's population today comprises of Chin people. The presence of cross-border ethnic kin and lax procedures make it easy to acquire residence and identity papers, thus making it difficult to differentiate the recent migrants from the locals.

The attitude of the state government with regard to informal border trade and the Burmese living in Mizoram also needs to be examined. Our experience led us to conclude that the authorities generally adopt a passive stance towards informal border trade instead of actively trying to tackle the issue. Therefore, it appears that the fight against informal border trade by the state government is not fully earnest, and one can sense a conspiracy of silence in addressing certain issues relating to the influx and presence of Burmese migrants and the overall informal nature of the border trade. What could be the reasons for such passivity? The state government provides no official assessment of the overall presence of Burmese migrants in the state and tends to underassess their total strength in Mizoram. When asked, officials maintain that given the difficult terrain and the physical and linguistic resemblance, it is practically impossible to monitor the flow of Burmese migrants at the border.

Newman (2003) conducted a study on 'Borders and power: A theoretical framework' and raises a question of whether it is feasible to build a bordering theory that would incorporate the many sorts of border and boundary experiences is raised. I have previously argued that developing a common set of theoretical constructs and frameworks that can be used as a generalised explanatory model for understanding changing border/boundary phenomena is the only way to create a common language between the various disciplinary languages (including geographers, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and others) (Newman 2003). This essay essentially restates the topic of how borders (boundaries) should be redefined in the context of modern times, which was originally posed in one of the classic studies of international boundaries.

Newman (2004) conducted a study on 'Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue' and the study reveals that the renaissance of border studies during the past decade has been characterized by a crossing of disciplinary borders, bringing together geographers, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, literary scholars, legal experts, along with border practitioners engaged in the practical aspects of boundary demarcation, delimitation and management. This



growth in border studies runs contrary to much of the globalization discourse which was prevalent during the late 1980s and early 1990s, positing a new 'borderless' world, in which the barrier impact of borders became insignificant. The article points to the common use of terminology which can create a shared border discourse among a diverse group of scholars, such as boundary demarcation, the nature of frontiers, borderlands and transition zones, and the ways in which borders are crossed. The article also discusses the reclosing of borders which is taking place as a result of 9/11 as part of the stated war against global terror.

Bhagowati & Das (2010) conducted a study on 'opportunities of border trade in north-east India with special reference to Indo-Myanmar border trade' and concluded that Despite having enormous resource potential, India's North East Region (NER) is regarded as one of the nation's economically underdeveloped regions. Many of the region's growth opportunities have been physically hampered by poor accessibility, a lack of infrastructural development, and poor connection. Along with its abundant natural resources, the NER's geographical location makes it potentially the centre of commerce and investment in India and a significant entryway to the nation's vigorous relations with its neighbours. To benefit from the strategic location of the NER, the commerce at the Indian border has to be improved. Beyond international borders, the NER border is essential for trade and business between North East India and its neighbours or in its vicinity by the people inhabiting the area. The importance of border profound for the North-eastern region as it yields tangible benefits to the region thereby facilitating sustainable economic development.

Das (2010) conducted a study on 'Border Trade through connectivity corridors: India and Myanmar and opines that several hurdles need to be overcome of which the region is embroiled for the past several decades before any meaningful activity can take place. Starting from various forms of insurgent activities to the problem of illegal migration and drug trafficking, which are all transnational in character, the Government of India need to forge cooperation from the neighbouring countries. Such cooperation with the neighbouring countries should not antagonize the people of this region. The trans-border communities can be restored through border trade and inter-country trade which the border region should not act merely as a transit corridor but as a source of

local manufacture and enhancing people-to-people contact. The emphasis should be on industrialization and growth. The Indian government and the north-eastern states must adopt proactive role and provide not only infrastructures but also political stability and good governance. Greater participation of the local people in production and distribution activities and raising agricultural productivity should be given prime importance. Trade alone will not be sufficient to transform the region into a sustained development path. In addition, growth in trading activities will only benefit those people who possibly are from outside the region and who are economically more powerful to exploit the resources of the region.

#### **2.4 Act East Policy/Look East Policy**

Naidu (2004) conducted a study on 'Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia' and assessed that India's policy towards Southeast Asia, known as the Look East policy from the early 1990s, has been a multifaceted strategy covering political, strategic, and economic dimensions. India has been an ardent participant and promoter of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, in addition to developing institutional ties with ASEAN and bolstering bilateral ties with its member nations, particularly in the area of defence. While the ASEAN plus one summit meetings highlighted the growing significance of India to Southeast Asia and vice versa, a new phase of this policy has begun despite the fact that it has so far been somewhat effective. The inclusion of India as a key player in the wider Asia-Pacific geopolitical context is one of the other key characteristics.

Mero (2005) conducted a report survey entitled 'Indo-Myanmar border trade in the light of Look East Policy' and opines that an endeavour to connect South East Asia with the North Eastern States exists. India intends to connect its roads and trains to Myanmar under the "look east" strategy. In order to connect Singapore with Istanbul and Europe via both India and China, there is a plan to build Eurasian land and rail lines. One of the keys focuses of India's Look East Policy is this. By utilizing Myanmar as a bridge to connect the rest of Asia, India hopes to develop the North Eastern states.

India aspires to transform the warring northeastern states into a prosperous nation by using Myanmar's connections to other ASEAN nations. It appears that the decision to reopen Stillwell Road also took objectives into consideration.

Sikri (2009) narrated the emphasis on the Look-East strategy, which underwent modifications as a result. Prior directives on economic integration were followed by a phase of strategic partnership, which aims to expand beyond economic ties by positioning itself on a radar to maintain security, improve greater standing among its regional partners, and pursue development on the domestic front of the Northeastern region. It examined the strategy at the heart of India's alliance with other regional organizations. There is a need for Asian players to fend off internal rivals and develop stronger cooperatives, to which India can play a leading global role, since globalisation has the ability to draw up an Asian face.

Pandya & Malone (2010) elucidated the Look East Policy describes India's historical ties to Asia and the role that continent plays in India's foreign policy. It provides a narrative description of India's policy phase of interaction with ASEAN nations, including economic and trade before moving on to politics, geostrategic engagement, and soft power involvement. However, it contends that India has yet to fully use its cultural advantages in Asia. It was argued that by encouraging religious travel and relying on the benefits of having strong socioeconomic ties, India can boost its soft power. Some of the ramifications of the strategy were noted in the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (MoDONER) study (2011) on Look East strategy and the North Eastern States. Different characteristics of the policy that are unique to the northeast area have evolved during the years of its implementation. Focus should be placed mostly on possible areas of potential such as connectivity, trade and investment protocols, gaps in operationalizing existing assets, and soft power. It evaluated trade policies for the Northeast with nations including Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, and Thailand in order to increase trade and investment. Additionally, it emphasised the necessity of empowering regional business owners. India's perspective on the Act East Policy is described.

Haokip (2011) conducted a study on 'India's Look East Policy' and concludes that in the years following the Cold War, India's "Look East" strategy has become a significant foreign policy endeavour. The core tenet of the Look East strategy is that India must discover its destiny by tying itself more closely to its Asian allies and the rest of the world, and that closer ties with East and Southeast Asia are better for India's future and economic interests. As a result, India's Look East policy is an effort to forge deeper economic integration with its eastern neighbours as part of the new realpolitik evident in that country's foreign policy, and India's elite's engagement with ASEAN is a recognition of the strategic and economic importance of the region to India's national interests. The Look East strategy, according to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, "is not just an external economic policy; it is also a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and India's place in the evolving global economy."

Muni (2011) conducted a study on 'Look East policy: The strategic dimensions' and concluded that India's Look East Policy (LEP) did not begin in the 1990s. It has evolved in four different waves over centuries. The first wave of cultural and commercial engagement between India and its extended eastern neighbours lasted until the 12th /13th century. To this was added a strong strategic dimension by the British Empire in India during the second wave. The leaders of independent India, particularly Nehru, took the lead in launching the third wave by focussing on East Asia as an important part of India's policy of Asian resurgence. However, the imperatives of the Cold War, intra-Asian conflict and rivalries, and India's weaknesses on economic and military fronts did not let its Asia policy blossom. The fourth wave of India's eastward (re)engagement is what has been referred to as its LEP from the early 1990s. In line with the strategic goals of this policy, India has not only strengthened its ties with ASEAN and East Asian nations on the economic and cultural fronts, but has also solidified its strategic ties with them through extensive discussions of regional and international security issues and ongoing collaboration in the military and naval sectors. India has demonstrated both its willingness and its capacity to play a crucial part in the developing strategic dynamics and architecture for this area, therefore its strategic vision for the East encompasses the whole Asia-Pacific region.

Basu (2012) conducted a study on 'connectivity, development and regional integration: The case of Indo-Myanmar Kaladana Project' and concluded that recognising the links between environmental sustainability and justice is one of the fundamental components in increasing human freedoms for both the present and future generations, according to the 2011 UN Human Development Report. One of the most important elements in this equation is connectivity. The Report further claims that the observed and verified increase in global human development cannot continue without robust international action to reduce environmental risks and disparities. In order to highlight regional connectivity as a crucial technology for the coming generation of people, a focus will also be made on developing plans for how people, local communities, countries, and the international community can advance environmental sustainability and equity in ways that reinforce one another in the future years.

Mehrotra (2012) conducted a study on 'India's look East policy: Its origin and development' and concluded that policy means creating bridges and stronger connections between India and South East Asia, East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region, particularly through India's eastern states, both in the north and south. These governments had historically fulfilled precisely such role, although it waned throughout the colonial era and later due to the severity of the cold war. On the eve of India's independence, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke of the comeback of Asia and of its emerging nations like India, China, and Japan at the inaugural Asian Relations Conference, which he organised in New Delhi. In doing so, he underscored his desire to revive that role for India.

Jyoti (2013) conducted a study on 'India's Look east policy: In its second phase' and concluded that the qualitative and structural changes brought about by the conclusion of the cold war prompted India and Southeast Asian nations to adopt new foreign policy philosophies. To establish solid economic, strategic, and political relations with these nations, India began to move towards Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Southeast Asian nations moved closer to India to establish cordial ties with it by letting go of any historical inhibitions. This area has gained significant prominence in India's

foreign policy as a result of the adoption of the Look East Policy by P.V. Narasimha

Rao in 1991. India's viewpoint has changed strategically as a result of the Look East Policy. It began with the goal of strengthening economic ties with ASEAN nations and has progressed towards the strategic, political and institutional linkage. Today, India's Look East Policy has become more comprehensive because of the adoption of "extended neighbourhood" theory, according to this India's Look East Policy includes not only ASEAN but also Northeast Asia, apart from Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan and South Korea.

Naidu (2013) conducted a study on 'India and East Asia: The Look East Policy' and found that India remained off East Asia's radar until the late 1990s, but it is now a crucial component of it. Additionally, it is becoming more widely recognised as a crucial component of the developing regional security architecture. Three regional powers—China, Japan, and India—are rising as key players almost concurrently for the first time in history. The United States is without a doubt the most powerful and important nation, yet there are questions about its position and its capacity to significantly affect developments. The recent "pivot to Asia" and reorganisation of its foreign military deployments represent its crucial interests, but it will also need to consider China's ascent and the expanding ambitions of other important nations. India and China are starting to use their rapidly rising interests and stakes, the contest will intensify in the maritime sphere. Russia is the other major power, despite its drastically diminished role, that is striving to carve a niche role through increased defence and energy links. Hence, the relations that govern them will be a principal determinant of regional economic and security order.

Bhaumik (2014) ascribed the importance of location in the northeast should encourage India's domestic and international policy to focus more on building strong economic, cultural, and strategic relations with Asian Tigers rather than the unstable west. The Northeast region suffers from weak connection, underdeveloped areas combined with diverse physical topography, and socio-political instability, which makes it difficult to carry out the Look East Policy. India should work to make the Northeast a

manufacturing powerhouse that will promote commerce and regional growth, following China's lead in creating the Yunnan Province a hub for trade with the SEA.

Hackmann (2014) states that another ambitious infrastructural project in Myanmar combines economic aspects with security politics for India. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project aims to provide a direct commercial route between Kolkata and Mizoram via the ports of Sittwe and Rakhine in Myanmar, across the Bay of Bengal. In this area, the Kaladan River's water transportation channels will be improved, and several roads will be updated or built from scratch. A much better connection between New Delhi's North-eastern region and the Indian heartland is the city's long-term objective. India has contributed 50 million USD to this initiative since 2007. In addition to giving the economy a boost, increased commerce might significantly improve living conditions in Mizoram and other North-eastern regions that have long been plagued by violence. It is envisaged that the planned socio-economic growth will lessen guerrilla group activity and diminish separatist movements, relieving the security issues. Additionally, the creation of a different link between the Indian centre and the northeast would at least partially make up for the Siliguri corridor's strategic drawback of being too small (Mullen et al. 2014). Long-term strengthening of ties between Myanmar and India's North-East might be advantageous to both, mutually reinforcing socioeconomic growth.

Kshetrimayum (2014) conducted a study on 'Look East policy: India's motive and Opportunities & Threats ahead' and concluded that since 1992, India started giving importance to South and South East Asian Countries in order to expand its trading activities. These countries have been considered as important trading destinations besides U.K. and other European countries. Government of India has started taking serious steps towards promoting Look East Policy. India has developed various bilateral and multilateral trade relations with these countries. Of the bilateral trade relations Indo-China, Indo-Myanmar and Indo-Sri Lanka and multilateral trade relations with India and South East Asian countries through BCIM, BIMSTEC, SAFTA, ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum are significant.

Pandit & Basu (2014) conducted a study on ‘connectivity, development and regional integration: The case of Kaladan Project between India and Myanmar’ and argues that according to the 2011 UN Human Development Report, one of the key factors in extending human freedoms for both the present and future generations is recognising the connections between environmental sustainability and fairness. Connectivity is one of the key factors in this equation. The Report also asserts that without aggressive international action to lower environmental hazards and inequalities, global human development growth cannot continue as it has been seen and documented. Therefore, we must emphasise how important it is for future generations to be globally connected through regional connections. In addition, over the upcoming years, emphasis will be placed on the creation of paths for individuals, local communities, nations, and the global community to promote environmental sustainability and fairness in mutually reinforcing ways. India is striving to pragmatically implement this theoretical paradigm at the fragmented regional level, with a focus on South East Asia, through a number of connecting projects with South East Asian states. India, one of the most potent civilizational nations with more capabilities and more ambitious goals, is expected to make significant advancements in reaching this goal. As a land bridge to South East Asia, India created connections with Myanmar through a variety of connectivity initiatives, including the Asian Highway Project, Kaladan Project, Moreh-Tamu link road, establishment of "Border Haats," etc. The Kaladan Project, also known as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit-Transport Facility, will be constructed specifically along the Kaladan River in the Arakan (Rakhine) State in Western Myanmar and across the Indian state of Mizoram.

Haokip (2015) examined the the Look East Policy and how it may be used to address the issues in Northeast India, as well as the relationship between India's Look East Policy and the Northeast, examines the policy's beginnings and the advancements it has achieved thus far in the areas of commerce, investment, and tourism. LEP was established as a result of changes at the organizational and domestic levels. India began developing its own policy to address these issues on the domestic front as a result of the political upheaval, insurgency, lack of economic growth, systematic decline of the Soviet Union, growing influence of China, and emergence of regional cooperation. Despite the fact that development has evolved since the LEP's debut, the majority of it



hasn't been able to reach the northeast. The existence of a colony inside the country where most of the people paying wealth tax and royalties were from outside the northeast. In spite of incentives and specific measures introduced into the area, the lack of cultural integration, migration, widespread drug trafficking, and insurgency issues that serve as a cover for poor performance stifle the development process. Since the majority of the difficulties in the northeast are transboundary in nature, he recognized regional integration with Southeast Asian and East Asian countries as the key to fixing a number of concerns. It calls for the rekindling of long-established ties with northeast border communities to address the root causes of those problems, legalizing informal trade to tap into complementary resources across borders, and utilizing existing soft power resources to advance the tourism industry.

Yhome (2015) stated that in order to expand its economic footprint and seek stronger connection with and via Myanmar, India has business interests in Myanmar that are motivated by its rising energy consumption. Both economic and strategic objectives are pursued. Economically, India wishes to assist Myanmar in using its vast, untapped natural resources so that Myanmar may invest the proceeds in its urgently needed socioeconomic development. In terms of strategy, India would want to see a more evenly distributed economic presence by outside parties. India's economic connections are focused on giving Myanmar alternatives to achieve this goal.

Srikanth (2016) examined the Look East Policy in the light of whether it fosters development along the landlocked northeastern region of India. It was assumed that once physical connectivity is in place, the northeast would be able to break the shackles of its landlocked status, and overcome its problems of underdevelopment and poverty. In light of various economic corridors being pursued and injecting physical connectivity projects, development is limited, as Srikanth observed. The policy's orientation, which is more national in scope and focuses on global goals rather than domestic concerns, is the cause of this. The misunderstanding that Look East Policy and India's northeastern area are comparable is true only in the context of being a neighbour that may act as a bridge to other adjacent countries. To create trade routes linking important parties, notably to boost trade and commerce, a number of projects were planned, envisioned, and implemented. Physical connection was given the

attention it deserved, but Srikant noted that improved trade routes may not always enhance trade unless they are supported by demand and that connecting roads between villages and cities and marketplaces should also be created. He proposed that in addition to physical connectivity, people-to-people connectedness supported by equality and mutual trust should also be developed in order for the Look (Act) East Policy to be successful.

Patgiri & Hazarika (2016) narration of the relationship between India and its neighbours has gone through several stages of growth. India's involvement with its neighbours is driven by security concerns and devoid of developmental components for the northeast area, in contrast to the beginning of the Look East strategy rephrased as Act East strategy. It contends that with the implementation of the strategy, development worries for the northeast, a landlocked region, with the beginning of border commerce, materialized. To get the maximum benefits of trade and regional integration strategy, local circumstances and broad national interests operate as hurdles. It suggests that because development is intended for the community and the area as a whole, it must be left in their hands. It welcomes the constitution of Towns of Export Excellence, by identifying towns having potential export capacity, with the support of state machinery.

Dahiya & Kumar (2016) on India's look east to act east policy focused on the extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region. The policy which was originally conceived as an economic initiative, has gained political, strategic and cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation. India has upgraded its relations to strategic partnership with Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Singapore and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and forged close ties with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, apart from ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS); India has also been actively engaged in regional fora such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Act East Policy has placed emphasis on India-ASEAN cooperation in our domestic agenda on infrastructure, manufacturing,

trade, skills, urban renewal, smart cities, Make in India and other initiatives. Connectivity projects, cooperation in space, Science & Technology and people-to-people exchanges could become a Springboard for regional integration and prosperity.

Panda (2017) conducted a survey report on ‘Act East Policy, transactions costs and development of the North East’ and reports that the Act East Policy's applicability, expansion, continuity, durability, and alignment with the development needs of NER depend on how fast and effectively we lower the prevalent high transaction costs. This necessitates, among other things, (i) a boost for social enterprise. Social innovations can make the property right regime, as well as the negotiation and enforcement of contracts arrangements, certain. Social entrepreneurship as a practise can be used to reduce these high transaction costs. (ii) A critical calibrated convergence in the establishment space in development, and more specifically, across the four important components therein, i.e. the government, the market, the community, and the civil society.

Ollapally (2018) gave a report on ‘How Does India’s Look East Policy Look after 25 Years?’ and opines that The Look East Policy's continued use by the Congress Party and Bharatiya Janata Party is evidence of its value to Indian policymakers. One may argue that Look East is a particularly effective rhetorical weapon for foreign policy—a contention that does not appear frequently in Grare's study. Grare contends that India's ability to implement institutional and economic reforms quickly enough to increase its attractiveness as a partner to the United States will ultimately determine how effective the policy will be as a complement to American strategic interests.

Ziipao (2018) conducted a study on ‘Look/Act East Policy, roads and market infrastructure in North-East India’ and concluded that certain facets of the nation's internal and foreign policies have been influenced by the socio political-economic environment in India's north-eastern region. The north-east acts as the gateway for the government of India's Act East Policy (AEP), which intends to develop ties with the

nations of South-East Asia, particularly commercial ties. This article examines the policy's applicability: What connection does it have to the complicated area of northeast India? Which effects may it have on the area? The essay makes the case that the local economy is bypassed by the new national road infrastructure and urges connecting rural infrastructure, particularly connectivity and local marketplaces with regional, national, and worldwide markets.

Chakraborty (2019) conducted a research on 'A study of Indian Diaspora in Myanmar in Contemporary Period' and suggested that The Indian Diaspora's contributions to society worldwide are now seen as having a substantial impact on the nation's foreign policy. It is regarded as one of the crucial tools in the nation's soft power diplomacy that aids in bridging the gap between the countries. Also, under its "Act East Policy," which places a strong emphasis on the role of diasporas. India has recently paid close attention to its South East Asian neighbours. In this context, the Indian diaspora in Myanmar is seen as important not just because of its closeness but also because it has contributed significantly to the country's economy since the British rule. Even though their numbers decreased under military rule and their statuses changed during the post-Independence era, people of Indian origin (PIO), the country's original immigrants from the British era, still played a significant role in today's population at close to 2% of the total. Despite their little political involvement, they had a significant impact on the country's socioeconomic situation and cultural integration.

Kalita (2019) conducted a research on the topic 'Evolution of India's Look East policy: An overview from historical perspective' and the study highlighted on the India's Act East Policy' which was introduced in the early 1990s as "Look East Policy" by the Government of India is now an important part of India's Foreign Policy (IFP). In fact, the Look East Policy is a paradigm shift in India's perspective towards South Eastern Asia. However, since the decade of 1990s, India's "Look Act East policy" has achieved many benefits and led India's economic development with increasing bi-lateral and multi-literal trade and commercial relationship with South East Asian countries. It has also increased people-to-people connection in the North-eastern region with Southeast Asia. Although, India's 'Look East Policy' has a huge potential for economies development of the Northeast region through trade cooperation with

South East Asian countries, there are equally challenging hurdles for socio-economic and political situation of North-eastern region.

Ngaibiakching (2019) conducted a study on 'India's Act East policy and ASEAN: Building a regional order through partnership in Indo-pacific' and found that Over the past few decades, India's security concerns have undergone a substantial change. With the formulation of the Look East Policy (LEP) in the 1990s, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a regional entity became an essential component and a corridor for India's outreach to Southeast Asia. In 2014, the LEP became more encompassing with a shift to the Act East Policy (AEP). The global security and economic environment too are witnessing significant changes with the USA taking a back seat, China's aggressive positioning and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) coupled with the emerging geopolitical construct of 'Indo-Pacific'. The regional stakeholders, such as ASEAN, the USA, Japan, Australia and India are yet to form a unified stand on the Indo-Pacific concept as well as the regional security architecture. The AEP appropriately fits into the current scenario as India is set to take up a larger role in the regional security environment while keeping the centrality of ASEAN intact. New Delhi seeks to create a platform for mutual development in the Indo-Pacific and engage with like-minded nations in the quest for a rules-based order that promotes transparency, respect for sovereignty and international law, stability and free and fair-trade framework. India and ASEAN can be apt partners in the Indo-Pacific to play a constructive role and build a regional order.

Reddy & Thomas (2019) book on Border and Connectivity: North-East India and South East Asia critically assess India's Act East Policy. The collection of articles provides comprehensive insights into the policy context reverberating the need for greater engagement of soft power and in exploring the potentials of the northeast region. The book weighs the policy agendas, aspiration and implementation of the Act at macro and micro level. A section on border trade deals extensively with implications on the social, political, and economic aspects of the region.

Examining how Act East policy interacts with the border town of Zokhawthar. The notion of how the bordering community, which is located on the way to the border commercial sector, manipulated its identity was questioned by Rohlupia (2019). The border community reshapes its own definitions of membership and what a border is, often at odds with the conventional wisdom about what defines a nation and a geographical boundary, in accordance with the trade economy. This comprehension served as a point of reference for how a strategy that centres a border community in the Act has effects that go beyond the need for economic gain. The border community has been motivated to respond in a variety of ways to possibilities and laws of exception due to the need for economic integration through border trade. A system to moderate the forces of liberalisation was formed by disputes over resources, conflicts, and the redefinition of social identity based on border economics.

Taneja et.al (2019) had conducted an evaluative study on 'India's Act East Policy: Facilitating India-Myanmar Border Trade' and they examines the success of the new trade policy initiatives taken by India with relation to bilateral commerce over the land border with Myanmar and sheds light on the difficulties experienced by businessmen in returning to regular trade. The study's main result is that informal commerce has significantly increased over the past two years whereas legal bilateral trade between India and Myanmar has almost disappeared. In its last section, the research makes policy suggestions to alleviate the obstacles to legal commerce across the land border with Myanmar and offers potential solutions to make the widespread informal trade more easily formalised.

Barua (2020) noted that Northeast India has adopted a new development strategy thanks to the Act East Policy. However, infrastructure development is at the core of the development paradigm. Since the policy's inception, it has sought to prioritise physical facilities that are essential for border commerce function above social development. The Northeast is reduced to a simple regional commerce and logistical transit hub as a result of this element, which forces the locals to consider the policy as hazardous. The objective of "Act East Policy" is to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and

develop strategic relationship with countries in the Asia Pacific region through continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the States of Northeastern Region including Arunachal Pradesh with other countries in our neighborhood. The Northeast of India has been a priority in our Act East Policy (AEP). AEP provided an interface between Northeast India including the state of Arunachal Pradesh and the ASEAN region. Various plans at bilateral and regional levels include steady efforts to develop and strengthen connectivity of Northeast with the ASEAN region through trade, culture, people-to-people contacts and physical infrastructure (road, airport, telecommunication, power, etc.). Some of the major projects include Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project, Rhi-Tiddim Road Project, Border Haats.

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## **CHAPTER-3**

### **Geopolitical Dynamics of India – Myanmar**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Historically, geographically, culturally, and strategically, India and Myanmar (Burma until May 1989) have been close neighbours. Before the year 1000, Indian religious and cultural influences were felt in Burma. Both Hinduism and Buddhism were brought to Burma from India. Indians also moved to Burma for business and trade. India and Myanmar have links that are based on shared history, ethnicity, culture, and religion. Additionally, there is ethnic proximity between people of north-caste India and the numerous ethnic groups of Myanmar. Long-standing interactions between the two populations have occurred mostly along the Assam-Myanmar border. Significant Indian influence may be seen in Myanmar's architecture, sculpture, music, dance, and even its paintings. Many terms in Burmese have their origins in Pali, which is the sacred language of Buddhism. The early legal structure of Burma was likewise quite similar to that of India.

This chapter examines the geopolitics of the relations between India and Myanmar in light of the world power structures, economic cooperation, bilateral trade, oil and gas, infrastructure, defence cooperation, the China factor, and interstate economic interactions and the implications and relevance of Act East Policy & Look East Policy, strategic role of Mizoram in India's Act East Policy, Kaladan multi modal transit transport project and also in this chapter background of the study areas, socio-economic development and cultural background of the study areas are discussed.

India and Myanmar were once part of the British Empire in Asia. Since the two countries' independence at the end of World War II, relations between them have largely been friendly. Jawaharlal Nehru and U Nu, the first two prime ministers, worked closely together to promote economic expansion. India and Myanmar both played a significant role in the Non-Aligned Movement, and India even provided Myanmar with a significant amount of military assistance. However, tensions between the two began to rise in 1962. India backed the pro-democracy movements and



vehemently opposed General Ne Win's establishment of a military dictatorship in Myanmar. The Ne Win regime withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979, refused to join the Commonwealth of Nations, and adopted an anti-Soviet stance while relations between India and the Soviet Union were developing. Even if certain issues remained, India and Myanmar's ties began to improve after 1988. In 1993, after Aung San Suu Kyi had already been branded *persona non grata* by the Myanmar government, she was given the Jawaharlal Nehru Prize for international understanding by India. At the time, India was funding NGOs that supported democracy. The two countries' resumption of full diplomatic relations was made more challenging by the State Law and Order Restoration Council's isolationist stance. After 1993, nevertheless, India's policy towards Myanmar was changed, and India adopted a more pragmatic and less moralistic stance. This intentional shift from an idealistic to one that was firmly anchored in *realpolitik* has been credited with improving relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's focus on the Southeast Asian nations was a reflection of India's growing interest in the nations around it. India's Look East policy sought to expand up markets in Southeast Asia, and it required tight coordination with Myanmar to be successful. This project's challenging partnership with Bangladesh only served to highlight Myanmar's importance.

The potential of continuous insurgencies would have made it difficult for many north-eastern Indian states to flourish without this adjustment in strategy. There is significant interest worldwide in Asia as a source of economic growth in the twenty-first century, as seen by both the Look East policy and India's interest in Myanmar. Myanmar applauds India's expanding engagement with its neighbourhood and wider region and supports its desire for a sunny location. The administration of Myanmar is happy to have the additional objective of settling problems in the north-eastern states. Furthermore, India's choice to engage Myanmar is a clear reflection of its growing concern that Myanmar is abandoning its position of neutrality between India and China and is instead subtly drifting towards China. The following are some of the internal and external factors that underpin India's strategic importance of Myanmar:

- I. Myanmar is India's second-biggest neighbour and the largest country on its

eastern frontier. The Kachin, Sagain, and Chin states of Myanmar are bordered by the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram along a 1,640 km common land border that is almost entirely unfenced.

- II. It is well known that several rebel groups maintain bases in Myanmar and carry out operations in India's northeast. Such alliances can only be successfully fought off on a bilateral basis
- III. Myanmar has a maritime border with India and plays a vital role in the littoral region of the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar contributes to India's developing understanding of the importance of its own geographic centre in the northern Indian Ocean. A hostile Myanmar may permit a rival naval presence in the Bay of Bengal, making Indian security more difficult.
- IV. The 2,185-kilometer border between Myanmar and China is located close to the problematic section of the India-China border.
- V. According to reports, Myanmar has the tenth-largest gas reserves in the world, with anticipated reserves of 90 trillion cubic feet of gas. India has a stake in gaining access to these resources. India might give financial support and technological assistance for both production and exploration.

### **3.2 Economic Cooperation**

Mutual Financial Assistance India and Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and Quiet in Border Areas in January 1994. The two countries concur that the joint secretary and home secretary yearly meetings would be held alternately in each country. Up to this point, there have been 14 home secretary meetings and 15 joint secretary meetings. Stronger relationships have resulted from frequent high-level visits. The earliest and most recent visits by Senior General Maung Aye were in January 2000 and April 2008, respectively. The State Peace and Development Council's current chair, Senior General Than Shwe, visited India in October 2004. The president of Myanmar hadn't travelled to India in 25 years. In November 2003, Vice President Shekhawat visited Myanmar, and in March 2006, President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam travelled there for the first time as the head of state of India since Rajiv Gandhi's tenure as prime minister in 1987.

More recently, vice president Hamid Ansari visited Yangon in February 2009. The foreign ministers of India and Myanmar have met multiple times during the previous

10 years. During these tours, a number of agreements and memorandums of understanding have been reached.

### **3.3 Bilateral Trade**

From \$273 million in 1980–1981 to \$995 million in 2007–2008, trade between the two countries rose. India has just surpassed Thailand, Singapore, and China as Myanmar's fourth-largest trading partner. It also receives over 25% of the nation's exports, making it the second-largest market after Thailand. Since India imports mostly agricultural and forestry goods from Myanmar and Myanmar exports principally steel and pharmaceuticals, the balance often favours Myanmar. The 1994 Border business Agreement included details on cross-border business. When they do, the agreement will be very beneficial in lowering illegal trade and monitoring rebel activity in the border regions of the two nations. The border trade points at Moreh and Zokhawthar in India and Tamu and Rhi in Myanmar have recently undergone improvements to become regular commercial links. Avankhu, located in the state of Nagaland, is now being developed as a third border trading post. There has been a minor reduction in bilateral trade as a result of the popularity of items imported from China and other countries. Trade has been impeded by intimidation by rebel groups in the border regions, despite a memorandum of understanding signed in 2004 regulating the free movement of tribal people residing in the border regions of both nations who have relations to their counterparts on an ethnic basis.

*India – Myanmar bilateral trade (in million US \$)*

*Figures in brackets indicate variation from previous year*

<b>Year</b>	<b>2014-15</b>	<b>2015-16</b>	<b>2016-17</b>	<b>2017-18</b>	<b>2018-19</b>	<b>2019-20</b>
<b>India's exports</b>	773.74 (-1.69%)	1070.65 (38.46%)	1,107.89 (3.48%)	966.19 (-2.79%)	1205.60 (24.78%)	973.89 (-19.22%)
<b>India's imports</b>	1231.54 (-1.76%)	984.27 (-0.08%)	1067.25 (8.43%)	639.64 (-40.07%)	521.49 (-18.47%)	547.25 (4.94%)
<b>TOTAL TRADE</b>	2005.28 (-8.13%)	2054.92 (2.5%)	2178.44 (5.85%)	1605.84 (-26.17%)	1727.10 (7.55%)	1521.13 (-11.93%)

*(Source: Dept of Commerce, India) Table 3.1 India's exports & imports*

*India's major imports from Myanmar (in million US\$)*

	<b>Products</b>	<b>2015-16</b>	<b>2016-17</b>	<b>2017-18</b>	<b>2018-19</b>	<b>2019-20</b>
1	Edible vegetables & certain roots & tubers (beans & pulses)	819.91	809.45	432.27	370.43	344.07
2	Wood & articles	125.03	156.39	142.64	92.25	75.47
3	Other edible items	31.56	33.86	11.09	11.13	66.10
4	Lead and Articles Thereof	0.09	5.46	12.24	-	7.80
5	Fish, meat & preparations	4.21	4.19	6.20	4.08	13.75
6	Aluminum & Zinc	0.73	-	9.33	16.99	12.61
7	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	0.13	0.18	0.03	0.67	0.29
8	Electrical Machinery and Equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers and parts.	0.08	0.23	0.32	0.42	1.46

9	Iron and Steel (Articles of Iron and Steel)	0.10	0.08	13.89	8.93	1.07
10	Raw Hide & Skins	0.67	0.52	2.58	2.16	1.01
11	Plastics and Articles thereof	0.02	0.18	0.01	0.02	0.05
12	Rubber and Articles thereof	0.18	5.22	6.44	8.34	10.99
13	Miscellaneous	1.53	5.22	6.44	8.34	10.99
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>984.27</b>	<b>1067.25</b>	<b>639.64</b>	<b>513.15</b>	<b>547.25</b>

(Source: Dept of Commerce, India) Table 3.2 India's major imports from Myanmar.

India's major exports to Myanmar (in million US\$)

	<b>Products</b>	<b>2015-16</b>	<b>2016-17</b>	<b>2017-18</b>	<b>2018-19</b>	<b>2019-20</b>
1	Sugars & sugar Confectionery	457.09	424.26	67.34	126.12	23.37
2	Pharmaceuticals	152.23	184.27	178.95	199.67	221.78
3	Vehicles other than railway	37.52	64.35	67.44	71.67	87.37
4	Cotton & yarn	49.50	40.91	48.01	46.49	47.99
5	Garment & textiles related	39.33	32.69	23.00	46.98	26.01
6	Iron & steel	30.43	47.55	124.00	39.57	45.90
7	Nuclear reactors, Boiler, Machinery & parts	46.07	47.30	45.21	55.91	63.16
8	Electrical Machinery & Equipment	73.46	54.46	68.20	61.86	65.46
9	Chemicals & allied products	20.43	36.56	33.66	-	50.36
10	Residues waste from the food industry	19.33	29.70	42.80	46.66	32.16
11	Products of Animal origin not elsewhere specified or included	22.77	26.31	29.15	26.94	6.56
12	Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils and Products of their distillation; Bituminous substances; Mineral Waxes	2.84	21.68	66.96	198.29	17.30

13	Meat and Edible Meat Offal	-	-	-	124.11	94.87
14	Edible items	15.53	15.80	18.16	56.8	16.43
15	Plastic & articles	14.39	13.94	15.99	16.00	22.41
16	Other metals & articles	20.43	12.43	11.88	5.63	7.81
17	Arms and Ammunition	-	-	-	1.89	33.78
18	Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco	5.67	9.81	8.21	13.00	18.21
19	Rubber & articles	7.65	5.89	6.96	7.93	7.64
20	Locomotives, rolling stock & parts	0.55	0.21	33.02	1.09	5.09
21	Tools implements	4.04	-	4.15	4.82	4.66
22	Miscellaneous	48.94	42.97	51.82	53.77	75.57
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1068.20</b>	<b>1111.09</b>	<b>966.19</b>	<b>1205.20</b>	<b>973.89</b>

(Source: Dept of Commerce, India) Table 3.3 India's major exports to Myanmar

#### Border Trade

*Trends of bilateral border trade (in million US\$)*

Year	Myanmar exports to India	Myanmar imports from India	Total trade	Balance of Trade
2013-2014	16.46	26.12	42.58	9.66
2014-2015	17.03	39.86	56.89	22.83
2015-2016	53.027	18.617	71.644	-34.41
2016-2017	63.461	24.435	87.896	-39.026
2017-2018	68.774	21.791	90.565	-46.983
2018 (April-Sept.)	84.316	9.136	93.452	-75.18
2018-2019 (Oct-Sept.)	177.50	23.75	201.25	-154.18
2019-2020 (Oct-Sept.)	89.59	3.064	92.654	-86.526

(Source: Ministry of Commerce, Myanmar) Table 3.4 Bilateral border trade between India and Myanmar.



Fig.3.1 Land Custom Station Building at Zokhawthar (India – Myanmar border)

### 3.4 Oil and Gas

The lack of significant rewards from the business is another reason why the inhabitants are disgruntled. Oil and gas India has been given permission to build, manage, and use an offshore hub for Myanmar gas. The undertaking should be completed in five years and establish a link between Sittwe, Myanmar and Mizoram, India. The landlocked nations of the north-east will get direct access to world commerce as a result, and bilateral trade will rise. In the competition for Myanmar's offshore gas resources in Rakhine state, China defeated India. The initial pipeline project, which was planned in partnership with Bangladesh, had to be cancelled because of that country's unreasonable demands. Due to its lack of economic feasibility, a second plan to build a pipeline from Myanmar via the north-eastern states to West Bengal was shelved in July 2009. India still hopes to someday utilise Myanmar's enormous energy resources. Only deft diplomacy and friendly relations to

the military leadership will be able to achieve this. A 1,575-kilometer pipeline from Sittwe to Aizwal to Silchar to Guwahati to Siliguri to Gaya is the most recent proposal for transporting gas. While the pipeline is being constructed, India has agreed to export the gas as liquefied natural gas. The oil and natural gas industry have a 30% stake in the discovery and development of the offshore natural gas deposits at Sittwe.

### **3.5 Infrastructure**

After finishing the 160-kilometer India-Myanmar friendship road in 2001, India is currently working on the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway project. The Ministry of Commerce is developing the Sittwe port and the open sea route going to Mizoram state in northeastern India. Additionally, joint ventures for the construction of the 1,200 megawatt Thamanthi hydropower dam and the 600 megawatt Shwezaye hydropower dam in the Chindwin river basin have been formed between India and Myanmar, as well as agreements for the Thathay Chaung hydropower project in Rakhine state. India will fund both dams, and the state of Manipur in India would get the power they generate. At a time when energy security is crucial for all developing nations, New Delhi and Yangon are working together on a hydropower development strategy that would ensure India's supply of electricity while simultaneously harnessing the hydropower potential in the area. The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Facility will connect the two countries as well as enhance connectivity inside and between India's north-eastern states as well as across the border with Myanmar. The project's goal is to build a network of roads and rivers that would link Myanmar's Sittwe port with India's eastern coast ports. Over the past ten years, India has routinely given infrastructure projects and more than 100 crore rupees (\$20 million) in development funding to Myanmar. Both nations are active participants in a variety of international organisations, such as the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation group and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Myanmar is a full member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), while India is a member at the summit level. In the alliance between Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar (BCIM). In addition, India might expedite the implementation of its Look East plan and enhance its links with Southeast Asia by



building the Trans-Asian Railway Project, which would connect 28 nations.

### **3.6 Defence cooperation**

India and Myanmar's defence cooperation is based on shared interests and national security concerns. The markers have been periodic high-level visitor exchanges and a few bilateral military exercises. Senior General Maung Aye, the head of the Myanmar army's staff, and General V. P. Malik, the commander of the Indian army staff, had meetings in Yangon and Shillong in 2000. Since then, senior officers from all three military forces have paid regular visits. Vice admiral Soe Thane, the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar navy, and Admiral Suresh Mehta, the chief of naval staff for the Indian navy, both travelled extensively in April and May of 2007.

The biennial multinational "Milan" naval exercises and contacts in the Indian Ocean have been attended by Myanmar since 2004, together with other countries in the Asia-Pacific area. When deciding the parameters of India's strategic engagement with Myanmar, cooperation in the area of counterinsurgency operations takes precedence over other aspects. There are ethnic ties between the rebels operating in the north-eastern Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram and the bordering tribes in Myanmar. Since the 1990s, the number of terrorism-related incidents committed by these groups, which assert to speak for the tribal populations on both sides of the border, has increased, demanding excellent ties between the armies of the two nations. Narcoterrorism and drug trafficking occurrences have both increased in the north-eastern states. In order to lessen the possible negative impacts of drug use, India must take the initiative to serve as a stabilising and balancing force. Additionally, it must take care to avoid obscuring non-traditional security concerns with its emphasis on conventional security. India must work with its neighbours to create regional and sub-regional groups in order to address these problems. Delhi is realising that using military might alone won't be enough to defeat insurgent groupings.

Operations to counter insurgency together have been carried out for a while. Operation Golden Bird, a successful joint military operation between the armies of India and

Myanmar against north-eastern insurgent organisations such as the People's Liberation Army (Manipur) and the United Liberation Front of Assam, was carried out in April and May 1995. Forty militants were slain, and a sizable arsenal of weapons was found. The Myanmar army assaulted various Manipuri rebel strongholds in November 2001, apprehending about 200 insurgents and seizing 1,500 firearms. The Tatmadaw undertook extra operations against militants operating out of Myanmar in 2005 and 2006 after General Than Shwe promised India during his visit in 2004 that action would be taken against them. In 2007, the Tatmadaw initiated a new military campaign against rebel organisations.

The two nations may now communicate real-time "actionable" intelligence to deal with rebels in the border region thanks to a Memorandum of Understanding on Intelligence communicate Cooperation that was inked in 2008. Myanmar accepted India's offer to provide combat training and uniforms for its military men. India also leased a squadron of helicopters and pledged to help the Myanmar military maintain its existing Russian military equipment. Since 2003, many port visits and joint naval drills have been conducted. The Indian military has trained military officers of all ranks from Myanmar at various sites over the years.

In the north-eastern areas of India, the paramilitary Assam Rifles are in charge of maintaining internal security as well as guarding borders. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police also monitors the region close to the Myanmar border as part of its duties. These paramilitary and police organisations work closely with their Myanmar counterparts. Although largely transferring small firearms, India has sent Myanmar military supplies. A shopping list for military supplies was delivered to the chief of army staff by Lieutenant General Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo, the quartermaster general of Myanmar and a representative on the State Peace and Development Council, in April 2007. Lieutenant General Tin wanted infantry weapons and ammunition to help against Indian insurgents. The Myanmar list contained a significant amount of small arms, such as sidearms, machine guns, and assault rifles.

India has been a huge help to Myanmar after natural disasters and is typically the first

to send humanitarian relief. In May 2008, India launched Operation Sahayata (Operation Help), in response to Cyclone Nargis. Two Indian navy ships and two Indian air force aircraft were dispatched to assist the storm-affected citizens of Myanmar. There was a substantial quantity of help provided in the form of emergency food and medical supplies.

### **3.7 The China Factor**

China has progressively increased its presence in Myanmar and other Southeast Asian nations. It has provided major political, military, and economic support to Myanmar despite the Western sanctions. India is conscious that it faces the risk of slipping behind in economic and commercial relations with Myanmar if it does not engage politically with that country, particularly in relation to the recently discovered and urgently needed oil and natural gas resources. India needs to do its part to counter China's growing sway in Myanmar. Myanmar obtains a lot of military equipment from China. Using a barter mechanism, it has given Myanmar jet fighters, armoured vehicles, and naval ships worth close to US\$2 billion, as Myanmar lacks the foreign exchange means to pay for these weapons. Additionally, China has assisted the Myanmar government in modernising its naval installations in Hanggyi, the Coco Islands, Akyab, and Mergui. The Myanmar army is the second biggest in Southeast Asia, behind Vietnam's, mostly due to China's support. In just a few years, it increased from 180,000 to 450,000 employees. A road connecting Kunming in southern China with Mandalay in central Myanmar has also been constructed by China. Trade between the two countries has increased, becoming China Myanmar's third-largest trading partner (after Singapore and Thailand). A 1,100-kilometer pipeline from Myanmar's Kyaukphyu port to Kunming, the province capital of Yunnan, would also be used to transport gas and oil. Formal preparations for this project have been developed. Once this pipeline is completed and functioning, China will be far less reliant on the Malacca Straits. In accordance to the Indian standpoint, China's strategic choices in the Indian Ocean region have greatly increased as a result of its close connections to Myanmar.

The upgrade of military bases and ports presents an opportunity for China to watch

Indian maritime activities and naval bases in the Bay of Bengal, and this has India concerned. China values its relationship with Myanmar because it gives them land access to the Indian Ocean, allowing it to avoid the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits. Myanmar has confirmed to India that it does not presently and will not in the future lease any bases to China. Recurring allegations claim that the Chinese government has established a naval reconnaissance and electronic surveillance station in the Coco Islands. China has made it clear that it wants to keep close connections with Myanmar by engaging in "cooperation" in the military and business. Such engagement is the obvious outcome of its strategy to maintain India's vulnerability and prevent it from becoming as a competitor regional power. In China's String of Pearls encirclement strategy, which is a key component of its foreign policy towards India, Myanmar is a significant pearl. Even while the military-led government in Myanmar is strong on the internal front, it has been powerless against China's immense influence and is only now fully understanding the effects of its dependence on China. India interprets Myanmar's ongoing and growing interest in cooperation as a move to counteract Chinese influence.

### **3.8 Look East Policy**

Nearly 35 years have passed since India announced its Look East Policy (LEP). Numerous advantages of this programme have been realised, including improved strategic ties between India and Asia. How well we have connected the rest of Asia to our eastern and north-eastern areas will increasingly have an influence on this approach.

India and the nations of Southeast Asia followed distinctly different courses as a result of the changing dynamics of the cold war. When India announced the Look East Policy (LEP), pragmatic reasons and even actual politics recognised the calibrated change in its foreign policy focus. The new wave of economic reforms and liberalisation in the framework of new guidelines that saw a structural shift in the broader geopolitical international order ushered in a fresh push to reengage with the Southeast Asian area as a result. Since gaining independence, the LEP was the first time the Indian government has focused on the ASEAN area economically. The creation of air and

land links, as well as economic relations and integration with the ASEAN area, were all key components of the programme. In 1992, India began a sectoral discussion with ASEAN, and in 1995, a complete dialogue began. When India joined the East Asia Summit in December 2005 after joining ASEAN at the summit level in 2002, a new dimension indicating the economic drivers of India's strategic concerns emerged. Through political discussions in multilateral organisations like ASEAN and the expansion of its commerce with Southeast Asian countries, India has extended its connection with the area of Southeast Asia in recent years. Although India's look-east policy was initially based more on economic than strategic considerations, it has evolved over time to include political, defence, maritime, strategic, and previously unexplored economic cooperation with Pacific Asia as well.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said: "We are engaged in a process of dialogue and consultation to help shape a new security environment." Sea routes that are extremely important from a strategic standpoint are near our region and must be safeguarded. India has become an indispensable component of the Asia-Pacific strategic debate as a result of the LEP's progressive strategic dimensioning. This may be seen as the continuation of the first phase of the engagement, which started in 2003 and involved more actors from East Asia to Australia, with ASEAN at its centre. Importantly, regardless of their political views, all administrations that came to power in New Delhi supported this strategy unanimously. The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which India joined in October 2003, reaffirmed ASEAN's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and non-interference in its internal affairs. It is interesting that ASEAN values and welcomes India's presence there because India and Southeast Asia have never been at war with one another. It is simpler to develop positive connections between India and Southeast Asia since there is little disagreement on important topics and because the two regions face similar difficulties. The constant collaboration between them is shown in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the regional collaboration Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and the MILAN exercises that India organises every other year. Studying Myanmar's status within this framework is important since it shares a border with the north-eastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram.

India and Myanmar share crucial seas in the Bay of Bengal, including the strategically significant Andaman and Nicobar Islands, where the two nearest Indian and Myanmar islands are only 30 km away. Myanmar's states that border India include Kachin, Sagaing, and Chin. Additionally, Myanmar's ports offer India the quickest access point to a number of its north-eastern states. Because the northeast is the point of connection where there are unmistakable similarities in cultural and social systems between India's northeast and Southeast Asia, Myanmar's strategic position as a bridge between India and Southeast Asia is important not only for the security of India's northeast and in containing the growing influence of China. The resurgence of the historical, ethnic, cultural, and religious links that the people of the two areas have in common may also be leveraged as a soft power resource. Given that Myanmar is the land bridge connecting India to the ASEAN nations with which it has developed engagement models, Myanmar's physical proximity to other countries is crucial. Due to Myanmar's strategic importance, India, China, and Southeast Asian countries have begun to recognise the importance of Myanmar in developing their bilateral ties and Indian ocean strategies.

### **3.9 Factoring Myanmar in India's LEP**

For the past three decades, India's interest in Myanmar has understandably concentrated on the problems of democracy and human rights. Factional conflicts within the military and violent conflicts with insurgent groups have been the hallmark of politics in Myanmar since 1962. The central issue facing the state since independence in 1948 has been finding a solution to the problem of governance of this profoundly multicultural society.

After the Ne Win regime collapsed in 1988, the country was ruled by the military junta, initially called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and then, after a re-organization in 1997, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The 2011 elections saw Thein Sein elected to the position of President. Presently Myanmar is in the midst of wide ranging reforms launched since 2011. The first phase focused on the political process, including political reconciliation, which led to the main

opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), rejoining the political process through a landmark election. The second phase of reforms was announced in June 2012, and was aimed at opening up the economy and improving practices to support economic liberalization. The government announced in December 2012 a third phase of reforms, aimed to tackle graft and corruption, attract greater foreign direct investment, and strengthen Myanmar's participation in regional economic integration process.

Myanmar's reforms continue in 2013 with several high profile events lined up. In June 2013 the World Economic Forum on East Asia will be held in Nay Pyi Taw, and the 27th South East Asian games in December. In 2014 Myanmar will take up the responsibility of the ASEAN chair for that year including ASEAN'S Summit meetings with global leaders. Undoubtedly Myanmar's ongoing democratization and normalization of relations with the outside world could affect the geopolitics in Asia. These moves are welcome to India as they reduce its unease in dealing with the autocratic military regime in the past. Although, there are a number of outstanding issues to be resolved to make Myanmar a reasonably credible democracy, President Thein Sein's moves to take Myanmar on the road to democracy needs India's support and encouragement. So long as the reform process continues and is irreversible, the prospects for India-Myanmar relations seem bright. Here it is important to understand that the sequence of India-Myanmar relation is not just with the ruling government, but with the opposition as well. Suu Kyi's recent visit to India must be seen not just against the background of her being conferred the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding in 1992, as much as it is about continuity in that direction.

New Delhi's rationale in engaging with Nay Pyi Taw has been convincingly logical. Internal and external considerations make it hard for India to avoid dealing with neighbouring, resource rich Myanmar with which India's northeast shares a porous 1643 Km long border. The primary rationale of engaging Myanmar in India's Look-East policy may be seen against the background of the dragon intensifying its relationship with Myanmar since the late 1980s, together with the increased isolation of Myanmar during the early 90s which helped to raise the consciousness of China's growing regional influence. India was uneasy with China's policy in Myanmar serving

as the key to circumvent the Malacca dilemma as it were, China's assistance in constructing military bases close to India, rebuilding roads, bridges and other infrastructure throughout Myanmar, and thereby making inroads into Myanmar to gain credible access to its natural resources and market in Myanmar. Myanmar with its abundance in oil, natural gas, coal, zinc, copper, precious stones, timber and hydropower, with some amount of uranium deposits as well makes it a very attractive destination.

Myanmar was closed to the outside world when China has been slowly but consistently stripping Myanmar of its natural resources. India perceived these developments inside Myanmar as a threat since it feared that China would in the process gain easy access to India's northeast. Consequently, India felt it necessary to take a realist assessment of the geopolitical and economic circumstance and decided to place security and economic objectives ahead of political and human-rights considerations when dealing with Myanmar. Geographically Myanmar dominates the Bay of Bengal. It is here the sphere of influence of China and India overlap. It makes sense therefore, for India to engage Myanmar irrespective of issues of human rights, suppression of democratic aspirations. By engaging Myanmar India could maximize its security and national interest. However, the lack of synchronization of India's policies with China, ASEAN and Myanmar has impacted the pace of engaging Myanmar to a large extent and the balancing act of maintaining ties with both the military junta and the pro-democracy forces within Myanmar has proved to be a difficult act. These ties have strategic implications for India, more so against the background of the Sino-Indian border dispute still eluding resolution.

In Myanmar, as elsewhere, India China strategic interests and most pressing concerns are characterized by growing uncertainty about each other's future role in the region. Myanmar is the only South east Asian country that shares a boundary with India and therefore, it serves as a gateway to the other 10 member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). More often than not India-Myanmar relations tend to be assessed through the strategic security prism of China-Myanmar relations.



Such comparison is inevitable so long as China continues to aggressively assert its political, economic and military strength in the region. Myanmar shares a boundary with China in the Northeast without any insurmountable geographic barriers except the Hengduan Shan range to separate the two lands. This also provides India a transit route to Southern China. China has exerted considerable influence in Myanmar ever since China's Yuan (ethnic Mongol) dynasty invaded Myanmar in the 13th century. Myanmar was one of the countries that recognized PRC in 1949 and has been supporting one China principle for a long time". "The isolation faced by both Myanmar and China in the wake of the Yangon massacre of 1988 and the cruel suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 clubbed them together in the same bludgeon. China grabbed the opportunity by establishing closer relationship after Myanmar uprising of 1988. The relationship blossomed when internal stability in Myanmar was in great turmoil and China aided the country with massive arms supply, signed trade agreement in 1994. In 1992, Myanmar agreed that China would modernize Myanmar's naval facilities and since then, Chinese technical experts have prominently improved and militarized Myanmar's port facilities in the Bay of Bengal at Akyab (Sittwe), Kyaukpyu and Mergui, constructed a major naval base on Hainggyi Island near the Irrawaddy river delta, and upgraded the naval base on Great Coco Island. And by the mid 1990's northern Myanmar was opened up to Chinese trade in a big way. At present between Myanmar and Yunnan province (China), there are 16 border gates where four of them are first class and 12 under second class (Provincial). China is also engaged in construction of waterways through Irrawaddy River, railways, oil and gas pipeline in order to connect Yunnan province to Bay of Bengal via Myanmar. In late 2009, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation started construction of more than 1,000-kilometer pipeline to transport oil and natural gas from Kyaukpyu Port, on the Bay of Bengal, to Kunming in China's Yunnan province. The oil pipeline would carry oil from the Middle East and Africa, enabling by passing of the bottle necked sea lane of the Malacca Strait, which currently delivers 80 percent of China's oil imports. Proponents of the pipeline argue that it would reduce China's reliance on the Malacca Strait for oil transportation by at least one-third. Much of the infrastructure is already underway where river and rail routes from Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam would converge in Kunming, in China's southern Yunnan province. At Ramree Island off Myanmar's north-western Arakan coast, China is constructing pipelines to take oil and

natural gas from Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Bay of Bengal across the heart of Myanmar to Kunming. The purpose was to alleviate China's dependence on the Strait of Malacca, through which four-fifths of its crude oil imports pass at present. There will also be a high-speed rail line roughly along this route by 2015. So, when China completes its ongoing communication projects in Myanmar, increased strategic cooperation between Myanmar and China would significantly enhance security threat to India's weak eastern flanks. Another major concern for India is that Myanmar gives China access to the Indian Ocean, not only for imports of oil and gas and exports from landlocked south western Chinese provinces, but also potentially for military bases or listening. India has also been extremely concerned with China upgrading its key air and naval facilities that strengthen the line of communication between the Chinese border and the Bay of Bengal. While India cannot afford to ignore the emerging strategic equation on its eastern borders especially when Myanmar's civilian President is talking of multi strategic cooperation in partnership with China, at the same time India also has to take automatically balance the region and in one that allows Myanmar to adjust to the strategic balance. Myanmar despite its problematic human-rights record has been able to take advantage of the economic, security and geostrategic interests of both China and India in the country to achieve developmental and security goals. Its relations with Beijing in particular have assumed ever greater significance as Western capitals have sought to place Myanmar under the scrutiny of the UN Security Council on the grounds that its domestic circumstances have regional security implications. If Myanmar continues with its reforms and opens up its links with its neighbours it will in a matter of time develop into an energy and natural resource hub, with potential to reap the benefits from connecting the North eastern India through Myanmar to the rest of South East Asia. Using the Myanmar option to enter Southeast Asia will provide opportunities to India's landlocked north east to be opened up to the outside. North east India is cut off from the rest of India by Bangladesh to the west and by Myanmar to the east. The 22 Km Siliguri strategic neck controls access to the seven sisters of the Northeast and represents a developmental hurdle as much as it acts as a psychological barrier to the integration of the region with the rest of India. Therefore Myanmar's political opening and economic development will amend this geopolitical fact, because India's northeast will benefit from Myanmar's political and economic

revitalization. As a result the shift to trans national cooperation through the LEP will allow the assistance for the growth of the North-East region to come out of its state of remoteness, under development, and instability. And a prosperous Northeast India could act as a shield against threats to the security of the country emanating from the eastern sector. Here special mention may be made to developing relations with Thailand which has been looking for greater engagement with this region with its look west policy. This in turn could have a bearing on reducing China's influence in Myanmar in relative terms.

Another stimulus to positioning Myanmar within the Look-East Policy came in the form of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral technical and Economic Cooperation, the Kunming Initiative, and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC). These projects under lie cooperation in tourism, education, emphasize links between Indian traditional culture and ASEAN'S culture, and could also become important measures for promoting relations with Myanmar. Additionally they are aimed at enhancing trade, encourage the development of an appropriate socio-economic strategy through infrastructure construction programs like the Trans- Asia Highway Project etc, so that the region would be transformed to a base for domestic and foreign investors, to tap the contiguous markets of China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and beyond. India is already engaged in constructing linkages with Myanmar and recognizes that since road and communication constitute important elements of infrastructure in any countries economy, therefore, physically connecting the northeast to the business centres of Southeast Asia was extremely important. An important step was taken when the 160 Km long road provided linking the border town of Tamu to Kalemyo and Kalewa, to the Indian border town of Moreh and the 225km Rih-Tiddim -Falam road was built to connect Champhai in Mizoram to Rhi in Myanmar. India is also constructing an energy terminal at Sittwe that will carry off shore natural gas to the Indian state of West Bengal. The Indian pipeline would actually split into two directions, with another proposed route going to the north around Bangladesh. This link from Mizoram to Sittwe either by land or an inter-modal road water transfer holds out the prospect of an alternate outlet to the Bay of Bengal for India's northeast which will help to boost trade

ties. For more than a decade now India and Myanmar have tried to broad relations focusing on five areas: capacity building of Myanmar in developmental areas, mutual trade, improving communication infrastructure forland and sea links between India's landlocked regions and Myanmar, defence cooperation and coordination, and regional cooperation. Officially both countries have avoided making public reference to strategic security aspects beyond the denial of sanctuaries for Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar soil and goodwill visits of military chiefs of both countries. This has nowbeen broadened (in the context of the current Myanmar's military confrontation with the Kachin Independence Army -KIA) to include denial of sanctuaries to Myanmar's insurgents on Indian soil. Contacts between the armies of both countries have been limited to exchange of visits of senior officers, border meetings of sector commanders and limited cooperation at the ground level in trans-border operations against insurgents.

During his visit to Myanmar Dr Manmohan Singh, extended a \$500-million line credit and inked 12 pacts. He also signed various memorandums focusing on the areas such as border area development, transportation, connectivity, agriculture, trade and investment, promotion of friendly exchanges and human resource development. These included an air service agreement providing for Fifth Freedom rights which will allow Indian Carriers, private included, combining flights to Myanmar with other destinations in Southeast Asia and beyond. A joint working group will examine the feasibility of rail connectivity between the two countries and movement of freight from India to the ASEAN region. Dr. Manmohan Sings visit may also see the finalization of the Imphal – Mandalay bus service aimed at promoting trade as well as people to people contact. It is an important component of development in the region that India sees crucial to its security and the Look East policy.

Although India has been engaging Myanmar to open up the geographic space between the two the ground realities is that both in terms of quality as well as quantity China is at an advantage. India has failed to capitalize on its relations with Myanmar whether economic orstrategic or in ensuring energy security. Infrastructure bottlenecks remain

in all of the India-initiated rail, road, power and energy related projects. The delay in the progress as a result generates comparison between the sluggish Indian performances with the promptness of Chinese companies to complete projects that they undertake. Overall India lacks in skilled manpower, which is a glaring short coming. India needs to do a lot more to catch up China's strides in Myanmar which is far ahead and its projects are well planned and executed.

While the future beckons with opportunities, the present is still not assured. There is then good reason to be cautiously optimistic on the recent developments in Myanmar. Myanmar can attain some form of stability only when it is able to successfully address the ethnic question and bring about immediate national reconciliation and democratization. It is important to understand what has compelled ethnic minorities to take up arms against the central government. This fundamental question needs to be addressed for Myanmar to achieve peace and stability. In other words, simply holding elections is not enough if all elections do is bring ethnic Bamar or Burmans to power. As an alternative the Constitution will have to be amended to give generous powers to the minorities accordingly so that the aspirations of the ethnic nationalities are fully met that will make diversity the strength of Myanmar instead of its weakness. This aspect is important especially in the context of India's northeast which houses more than 200 ethnic and tribal groups, who are ethnically, linguistically and culturally distinct. The region has been battling insurgency movements with demands ranging from independence, autonomy, tribal rights etc. Since the beginning of these movements ethnic ties and tribal linkages between the people on either side of the border has facilitated their movements and in finding safe haven and often these groups take refuge in Myanmar's soil. Myanmar faces similar problems of ethnic conflict which also has a consequence for India.

Then again India being located between the golden crescent in the golden triangle in the east faces also the challenge of arm-drugs nexus. There is a strong connection between the conflicts in the country and the most immediate sources of revenue to purchase weapons and in many instances this is both opium and heroin and metamphetamine pills. Production of opium is closely linked to ethnic insurgencies inside Myanmar. The areas of highest cultivation intensity are also the areas of ongoing

or suspended conflicts. The emergence of peace and security is therefore an essential ingredient in tackling the poppy problem in Myanmar. Myanmar is also the largest centre for the manufacture of ATS, notably metamphetamine while parts of India's northeast act as transit points for drug traffickers to carry on their lucrative. As expected there will be a spill over of the problems to the Indian states that Myanmar faces.

So far India's policy towards Myanmar has been predominantly responsive, dictated by China's activism in Myanmar. With China's well equipped navy, its growing economic might, its growing aggressive policy in the South China Sea, and the string of Pearls, all of it put together is certainly causing an alarming situation for New Delhi. New Delhi in the present circumstance needs to manage its LEP to effectively articulate and react to the developing scenario. How it responds to these challenges will be the real test of Indian diplomatic maturity. It would be in India's interest to read Myanmar in transition correctly (regime reform and regime change) as the political processes in. And Myanmar gathers momentum triggered by domestic and international factors under the changed circumstance India will have to take into account all these factors and carve out a role for itself which is more proactive rather than simply being reactive to what China does in Myanmar. In the light of the change taking place in Myanmar it analyse India's policy towards its eastern neighbour. India can be a useful counter poise for Myanmar in handling China, particularly when China's strategic ambitions override its acceptance of the civilian regime in Myanmar. A good beginning would be to persuade the new government in Myanmar to allow greater people to people contacts between the two countries at the level of students, scholars and academic exchange. While India's policy of engagement will need recalibration to an extent depending on the degree to which Myanmar will transform and the transformation is irreversible. Interestingly, at a time when US policy toward Southeast Asia is widely seen to be underpinned by concerns regarding the Peoples Republic of China, the Obama administration suggested that it's more pragmatic policy toward Myanmar was fundamentally about supporting democracy and human rights as well as stability and greater prosperity in Myanmar, rather than being about China. As the US stepped up its pragmatic engagement with Myanmar, China

responded with enhanced military, political and economic commitments. The Chinese Global Times voiced China's concern and held said that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visit had undermined the Chinese wall in Myanmar. US has been keen to stress that the improvement in the bilateral relationship between US and Myanmar was not intended to replace China's influence in Myanmar and nor is at the expense of Sino-Myanmar ties. Hillary Clinton has stated that the United States does not expect any country to give up relationships with their neighbour, noting that in the case of Myanmar and China there are long standing ties that certainly are deep in the soils of both nations. Yet it has to be recognized that opening up of Myanmar has jeopardised China's sole privileged position in Myanmar.

The nascent military-to-military relation between the United States and Myanmar is another issue which throws up questions on how China will view such developments. Will it see it as a part of the Obama administration's pivot from Middle East to Asia followed up with several major investment-diplomatic, economic, and strategic. Or will the policy be viewed as rebalancing of military forces towards Asia? Particularly the stationing of US Marines in Darwin, the forward deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, greater US presence in Asia's maritime domain, especially in the South China Sea, the release of an air-sea battle concept that requires strikes on the Chinese mainland that could escalate into a dangerous confrontation, and the frequent training and capacity building exercises with Southeast Asian countries. The drift in US China relations towards strategic rivalry has severe consequence that will undermine the environment that has been important for the Asian miracle.

The truth is that in Myanmar, The US and the EU are driven by their own strategic and business interests rather than by Myanmar's needs. Nonetheless the realist rationale is that Myanmar's geography dictates that it cannot get too close to the United States without raising concerns from its giant neighbour to the north. This is where India again figures very prominently.

Responding to the needs of time is therefore the call of the hour when India should

work out a concrete policy vision, such as strengthening the hands of democracy that would ensure that Myanmar is less reliant on China. India needs to go ahead with its Look East Policy even more vigorously than ever before. Since Myanmar is an important factor in the Look-East policy it is high time for India to reassess and reinvigorate its policy towards Myanmar with a definite proactive road map to include plans to promote soft power in the region, devise concrete strategy with actionable goals to open up its eastern frontiers to Myanmar. Ethnic relations are likely to be one of the key drivers of change in Myanmar along with the development of Human Capital, democratic gridlock and the triangle between China, India and the US. In this it is important for India to understand and appreciate the unique dynamics of that society taking into account all eventualities in Myanmar's political future. In conclusion India and Myanmar are likely to continue to find their mutual coordination more so since pragmatic engagement will serve a useful purpose to both.

### **3.10 Act East Policy**

India and nations in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific have overlapping interests in the twenty-first century. The globalisation process and the advent of new regional difficulties, which forced India to pause and re-evaluate its foreign policy towards the nations to its east, have greatly influenced the new narrative. While the United States is pursuing a pivot to Asia strategy, India's government, led by Narendra Modi, has prioritised its relations with its neighbours in East Asia and the South Pacific. According to India's Look East Policy, the Modi government has been quite explicit that India would place an increasing amount of emphasis on enhancing its relations with ASEAN and other East Asian nations.

In order to improve India's economic involvement with its eastern neighbours, P.V. Narasimha Rao's administration developed the Look East Policy in 1992. During her 2014 visit to Hanoi, Vietnam, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj recommended a replacement strategy called Act East Policy. It will have an emphasis on playing a more proactive role and serving as a mechanism for developing strategic alliances and security cooperation in the area.



The paradigm change in Indian policy was driven by pragmatism and realism, and it resulted in the Look East Policy, which established the theoretical foundation for engaging Southeast Asia and eventually the South Pacific. Act East Policy, which is currently being developed, reaffirms India's commitment to the East Asian area and its plan for forging tighter connections with the nations in the region. The South Pacific and Southeast Asian nations are the focus of the Modi government's foreign policy, which should improve awareness of the area. The Asia-Pacific area was the primary target of India's Act East Policy. The strategy, which was first intended to be an economic effort, has taken on political, strategic, and cultural elements, including the creation of institutional frameworks for communication and collaboration. India has developed strong relationships with all of the nations in the Asia-Pacific region, upgrading its relations with Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Singapore, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to strategic partnerships. Further, apart from ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS), India has also been actively engaged in regional fora such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Act East Policy has placed emphasis on India-ASEAN cooperation in our domestic agenda on infrastructure, manufacturing, trade, skills, urban renewal, smart cities, make in India and other initiatives. Connectivity projects, cooperation in space, Science & Technology and people-to-people exchanges could become a springboard for regional integration and prosperity. Our Act East Policy (AEP) has given the North East of India top attention. AEP offered a connection between the ASEAN area and North East India, including the state of Arunachal Pradesh.

Consistent efforts are being made to promote and improve connection of the north-east with the ASEAN area through commerce, culture, people-to-people interactions, and physical infrastructure (road, airport, communications, electricity, etc.) as part of a number of strategies at the bilateral and regional levels. The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project, the Rhi-Tiddim Road Project, Border Haats, etc. are a few of the larger projects.

Adopted in August 2015, the ASEAN-India Plan of Action highlights specific objectives and areas of collaboration along the three pillars of political-security, economic development, and socio cultural exchange. India kept up its increased attempts to develop tighter alliances with relevant regional and multilateral organisations including ASEAN, ARF, EAS, BIMSTEC, ACD, MCG, and IORA. Buddhist and Hindu connections might be reactivated to create new connections and relationships on the cultural front.

To build a cogent plan in the area of connectivity, in particular for tying ASEAN with our North East, special efforts are being undertaken. A number of actions are being taken, such as constructing transit infrastructure, encouraging airlines to improve connectivity in the area, and establishing connections between academic and cultural organisations. India has increased its economic involvement with ASEAN; regional integration and project delivery are top concerns. As of July 1, 2015, the ASEAN-India Agreement on Trade in Services and Investments became effective for India and seven ASEAN nations. A revision of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement has been assigned to the ASEAN-India Trade Negotiating Committee. Additionally, India has extended an invitation to ASEAN members to join the International Solar Alliance, which is co-launched with France on November 30, 2015, during COP21. India and its major allies increasingly share similar security objectives on strategic problems, both in a bilateral and international setting. On the basis of international norms and regulations, more collaboration is being undertaken in the fight against terrorism, supporting regional peace and stability, and promoting maritime security.

The 21st century, in Modi's opinion, will be the Asian century. The major economies in Asia, China, Japan, and India, are among those most likely to dominate strategically significant Asia in the latter half of this century. But in recent years, China has taken a more forceful stance in the area, which has alarmed the relevant parties. In order to avoid direct conflict with China, it appears that Modi's foreign policy is concentrated on strengthening bilateral ties to new heights with strategically positioned Asian nations like Japan, Vietnam, and Australia. No formal security alliances in the Indo-

Pacific area have been formed. Due to its positive relations with both Russia and the US, India is sometimes seen as the deciding factor in the struggle for strategic dominance in Asia between the democratic alliance of Japan and the US and the China-Russia club.

### **3.11 Mizoram's Strategic Position in India's Act East Policy**

The 404 km international border between Mizoram and Myanmar allows for ongoing trade between the locals on either side of the border. Because the inhabitants of the border regions occurred to be of the same ethnic stock, border trade started as village trade in the pre-colonial era. Zo ethnic group tribes are clearly present on both sides of the border between India and Myanmar, especially in Mizoram and Chin State. The districts of Lawngtlai, Siaha, Hnahthial, and Champhai in Mizoram share a border with Chin State, which is home to tribes of the same Zo ethnic group that are connected genetically, linguistically, socially, culturally, and spiritually on both sides of the border. Since before the advent of the colonies, people on both sides have continued border trade. Similar tribes of the Zo ethnic group, including the Bawm (Bawmzo), Pang (Pangkhu), Miria, and Lusei (Lushai), live in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts, where there is also a sizable Chakma community. These tribes have maintained trading and sociocultural ties regardless of whether there was authorised border commerce since they live on both sides of the border. These business ties clearly show how important Mizoram is to India's Act East Policy. Two significant projects—the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Kolodyne Hydro-Electric Project II—are located there, which highlights Mizoram's importance in India's Act East Policy. The Kolodyne HEP II is anticipated to maximise the Kolodyne River's capacity for many uses, which should be advantageous for the local population. The Government of India increased its efforts to work with Myanmar by pursuing the projects under the LEP/AEP, in part as a result of an external cause. Brigadier T. Sailo, a former Chief Minister of Mizoram, was the first politician in Mizoram to have the idea to capture hydro-electricity from the Kolodyne (Chhimtuipui) River, but he was unable to carry out his vision. The Kolodyne HEP II may be successfully accomplished even though the NTPC began operations in Lawngtlai in 2009, demonstrating that the project's successful completion requires the support of the state government, local authorities, civil society, and the state's residents. The Government of India has been

courting Myanmar in many ways since it is an important player in the completion of the Kolodyne HEP II and the KMMTTP. The combined exploitation of Myanmar's gas reserve in Rakhine state, the multi-modal project for developing motorways, the inland canal on the Kolodyne River, Sittwe Port, and the creation of hydroelectric power from a dam on the Kolodyne River are the primary initiatives for appeasing Myanmar. The KMMTTP also consists of three components: the construction of the Sittwe port, the opening of the Kolodyne River for navigation up to Mizoram, and the creation of highway links from Mizoram's Indian border. In addition to the Kolodyne HEP II and KMMTTP, a Land Custom Station has been operating at Zokhawthar since 1995, and at this day, that is the only border trade between Mizoram and Myanmar that is legally acknowledged. The installation of two more LCSs is suggested for Tlabung and Zorinpui. As a result, Mizoram is crucial to the success of India's Act East Policy, which aims to harness the northeastern states' potential as a conduit for Indian trade with Asean nations.

After the expansion of Chinese economic activity in the Rakhine State of Myanmar, which is physically next to the Saiha and Lawngtlai districts of Mizoram, it is clear that India should not watch in silence for its own interests. Alongside the LEP initiatives, certain unavoidable issues might arise, such as escalating cross-border crime, illegal trafficking in weapons, and illicit drug use, which the local government would not be able to adequately address. The marginalised populations who live in the strategically positioned international border areas would suffer if prompt and proper action was not taken by the state and federal governments. Positively, the AEP projects may reduce the distance between Northeast India and the rest of India and open Mizoram to Southeast Asia. Mizoram's geostrategic location has naturally raised its relevance in India's Act East Policy, and this fact has to be acknowledged and taken into account.

### **3.12 Rhi-Tiddim Road**

The 225-km Rhi-Tiddim-Falam road is being built to connect Champhai in Mizoram to Rhi in Myanmar. It is important to note that Moreh and Champhai are two important border-trading points along the Indo-Myanmar border, which became operational in

1994 and 2004, respectively. The Indian Railways have also recently proposed a rail link to Myanmar through the Northeast which involves laying tracks in the Jiribam-Imphal-Moreh sector; this line could be extended to Mandalay as part of the Delhi-Hanoi rail link. The 80-km Rhi-Tiddim road connecting Myanmar with Mizoram in India is considered a vital lifeline in terms of boosting trade and commerce, a trade centre at Mizoram's Champhai district would be the direct beneficiary once the road opens. If the Rhi-Tiddim road opens, it would surely boost bilateral trade between the two countries. With the current poor road communications on the Myanmar side, there is limited business at the trade centre in Champhai.

During the July 2010 visit of the Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman, State Peace and Development Council of Myanmar to India, it was decided that the construction and revamping of the Rhi-Tiddim road in Myanmar would be financed through a grant assistance of US\$60 million from India.<sup>23</sup> The project is yet to be implemented, however, and the present road is in poor shape. With India's assistance, it can be made into a single-lane road, which is expected to promote trade and travel links between Myanmar and Mizoram and help in optimizing the utility of the investment made in the Zokhawthar LCS in Mizoram. The adjoining town on the Myanmar side is Rhi and at present, the road connectivity from Rhi further inland into Myanmar is unpaved and in poor condition. The present road connecting Zokhawthar LCS towards the Myanmar side is a mere *kutcha* road from Kalemyo via Tiddim which can be plied only in dry season. A stretch of four to five km between Indian border at Zokhawthar and Rhi town in Myanmar needs upgradation and is essential for seamless connectivity from Zokhawthar to Rhi and onwards. Rhi-Tiddim road will connect to Monywa and onwards to Mandalay. In effect, it will provide connection between Zokhawthar in Mizoram and Mandalay.




Fig.3.2 Map of Rhi – Tiddim – Falam Road

IRCON has prepared the estimate of the 80-km Rhi-Tidim road at INR 298 crore. The MEA has obtained the approval of the Committee of Non-Plan Expenditure (CNE). The construction will be completed within three years after the requisite approvals. India has agreed to the implementation of Rhi-Tiddim Road Development Project in Myanmar with grant assistance to that country and Ministry of External Affairs of India (MEA) has sought technical assistance from the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORTH) for the road.

Trade between India and Myanmar through the Zokhawthar LCS takes place on a regular basis although the volume of legal trade is limited. Unlike the Moreh-Tamu

border points, the Zokhawthar-Rhi trading point is a more peaceful one, although the latter sees a larger volume of exchanges. The road from Champhai, the nearest town in Mizoram from the border at Zokhawthar, is at a distance of about 33 km, a little more than an hour away. The road from Champhai to Zokhawthar is being constructed with assistance from the ADB and is almost finished. It is at present a modest one but the road is being widened at several points and its condition being improved as it nears completion. The distance from Aizawl, the capital city of Mizoram, to Champhai is about 186 km and the journey takes about six hours.

For increase in trade through the border point at Mizoram, the road on the Manipur side needs to be improved and made capable of handling heavy vehicles.<sup>25</sup> This is not the case at present. The Zokhawthar-Rhi border point has a lot of potential for increasing links between India's northeast and Myanmar. The opening of the Rhi-Tiddim road is also expected to boost bilateral trade between the two countries.

### **3.13 The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project**

The Look East Policy envisaged by the Government of India will be beneficial to the geographically land-locked Northeastern region of India. The region with rich untapped natural resources and huge potential human resources must have an outlet to generate economic growth of the region. The North eastern region is located in a strategically important region which touches in the north China, and south Myanmar and in the west, Bangladesh, becomes a potential gateway to the most developed Asian regions. The opening of eastern border trade points with Myanmar are all part and parcel of the India's Look East Policy. The fact of the matter is that without a close rapport and co-operation with Myanmar, the Look East Policy will not be successful because Myanmar is located at the gate of our immediate and distant eastern neighbours.

The people of Mizoram watch the Look East Policy with great enthusiasm, some of them expressed their doubts about the utilities to be reaped by the Mizos. In the Look

East Policy, Zokhawthar-Rih sector border trade center and Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport project occupy important place in Mizoram. The reasons of signing the historical agreement on Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project between India and Myanmar are many. Both of them want to develop good neighbourly relations. Both countries want to strengthen bilateral relation and promote greater economic integration.

Both countries want people to people contact for mutual benefit. Both India and Myanmar want to explore possibility of constructing commercial route which connects the port of Sitwe in Myanmar with the State of Mizoram. By keeping in view of all these things, the Indian Government and the Myanmar Military Junta chalked out this historic project that will link the Eastern sea port of Kolkata with Sittwe port in Arakan State of Myanmar. The transport project will be the combination of a system of inland water-way and highway. Both India and Myanmar after carefully examining the detailed project report prepared and submitted by Rail India Technical Economic Services (RITES) in December 2003, signed an agreement on April 2, 2008, for the construction of Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP). The backwardness of the Northeastern States in general and the State of Mizoram in particular will immensely benefit from KMMTTP. The project aims to link the Northeast States with the sea via this route. The State of Mizoram is very far from sea ports. Even though Kolkata sea port is very near from the air, it is very far by land route, as such, people need to pass through Siligury in West Bengal by road. Another way through short route is through Bangladesh but that is not possible. In this context, goods in bulk cannot reach Mizoram easily. Fortunately, one of the biggest rivers in Mizoram, river Kaladan in Mizo called Chhimtuipui flows through Myanmar Sittwe port in Bay of Bengal. Sittwe is a big sea port in Bay of Bengal in Myanmar. After surveying Kaladan River from different angles, it has been found out that the river Kaladan from Kaletwa to Sittwe which is about 225 km can be made navigable.

The distance from Mizoram border to Kaletwa in Myanmar is 62 km which is not navigable, therefore, land route is to be constructed along the river Kaladan. All expenditures in the project are to be incurred by the Government of India. After investigations by the groups of experts India and Myanmar have made the following



agreements, firstly, expenditures for the project are to be borne by India, secondly, Myanmar Government will levy taxes to those who utilize the transport facilities of these projects. Thirdly, from Kaletwa to Sittwe port is to be made navigable. Fourthly, from Kaletwa in Myanmar to Lawngtlai in Mizoram is to be made motorable. Apart from that, from Kaletwa in Myanmar up to river Zochaw in Mizoram– Myanmar border is to be made doubled land-motorable road. Therefore, when Kaladan Multi-Modal Project is completed, the route of Kolkata-Sittwe-Lawngtlai-Aizawl will be shorter by several kilometers. The routes will be immensely benefited by Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur and southern region such as Barak valley of Assam. It is expected that Mizoram and those States that make use of these roads, for them, business corridors will be open to Singapore and other eastern Asian countries through this project. The Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transit Project (KMMTTP) as envisage by the Government of India and Myanmar has been classified into three phases. A brief explanation of each phase is made in the following so as to give a clear picture of the project.



Fig. 3.3 Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Road at Zochachhuah

### **3.13 (i): First Phase of KMMTTP**

The First Phase is the reconstruction and development of Sittwe port so as to accommodate bigger vessels. The widening of the approach river channel in order to

accommodate 6000 ton ships is also included in this phase. The current size of Sittwe port will be expanded by constructing landing facilities. Loading and storage facilities will also be extended so as to increase the capacity of the port. After the completion of the project, the port landing stages will be expanded by 219 x 15m that will facilitate the handling of 20,000 cargo-carrying ships. There is also another scheme of Inland Waterway Terminal (IWT) with the area of 54 x 15m port jetty which will provide for smaller vessels plying on the river. The present Sittwe port composes of 78 x 15m landing stage, and as such, it is suitable for handling only for vessels of 2000-3000 tons.

### **3.13 (ii): Second Phase of KMMTTP**

The Second Phase of the KMMTTP is the river Kaladan transport extending from Sittwe port to Kaletwa in Chin State. The total length of the Second Phase is estimated to be 225km which passes through Paletwa located between Sittwe port and Kaletwa. In the process of the construction and widening of river Kaladan in the Second Phase of KMMTTP more than 2 million cubic meters of materials are needed to be taken away from the river. This will make the river navigable. Another Inland Waterway Terminal also will be built at Kaletwa. This will facilitate the movements of cargo from the river to the road transport which means movements of goods and people from Second Phase to the Third Phase.

### **3.13 (iii) The Third Phase of KMMTTP**

The Phase 3 of the KMMTTP is the land transport that extends from Kaletwa to river Zocha of Mizoram-Myanmar border. The distance between Kaletwa to river Zocha in Mizoram is 62 km. From river Zocha at Indo-Myanmar border upto Lawngtlai National Highway covers a distance of 99.830 km. The distance between Kaletwa and Lawngtlai NH-54 encompasses the Third Phase of Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project. Therefore, one can say that the Third Phase consists of two parts, Myanmar section and Mizoram section. Feasibility studies for the land route were carried out by the Indian authorities. The study has found out that in order to implement the project successfully, the work has to be carried out by an experienced construction firms, but in June 2009 the Myanmar military government has decided to take up the

highway construction inside Myanmar. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) Lawngtlai to Myanmar border Highway Project is to be manned by Public Works Department (PWD), Mizoram. Rail India Technology and Economic Services (RITES) have conducted survey of the stretch between Lawngtlai to Myanmar. It mainly involves improvement and widening of existing Border Road Organization roads, such as, Lawngtlai-Dingtlang-Parva (LDP) and NCV-Nalkawn-Chamdur valley (NCV), and about 30 km of new alignment is made by PWD, Government of Mizoram. The Mizoram Public Work Department (PWD) rejected the Rail India Technical and Economic Services (RITES) survey and prepared a new alignment. The Government of India has accepted the detailed Project report, 261 prepared by Mizoram Public Work Department (PWD) in principle and is expected to begin their work by the year 2010. The Sittwe port project which has been planned at the cost of US\$120 is a system of build transfer and use project to be funded by a grant from the Government of India. Berth users will be charged for services offered by the port once it has been upgraded and operated. When the project is completed, it will be handed over to the Burmese Government. This project involves development of a trade route between India and Myanmar along the river Kaladan. River Kaladan is navigable from the point where it merges with the Bay of Bengal of Sittwe port up to Kaletwa (Setpyitpyin) in Myanmar and then from Kaletwa (Setpyitpyin) and beyond the river is not navigable. As per the report prepared by the Ministry Development of Northeastern Region (DoNER), Kolkata port is at a distance of 539 km from Sittwe by sea, while the distance from Sittwe to Kaletwa (Setpyitpyin) via river Kaladan is another 225 km, and from there to the Indian border of Mizoram is 62 km by road. Again, as per the project report of the PWD, the Government of Mizoram, from Mizoram-Myanmar border to Lawngtlai NH-54 is 99.830 km. From Kaletwa, Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project runs parallel to the river Kaladan linking the District Headquarters of Lawngtlai. The road is to be made in double lane of 12 metres wide and out of these 8 meters to be black topped. This project connects the NH-54 from Lawngtlai which in turn connects the entire mainland of India. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project will link the NH-54 from Lawngtlai to Sittwe port in Arakan via Kaletwa in Myanmar into the India Ocean. From the Sittwe port the trade route links up to Haldia in Kolkata then to Vishakapatnam (Vizag) in Andhra Pradesh and

to different ports. With regard to the KMMTTP Third Phase, Chief Minister Lalthanhawla informed the Assembly House stating that under Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project Rs 680 crores has been sanctioned by the Centre Government for the construction of road from Lawngtlai (Mizoram) to Myanmar border. For this purpose issuing of tender is in the process and the work is to be completed within 4 years. This project will run through the State of Mizoram and will boost the economy. The cost of transportation of goods and people of Mizoram via Sittwe port in Bay of Bengal will decrease as it takes only eight hours from Sittwe to Kolkata. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Route will run right through the State of Mizoram. This development will lead to economic prosperity to the land-locked Mizoram. The transport of goods and movement of people via Sittwe will reduce travel time and cost as it takes only eight hours from Sittwe to Calcutta by sea.

### **3.14 Mizoram as One of the Economic Gate Ways of the Country**

The people of Mizoram will reap many benefits from the international highways between Myanmar and Mizoram. The Mizos have to prepare for this great event, so that they may not be left behind when opportunities open to them through the Government of India's Look East Policy. New Delhi wants to connect the North-east with commercial sea routes. Moreover, with the development of Sittwe port and the Kaladan River as navigable, the river is expected to have another viable excess to the association of South East Asian nations. Talking to Media persons on January 29, 2007, the then Chief Secretary of Mizoram, Haukhum Hauzel has highlighted India's plan to connect the North- East Region to the sea through Mizoram under Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP). The Government of India has agreed to spend a huge amount of money for the project costs for the development of the Sittwee port and the terminal at Kaletwa, the up-gradation of the water way between Kaletwa and Sittwee and the construction of road from Kaletwa to Mizoram. India has decided to spend a huge amount of money for connecting the Northeastern States to the outside world. In order to fulfil its vision, she has extended to Myanmar a soft loan of US \$10 million at an annual interest rate of 2.5 per cent to cover the expenses of its share of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project. The reason for doing this is that the Myanmarrese Junta Known as State Peace and Development

Council has shown reluctant to invest but assured free land for the Project. As it has been mentioned earlier, the detailed project report has been prepared by the Rail India Technical and Engineering Services (RITES). The total cost for the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport project has been estimated at Rs 860.95 crores. 'The Ministry of Finance has confirmed the amount being sanctioned' and this project will link Mizoram with Myanmar. The proposed project begins from Sittwe port and enters the State of Mizoram through Kaladan River in the southern tip of Mizoram. As it has been stated earlier that Kaladan Project with a budget of \$120 million is a system of 'Build Transfer and Use (BTU)', and the Government of India will finance the project by way of grant. The arrangement would allow the movement of cargo from Sittwe to Indian ports. This project has been conceived by the Indian External Affairs Ministry in 2003, the project also received its approval from the Planning Commission of India. In addition to that the Government of Myanmar has also given a green signal to this project.

### **3.15 Background of the Study Areas**

Mizoram is located between 22 19'N and 24 19'N latitude and 92 16' E longitude covering a geographical area of 21087 sq km. with a population of 10,91,014 (2011 census) it has an average density of 52 persons per square kilometre. The state of Mizoram is surrounded by Myanmar in the east, Manipur and Cachar district of Assam in the north, Tripura and Bangladesh in the west and again, Myanmar in the south. Geographically, it is 277 km from north to south, and 121 km from east to west. The tropic of Cancer passes through the middle of the state.

The geographical location of Mizoram is of great significance and forms an ideal field of geopolitical study. It has a long interstate boundary with Assam (123 km), Tripura (66 km), and Manipur (95 km). besides Mizoram shares international borders from three sides, with Myanmar in the east and south (404 km) and Bangladesh in the west (306 km). This has divided the Mizo's and their associated clans. It has a complex north-south trending mountainous terrain which is thickly forested. Along with its inaccessible and isolated nature, the southern margins and the trijunction points (of Mizoram – Tripura – Assam, Mizoram – Manipur – Assam, Mizoram – Bangladesh – Tripura and Mizoram – Myanmar – Bangladesh) have formed an important core of

activities at the time of insurgency. This is the reason why this frontier has attained strategic and geopolitical significance.

Mizoram has borders Myanmar from four districts namely Champhai district and Hnahthial district in the east and Siaha district and Lawngtlai district in the south. The study areas consist of Zokhawthar in Champhai district, Thingsai in Hnahthial district, Lungbun in Siaha district and Zochachhuah in Lawngtlai district. The total length of this boundaries is 404 kms.

Mizoram is a hilly state and the highest point is 2157 metres above sea level on the blue mountain. The hill ranges run from north to south direction and in between such parallel ranges of hills there are narrow valleys and deep gorges. The average height of this mountainous state is 900 metres above sea level. The folds of the ranges are characterised by compressed anticliness alternating with broad, gently depressed synclines.

The relief of the eastern part is quite higher and the slope are steeper than in the southern part. The average height of the ranges along the Indo-Myanmar border is 2000 metre above the sea level.

Physiographically, the terrain is mountainous with prominent relief. Hill ranges are trending in the north-south direction parallel to sub-parallel anticlinal hill ranges, synclinal narrow valleys from deep gorges. Basically these are structural hills. The process of denudation and weathering is still continuing in response to various natural forces. One of the dominant forces of formation of such landforms is exertion by running water. Based upon lithology, relief drainage, and structural pattern, the border areas in the eastern part i.e. Zokhawthar & Thingsai village has been divided into two major units viz denude structural hills and valleys.

**(a)**



**(b)**



Fig. 3.4 (a)Tiau River at Thingsai – Myanmar Border

(b) Bridge connecting Thingsai & Myanmar

Lungbun is mostly occupied by denudo structural hills, i.e. the processes of denudation have not yet obliterated the structural features such as dip facet and strike trend, anticline and syncline.

Zochachhuah is mostly occupied by denudo structural hills which is predominantly argillaceous. Zochachhuah is low elevated hills in the south eastern part of the district along the Myanmar border. They have gentle to moderate slopes and possess gully erosion. In between these, north-south trending longitudinal valleys are common. The main rock types are shales with siltstone alterations of Bokabil formations.



(a)



(b)



Fig 3.5 (a) & (b) River Kolodyne at Lungbun – Myanmar border



Fig. 3.6 Sekulh Lui (River) at Zochachhuah – Myanmar boundary

### **Climate**

The greater part of Mizoram enjoys a humid sub-tropical monsoon climate and the narrow belt of the Indo- Myanmar border has a cold, humid high altitude climate. The average annual temperature in the areas having subtropical monsoon climate is between 10°C to 20°C. During summer the temperature is sufficiently hot (18°C - 25°C) and winter is cool, longer and drier. The temperature is usually low in the Indo-Myanmar border lowest below 0°C in the winter and highest is not exceeding 20°C

during the summer. The entire Mizo Hills falls under the direct influence of southwest monsoon and receives sufficient amount of rainfall.

The eastern part of the border areas such as Zokhawthar and Thingsai experiences a very pleasant climate. It is neither too hot in summer nor too cold in winter warm and moist weather is observed in summer whereas cold and dry weather is found in winter season. According to the prevailing weather condition, it has three distinct seasons- warm season, rainy season and cold season. Warm season begins in the month of March and continues till the end of May. April and May are the hottest months where maximum temperature exceeds 23°C. Rainy season includes the month from June to September. During this season the area receives heavy amount of rainfall and this cools down the climate but days are as hot as the hot season where there is no rain. Cold season started in the month of October and lasted till the end of February. January is the coldest month where the minimum temperature goes down below 5°C. This season is very cold and frost is falling down in the night.

Whereas the climate of Zochachhuah is moderate, slightly extreme in Summer months. The average temperature ranges from the minimum 13°C in winter to maximum 33°C in summer. The hottest month is June and the coldest month is January. The wind characteristics is sometimes is mild flowing from East to West direction but violent weather with wind, rain and hailstorm starts at the end of April and beginning of May which causes wide spread damage to crops cautions the beginning of long period of monsoon. The average rainfall of the region is about 2250 mm. Pre monsoon rains start in the month of April and rainy season begins from May and continues till October. The mild cold starts in October and colder season begins in November and the cold spell continues till February/March.

Lungbun experiences tropical humid climate with cool summer and cold winter. The rainfall is mainly due to the monsoon in early May to late September. The average annual rainfall is 2150 mm. Rainfall occurs mostly between June and September by the southwest monsoon. The (October to January) is a full dry with few rainy days. Winter temperature varies between 11<sup>0</sup> and 13<sup>0</sup>C in general. The winter season is however, without snow fall. Summer (March to May) is largely hot and dry with

occasional thunder showers and pre-monsoon rains in April to May. Temperature exceed 32°C during April and May and after occurrence monsoon rain, temperature recedes slowly. Climatic disturbances in the Bay of Bengal have marked influence in the intensity of rainfall.

### **Natural Vegetation**

The type of forest cover in the eastern part of border area is primarily sub-tropical forest. The vegetation is made up of a variety of species. Natural vegetation found in Zokhawthar & Thingsai forest area are Lithoparcus, schimawallichi, Rhododendron, cane sand, a variety of orchids and lichens etc. Common herbs are Ageratum adenophorum and maesa indica.

Forests are the most critical natural resource for the people of Siaha as 84.7% of the total area of the district is under forest and tree cover (FSI, 2019). The communities has the right to utilize the land and cultivate in the vicinity forests as per the approval accorded by the village council. Natural vegetation comprises of tropical evergreen in the lower altitudes and semi-evergreen on the upper slopes. There is little vegetation found in the south eastern part of Mizoram especially in the border area of Zochachhuah.



Fig 3.7 Community Reserve Forest at Thingsai



Fig 3.8 Natural Vegetation at Zochachhuah

## **Agriculture**

The economy of Zokhawthar is based primarily on agriculture and international border trade. The topography and climate are ideal for growing a wide range of crops. Agriculture plays a vital role in the life of the people. The cropping system is influenced by soil, micro climate and the overall socioeconomic status.

Zokhawthar has a small area for cultivation due to high population pressure and new settlement in the village .Rice is the main food crop cultivated in the area, beside rice a small patch of land are used growing cash crops (vegetables).

Agriculture is the mainstay of the people of Thingsai village. Jhum cultivation is practiced by 320 families. The household survey who involved in the cultivation of Rice and Vegetables consist of 31.6%. The household comprising 17.8% were engaged in only vegetables cultivation.



Fig 3.9 Chilli cultivation at Thingsai



Fig 3.10 Rice Field at Thingsai



Fig 3.11 Paddy field at Zokhawthar

Thingsai has an agricultural land of 252.80 hectares for cultivation. Introduction of permanent jhuming in Thingsai for which land development activities like Bench Terracing, wet rice cultivation, contour trench and half moon terrace and other moisture conservation are carried out. Harvesting of rain water during monsoon for optimum utilization during dry season. The major cash crop in Thingsai is chilli and ginger. Planting of Horticulture cash crops like orange, nimbu, hatkora, banana, avocado, pineapple and broom grass cultivation in areas with slope % of 10-45. There is and introduction of climbers like Passion fruit and grapes in areas above 4000 feet from mean sea level.

### **3.16 Socio-Economic Development and Cultural Background**

The evolution of the Mizo and other sub-tribes depicts their migratory nature in the beginning of their habitation in Mizoram. These Kuki-Chin groups of Tibeto-Burman branch of Indo-Mongoloid race came to the present Mizoram in different waves and



occupied the area where they could find suitable land for agriculture, besides consideration of their security. They occupied the land which was either virgin or captured the land by driving out earlier settlers in the North or the West. But their migratory nature did not change and as such, they went on changing the places of habitation. There was no permanent settlement till the advent of the British administration at the end of the last century.

After their permanent settlement, they made their abode either on the hill-tops or slopes maintaining defensive position. They developed local cultural traits which were distinguishable from one another. Their spatial distribution of settlement was geopolitically significant. The ethnic map clearly exhibits that the more advance group i.e. Lusei (Sailo Clan) occupied the nearest area of Mizoram i.e. in Aizawl and Lunglei Districts. The Northern area was inhabited by the weaker groups like old Kuki, Hmar and Paihte in North-Eastern region. In the Southern district of Chhimtuipui, there is predominance of the Lakhers (Tuipang C.D. Block). All these tribes and sub-tribes occupy specific area of their own and follow their own Socio-economic patterns distinctly.

These tribes living in specific location in Mizoram have not maintained water-tight compartment relation in their mutual social-Economic life. Their mutual social relationship reflects Social Unity and harmonious ethnic relationship, This exhibits a close-knit Mizo Society. Their Social and religious customs are common with little local variations. However, the Chakmas maintain distinct social customs due to difference in religious practices. Their agro-economics life reflects the common outlook and high sense of morality.

The egalitarian perception has made the Mizo society classless and casteless. The self-sufficient village life is unsophisticated. They are also proud of their “Tlawmngaihna” (Selfless service to needy persons). In their early economic life they used to follow barter system Irrespective of their group or sub-group feeling. But with the introduction of money economy, the exchange of commodities started in terms of money.

The advent of Christianity in Mizoram in the early part of the present century had excellent impact on the socio-cultural life of the Mizo people. Their mode of life was changed and their social structure was completely transformed.

The Christianity spread education in Mizoram gave them lesson of love, sympathy and a sense of value which were completely missing during their traditional life. Christianity taught the tribes the value of peace, tolerance, co-existence and universal brotherhood. It paved the way for modernity in Mizoram. As a result, the lifestyle, the way of thinking and doing, were radically metamorphosed. Their mental horizon widened by its teaching, and the superstitions and faith in spirit vanished.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the Christianity made them adaptable to western culture. Its impact on socio-economic activity is also significant. A sense of individualism and individualistic approach to life was inspired by Christianity.

The Mizo society is a well - knit society. There is caste or class system. The community life is comprehensive and free from any rank or status consciousness. They participate in all social or religious functions without any consideration of social hierarchy. The festivals have promoted community feeling and have helped in influencing the attitude of Mizo people. Every festival is accompanied with dance and music which is the symbol of their love and fellow feeling. The community feasts and festivals have widened the boundary of community life.

Among the community festivals (called 'Kut' in Mizo), 'Pawlkut', 'ChapcharKut' and 'MimKut' are most important.<sup>2</sup> These are celebrated on specific occasions of the agricultural cycle, for example, the Pawl but is celebrated at the end of the harvest to commemorate the new years. This also synchronizes with the completion of the harvest and gathering of the crops. This is the festival of children also. The ChapcharKut is the festival of spring which is celebrated before the Jhum is burnt. For this festival, long preparations are made. The traditional Mizo dance 'Chai' is performed which is shared by both male and female. The 'MimKut' is festival for propitiating the dead spirit which is observed when the first maize crop in the field is reaped. They consecrated samples of new grains to the departed souls with full

fanfare. After the advent of Christianity, most of these festivals disappeared. A new festival namely, 'Thalfavang Kut' has come to be celebrated.

The social life, animal sacrifice, arranging feast, offering drinks and inviting large number of guests are the common cultural phenomena of the Mizo life. These strengthen fellow feeling, stimulate interest in adventurous activities and promoted spirit of selfless (Tlawmngaihna) service to the needy persons, irrespective of social, economic, political and other considerations. These are the most essential parts for their life in such a natural surrounding where people are leading an isolated life. The tribal society is an ideal one and the people help the poor, hungry and needy persons. No begging is allowed in Mizo society. The community life of the Mizos is deeply embedded in agricultural activity which invites the whole community to share both pleasure and pain. This ultimately gives birth to a socio-cultural unity. The development of Mizo society and its various socio-economic and political organizations are embedded in agriculture.

### **3.17 Trade**

Prior to Indian independence, there was free trade between Myanmar and Mizoram. Rice was imported from Myanmar to meet the Mizo requirements in exchange of Mizo products. But after the partition of India, the trade between India and Myanmar ceased to exist. As a result, the Mizo economy which so long largely depended on Myanmar suffered a heavy blow. So, Mizo economy, during those days, mainly depended upon the money earned by serving in various Government establishments or doing petty trades like selling vegetables etc. Thus, in the first phase i.e. during the period of chieftainship, the Mizo economy was by and large based on Jhum.

Contributing the required amount of produce to the concerned chief as Fathang, a Mizo used to somehow meet his daily needs. Moreover, he had little hopes and aspirations. Then came the British period during which produce in Jhum Cultivation decreased for want of new sites for Jhum cultivation caused by cessation of nomadic life by law in force and withdrawal of a section of people from agriculture caused by the spread of education. And the Mizo economy became bad to worse during the transitional period from the British- India administration to the administration of the

independent India when trade between Myanmar and Mizoram was stopped owing to the political partition of India and Myanmar.

From time immemorial, trade between the people of Mizoram, Manipur and Myanmar has been taking place through traditional trade routes. However, in view of the immense potential that exist between India and Myanmar in the fields of trade and economic cooperation, government of India and government of Myanmar signed an Indo-Myanmar border trade agreement on January 21, 1994, with the following four objectives.

1. To exchange locally produced commodities by people living along both sides of the Indo-Myanmar border.
2. To deal with the foreign trade transactions in freely convertible currencies or in currencies mutually agreed upon by the two countries, including local currencies or through counter-trade agreement.
3. To make the product available cheaper by transporting by land route; and
4. To provide schemes for employment generation by creating facilities of manufacturing activities through free trade zones or joint ventures establishments on both sides of the border.

With these main objectives in mind the government of India and the government of Myanmar have agreed to open borders on the following three sectors —

1. Moreh (Manipur) in India and Tamu in Myanmar.
2. Champhai (Mizoram) in India and Hri in Myanmar.
3. Lungwa (Nagaland) in India and in Myanmar.

It has been observed that official trade statistics of either country do not reflect the substantial border trade that takes place between India and Myanmar every year. Border trade between India and Myanmar was formalized through signing of India-Myanmar border trade agreement (BTA) on January 21, 1994 and operationalised on April 12, 1995 through Moreh border (Manipur).

The second designated Border Trade Point at Champhai in Mizoram corresponding to Rih in Myanmar as the second route in border trade agreement also operationalised. Road improvement is almost complete. To facilitate arrangement relation to border

trade with Myanmar, the Ministry of Commerce has sanctioned a sum of Rs.2 Crores for construction of a composite building in Zokhawthar a new border township.

Indo-Myanmar border trade through Champhai has a special significance because three types of trade can exist. They are:-

- 1) Traditional Barter trade. this is free trade.
- 2) Barter mechanism or counter trade.
- 3) Normal or Regular trade Mechanism.

As per the Government of India EXIM policy, Normal or Regular Trade will be carried on through Letter credit. Under Traditional Free exchange mechanism; there will be trade link in twenty two commodities. They are as follows-

- 1) Mustard/ Rape seed.
- 2) Onion
- 3) Pulses and Beans
- 4) Fresh vegetables
- 5) Fruits
- 6) Chillies
- 7) Spices
- 8) Food items for local consumption.
- 9) Tobacco.
- 10) Tomato.
- 11) Minor forest products. (excluding Teak)
- 12) Reed Broom.
- 13) Sesame.
- 14) Resin.
- 15) Coriander seeds.
- 16) Soya bean.
- 17) Roasted Sunflower seed.
- 18) Katha.
- 19) Ginger.
- 20) Garlic.
- 21) Guava.
- 22) Any other commodities as maybe mutually agreed upon between the two sides.

Border is a peripheral land lying along the International boundary and in context of border of the neighboring country. The two borders are complementary to each other. Though isolated in one sense, but the region has never been devoid of socio-cultural and economic relations with its neighbor. A flourishing border trade did exist here. There is a need to revive and strengthened it in the changed situation for the benefit of the border people.

The border have their own natural and human environment, which influence the trade, taking place between them. Economic linkages developed naturally between people of two borders, for both have spatial proximity and both are far away from the mainland or production centers of their respective country.

Therefore, surplus product are bartered or purchased by each other to maintain their survival. Such a trade most strong and necessary where borders are in different topographic units or ecosystem, example, hills and plains, and also in the borders occupied by more or less similar people.

The economy and border trade both profit from one another. Therefore, it is important to cultivate both. The establishment of "Fair" border commerce is essential for the growth of the populace's economy due to the border regions' challenging terrain, remoteness, and lack of infrastructure. Selling their goods was extremely difficult for the border, particularly for the perishable agro-horticulture items. Therefore, the growth of commerce and the economy of the border people must be taken into consideration by planners, law makers, administrators, and academics. A strong and successful border equates to a strong and content country.

### **3.18 Status of Myanmar Refugees in Mizoram**

Since the military takeover of power in Myanmar at the beginning of February 2021, widespread violence, internal displacement, chaos and human misery has set off a catastrophic refugee crisis in Myanmar. As the military crackdown on protesting civilian shows no signs of abating, thousands of Myanmar citizens have left their homes without any hope of returning soon. As a matter of fact, India, which shares a

1,643 km long stretch of land border with Myanmar is also evidently affected. About 35,000 Myanmar nationals, mainly from the Chin State, have fled to the border districts of India's north-eastern State of Mizoram. However, the Indian government has cold-shouldered to accept the fleeing Myanmarese as refugees. Ministry of Home Affairs has sent an advisory letter in March 2021 to four states bordering Myanmar- Mizoram, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, and Manipur- to identify and deport Myanmar nationals, citing India is not a signatory to the National Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 1967 protocol.

Most refugees coming in from Chin are from Lai, Tidim-Zomi, Lusei, Hualngo and Matu tribes, which share close links with the Mizo's of Mizoram. The Chin state shares a border with six districts of Mizoram- Champhai, Lawngtlai, Siaha, Hnahthial, Saitual and Serchhip.

Sl. No	Name of Village	No. of Relief Camp	No. of Persons in Relief Camp	No. of Persons Outside Relief Camp	No. of refugee			
					Adult		Minor (Male & Female)	Total No. of increase/Decrease from last report
I	II	III	IV	V	Male	Female	Below 18 yrs	
1.	Thingsai (Hnathial Dist.)	02	76	269	133	143	69	345
2.	Zokhawthar (Champhai Dist.)	11	2458	3146	1988	1328	2288	5604
3.	Zochachhuah (Lawngtlai Dist.)	01	115	0	37	42	36	115
4.	Lungbun (Siaha Dist.)	0	0	158	43	48	67	158
	<b>Total</b>	14	2649	3573	2201	1561	2460	6222

Table 3.5 Status of Refugees in border areas of Mizoram for the Week ending Date –

13/05/2023

Note: Number of refugees shown included both who are staying at relief camps and those outside relief camps



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## CHAPTER-4

### Socio-Economic Development of Case Study Villages

#### 4.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is an attempt to investigate the socio-economic circumstances of individuals living in Mizoram's frontier regions. The population structure, cultural practices, means of livelihood, trans - border commerce between Myanmar and Mizoram, in-migration, and how it affected the socio-economic circumstances of those living in Mizoram regions have all been further explored in this chapter. Relationships between India and Myanmar are founded on common historical, regional, cultural, and religious connections. India, the birthplace of Lord Buddha, is a sacred destination for Myanmar's pilgrims.

Relations between India and Myanmar have endured the weight of time. The two nations' closeness to one another has helped in the establishment and maintenance of friendly relations as well as enabled people-to-people exchanges. Over 1600 km of land separate India and Myanmar, and they also have a marine frontier in the Bay of Bengal. In Burma, there are a lot of people with Indian ancestry where some figures put the number at 2.5 million. The geographical location of Mizoram is of great significance and forms an ideal field of geographical study. Mizoram shares international borders with Burma in the east and south (404 km) and Bangladesh in the west(306 km). This has divided the Mizo's and their associated clans. It has a complex north-south trending mountainous terrain which is thickly forested. Along with its inaccessible and isolated nature, the southern margins and the trijunction points ( of Mizoram – Tripura – Assam, Mizoram – Manipur – Assam, Mizoram – Bangladesh – Tripura and Mizoram – Myanmar – Bangladesh ) have formed an important core of activities at the time of insurgency. This is the reason why this frontier has attained strategic and geopolitical significance. The border of Myanmar and Mizoram on the Indian side was 404 km long and involved the Mizo groups and the Chins. Until 1966, the border was calm. But with the rise of the Mizo insurgency and the active Chin movement on the Burmese side, the border area has become

volatile. Further south in the Mizo Hills, where mountain ranges and river valleys run parallel to each other from north to south, the border lies some distance along the river, the Tuisa, Tiau, and Boinu, all the tributaries of Kaladan which drained the eastern Mizo Hill into the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar. The people are ethnically and socio-culturally related with the people living on the other side of the border. Though they are divided by a boundary line they could not totally sever the old link. Many have their own kits and kins, many have matrimonial relations. Economic changes are also carried out.

## **4.2 Population Structure**

The population of the study comprised of four villages from four districts in Mizoram which borders Myanmar. The four villages and districts constitutes viz. Thingsai which is in Hnahthial district, Zokhawthar village which is in Champhai district, Zochachhuah village which is in Lawngtlai district and Lungbun village which is in Siaha district.

**Thingsai Village:** The latitude 22°92' and longitude 93°08' are the geocoordinate of the Thingsai village. Thingsai has an elevation 1174 meters (3857 ft) from the mean sea level.

Thingsai is a large village located in Hnahthial district of Mizoram having a total of 461 families. Thingsai village has a total population of 2241 of which 1111 are males while 1130 are females as per the population census 2011. The sex ratio of Thingsai village is 1017 which is higher than Mizoram state average of 976. Thingsai has a higher literacy rate as compared to Mizoram. In 2011 census, the literacy rate of Thingsai was 96.38% as compared to 91.33% of Mizoram. The nearest village in the Myanmar side is Bungkhua which is 26 km from Thingsai.

### LOCATION MAP OF THINGSAI, HNAHTHIAL DISTRICT, MIZORAM




Fig. 4.1 Map of Thingsai at Myanmar border



Fig 4.2 Public Health Centre at Thingsai



Fig 4.3 High School at Thingsai



Fig 4.4 A view of Thingsai Village

**Zokhawthar Village:** Zokhawthar is located in the North-Eastern region of Mizoram, between  $93^{\circ}3'$  East longitude and  $23^{\circ}4'$  North latitude and at an elevation of 735 meters (2,411 ft). The village covers an area of 8 sq kms. It is bounded on the north by Manipur, on the South and East by Myanmar, and on the West by the districts of Saitual and Serchhip districts.

Zokhawthar is a border town in Champhai district of Mizoram. It is located in Champhai RD block on the India-Myanmar border near Rihdil lake. Khawmawi village and Rih khawdar on the Myanmar side are accessible through a bridge over the Harhvar river (a tributary of river Tiau) in the year 2022, there were 728 households in Zokhawthar and the total population is 3613, of which there are 1701 males and 1912 females. Due to Myanmar's internal conflict 1200 refugees are provided shelter in Zokhawthar village.




Fig. 4.5 Map of Zokhawthar at Myanmar border.






Fig.4.6 A bridge between India and Myanmar at Zokhawthar



Fig 4.7 A bridge between India and Myanmar at Zokhawthar (Showing Myanmar side)



Fig 4.8 River Tiau at India and Myanmar Boundary during dry season

**Zochachhuah Village:** Zochachhuah is located in the south eastern part of Mizoram flanked by Lunglei district on the north, by Myanmar in the south, Siaha district on the east and by Bangladesh on the west. The exact location of Zochachhuah is from  $22^{\circ}7'57''$  N latitude and  $92^{\circ}46'24''$  E longitude. Zochachhuah has an altitude of 73 meters (240 ft) from mean sea level. It has an area of 3 sq. km.

Zochachhuah is a village on the India-Myanmar border in Lawngtlai district of Mizoram. It is located about 87.8 km from Lawngtlai. On the kaladan multi modal transit transport project road, there is a bridge over the river Sekulh lui which separated

LOCATION MAP OF ZOCHACHHUAH, LAWNGTLAI DISTRICT, MIZORAM




Fig. 4.9 Map of Zochachhuah at Myanmar border

India and Myanmar. Zochachhuah lies 3kms on the east bank of Sekulh lui. The total population of Zochachhuah village is 380 of which 260 are male and 120 are female.



Fig. 4.10 An bailey bridge at Mizoram's Zochachhuah, on the Indo – Myanmar border



Fig. 4.11 A under-construction bridge to connect India – Myanmar at Zochachhuah.

**Lungbun Village:** Lungbun village is located in the southeastern part of the state. It is bounded by Lawngtlai and Lunglei districts in the west and north respectively.

The South-eastern part is occupied by Myanmar. It lies in between North Latitude 22°46' and East Longitude 93°10' covering an area of 12 sq. km.

Lungbun is a border village in India and Myanmar, which is situated in the district of Siaha. It is about 35kms from the district capital Siaha. Mizo is the local language in Lungbun. The total population of Lungbun Village is 799, and there are 167 homes. 50% of the population is female. Female literacy rates in the village are 35.3% and 74.3%, respectively.




Fig. 4.12 Map of Lungbun at Myanmar border.



Fig 4.13 A view of Lungbun Village near India – Myanmar Border



Fig 4.14 A market place of Lungbun Village

#### 4.2.1 Family Size

From table 4.1 with reference to the family size among the households of Thingsai village, 4 to 6 members comprises of 45.3%, and 1 to 3 members comprises of 38.2%, 7 to 9 members comprises of 15.8% while family with 10-12 members comprises only 0.7% households. it can further be interpreted that in Zokhawthar village with regard to family size of households, 4 to 6 members constituted 47.9% and 1-3 members constituted 40.5%, 7 to 9 members constituted 10.8%. Only 0.9% of

family households in Zokhawthar village constituted of 10 to 12 members. Therefore, it can be suggested that in the eastern border area of Mizoram viz. Zokhawthar and Thingsai villages family members between 4 to 6 are more prevalent. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, it can be seen from table 4.1 that the percentage of households with 4 to 6 members at Zochachhuah village comprises of 48.3%, 1-3 members comprises of 36.6% households and 7 to 9 members comprises of 15% households. In Zochachhuah village, it is seen in table 4.1 that no family household has family members with 10 to 12 members.

Table 4.1: Family size

No of family members	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1 to 3	58	38.2%	136	40.5%	22	36.6%	4	4.4%
4 to 6	69	45.3%	161	47.9%	29	48.3%	54	60.0%
7 to 9	24	15.8%	36	10.8%	9	15.0%	32	35.6%
10 to 12	1	0.7%	3	0.9%	-	-	-	-
Total	152	100%	336	100%	60	100%	90	100%

According to table 4.1 in respect to family size of Lungbun village, majority of households has 4 to 6 members which makes up to 60%, 7 to 9 members makes up to 35.6% households, 1-3 members makes up only 4.4% households. So, it can be inferred from the above table 4.1 that the majority of families from various demographic areas has member between 4 and 6. The least amount of families in each of the four communities had between 10 and 12 members.

#### 4.2.2 Sex Ratio

Information about sex ratio is important social indicator to measure the socio-economic well-being. Table 4.2 shows that out of 152 households there are 666 family members in Thingsai village, in which 343 (51.5%) comprised of female while 323 (48.5%) comprised of male. Hence, we can infer from table 4.2 that female members are higher than male in Thingsai village. Out of the total 336 households in Zokhawthar village, 724 (52.1%) are female while 665 (47.9%) consists of male. Hence, it was found that, there are more female as compared to male in Zokhawthar village. At Zochachhuah village the total number of households consists of 257, and of those, 129 (50.2%) are male and 128 (49.8%) are female. Therefore, it can be concluded that Zochachhuah workforce predominately consisted of male. Out of the 511 households in Lungbun village, 273(53.4) are female while 238(46.6%) are male. Hence, it clear

from table 2 that members of Lungbun village has more number of male as compared to female.

Table 4.2 Sex ratio

Gender	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	323	48.5%	665	47.9%	129	50.2	238	46.6
Female	343	51.5%	724	52.1%	128	49.8	273	53.4
Total	666	100.0%	1389	100.0%	257	100	511	100

### 4.2.3 Educational Level

Table 4.3 indicates that out of 152 households in Thingsai village, with regard to education, 40.1% had completed secondary level of education, 30.3% completed middle level of education, 26.3% graduated while only 3.3% completed primary level of education. In Zokhawthar village, out of 336 households, 31% completed middle level of education, 28.6% completed Secondary level, 25.9% completed primary level, 8% were graduated, 3% had completed higher secondary level of education, whereas 2.4% were uneducated and only 0.60% completed their post-graduation level of education. Out of 60 households at Zochachhuah village, 75% had completed primary level of education, 11.70% had completed middle level of education, 6.7% were found to graduate while only 5% had completed secondary level of education.

Table 4.3 Educational level

Educational level	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Uneducated	0	0	8	2.40%	1	1.70%	9	10.0%
Primary	5	3.3%	87	25.90%	45	75%	24	26.7%
Middle	46	30.3%	104	31%	7	11.70%	28	31.1%
Secondary	61	40.1%	96	28.60%	3	5%	23	25.6%
Higher Sec	0	0.0%	10	3%	0	0%	3	4.4%
Graduate	40	26.3%	29	8.60%	4	6.70%	2	2.2%
Post Graduate	0	0.0%	2	0.60%	0	0%	0	0.0%
Total	152	100%	336	100%	60	100%	90	100%

In Lungbun village, out of 90 households, 31.1% had completed middle level of education, 26.7% had completed primary level of education, 25.6% had completed secondary level, 10% were found to be uneducated, 3.3% had completed higher secondary level of education, and only 2.2% are graduated.



### **4.3 Occupational Structure**

Occupational structure refers to the number of workers who are engaged in different types of economic ventures. In the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, about 38% of the households were farmer and majority (58.9%) of households are found to be daily labourer respectively. In Thingsai village, while 16% were unemployed, 13% were daily labourer and the rest of the households are working as merchants, mistiri, carpenters, teachers, working in police department, and drivers and the remaining small percentage worked as village council, tower maintainer, reverend, pig farmer, pensioner, and army. In Zokhawthar village, while 16.6% were merchant, 5% were driver, 2.7% worked as teacher, 2.4% were tailor, 1.8% were private teacher, and another 1.8% were farmer, 1.5 of the total households were carpenter, 1.2% owns a tea stall, 0.9% owns motor rental, 0.9% had no occupation while another 0.9% are mistiri, 0.6% runs wholesale shop, 0.6% were vendor, 0.6% owns motor workshop, another 0.6% were pharmacy, and the remaining small numbers includes baker, cement mistiri, civil pensioner, commercial vehicle, electrician, meat shop, mechanic, pensioner, police, restaurant, and two-wheeler workshop. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, about 51.7% of the households are farmers and 36% of households are found to be unemployed respectively. In Zochachhuah village, while 38.3% are unemployed, 6.7% work as merchant, 1.7% are Assam Rifle porter, and the remaining 1.7% work as a driver. With regard to the households' family of Lungbun, while 12.2% were teachers, and another 12.2% were farmer, 7.8% worked as merchant, 6.7% were daily labourer, 4.4% were fisherman, 3.3% were driver, 2.2% were police, and the remaining small percentage includes vendor, tourism, tailor, poultry farmer, pig farmer, public health engineering, peon, pensioner, mechanic, jcb operator, electrician, baker and army.

Table 4.4 Occupational structure of the study villages

Type of occupation	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No occupation	25	16.4	3	0.9	23	38.3	33	36.7
Assam Rifle Porter					1	1.7		
Army	1	0.7					1	1.1
Baker			1	0.3			1	1.1
Carpenter	7	4.6	5	1.5				
Cement Mistiri	1	0.7	1	0.3				
Civil pensioner			1	0.3				
Commercial vehicle			1	0.3				
Daily labourer	21	13.8	199	58.9			6	6.7
Driver	3	2.0	17	5	1	1.7	3	3.3
Electrician			1	0.3			1	1.1
Farmer	58	38.2	6	1.8	31	51.7	11	12.2
Fisherman							4	4.4
JCB Operator							1	1.1
M.A.P	2	1.3						
Meat shop			1	0.3				
Mechanic			1	0.3			1	1.1
Merchant	10	6.6	56	16.6	4	6.7	7	7.8
Mistiri	8	5.3	3	0.9				
Car rental			3	0.9				
Car workshop			2	0.6				
Pensioner	1	0.7	1	0.3			1	1.1
Peon							1	1.1
Pharmacy			2	0.6				
PHE							1	1.1
Pig Farmer	1	0.7					1	1.1
Police	3	2.0	1	0.3			2	2.2
Poultry Farmer	2	1.3					1	1.1
Private Teacher			6	1.8				
Restaurant			1	0.3				
Reverend	1	0.7						
Tailor	2	1.3	8	2.4			1	1.1
Tea stall			4	1.2				
Teacher	4	2.6	9	2.7			11	12.2
Tourism							1	1.1
Tower maintenance	1	0.7						
Two wheeler workshop			1	0.3				
Vendor			2	0.6			1	1.1
Village council	1	0.7						
Wholesale shop			2	0.6				
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.4 Income Level

According to table 4.5, with regard to income level in the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar, majority (81%) of the 152 families in Thingsai village have an income that falls within the category of ₹14499 or less. Just 4.1% of the families' income falls into the ₹46000-149999 category, whereas 15% of the households' income falls into the ₹14500-45999 range. Out of 338 homes in Zokhawthar, 62.7% had income between ₹46,000-149,000. Just 21.6% of the families in the homes had incomes between ₹50,000 and ₹200,000, while 13.5% of the households had incomes of ₹14,499 or less. Whereas 5.1% of the households' income is in the range of ₹14,500 to 459,99. Of the 60 Zochachhuah households, 36.7% had yearly incomes ₹14,499 or less, and 35% had annual incomes of ₹14,500 to 14,999 and 20% of households' households had an annual income of ₹14500-45999. Nevertheless, only 8.4% of the households' total income is in the range of ₹150000 to 2000,000. Of the 90 families in Lungbun, 63.3% had yearly incomes of less than ₹14499, 25.3% had annual incomes between ₹14500-45999, and 9.9% had annual incomes between ₹46,000-149,999. Yet, the household income only represents 1.1% of the range of income between ₹150,000-200,000 in Lungbun village.

Table 4.5: Income level

Annual Income of Households	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
14499 and below	124	81%	45	13.5%	22	36.70%	57	63.3%
14500-45999	23	15%	17	5.1%	12	20%	23	25.3%
46000-149999	5	4.1%	202	62.7%	21	35%	9	9.9%
150000-2000000	0	0	72	21.6%	5	8.40%	1	1.1%
Total	152	100%	336	100%	60	100%	90	100%

#### 4.5 In-migration status

Table 4.6 depicts the in-migration status of case study areas of the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, 31.6% are the original inhabitant of Thingsai village whereas 20.4% people had migrated from Bungkhua, 8.6% in-migrated from Thantlang, 5.9% in-migrated from Leisen, , 3.3% in-migrated from Lawklung, 2.6% in-migrated from Funkah, 2% in-migrated from Thantlang, 2% in-migrated from Aizawl, another 2% in-migrated from Bungtlang, 1.3% from Halkha, 1.3% from Khuafu, 1.3% from Bungkhua, Bungtlang,

and the remaining in-migrated from Fungkah, Cherhlun, Dawn, Ngharchhip, Niawhtlang, Rawlbuk, Serchhip, Sihmuh and Vambai. In Zokhawthar village, it was found that 20.1% of people are the original inhabitants while 14% of the households in-migrated from Tahan, Zotlang, Tuichhir, 4.4% in-migrated from Rihkhawdar, 3.3% in-migrated from Leilet, Tuingo, Vangchhia, Tlangsam, Vuangtu, and 2.7% in-migrated from Tiddim, Tlangzawl, Saek, Myohlah and another 2.1% in-migrated from Khawzawl and Champhai, 1.8% in-migrated from Simdihai, Zimte and Myanmar, 1.5% from Melbuk, Farkawn, Hruaikawn and Thingchang, merely 1.2% in-migrated from Letpanchhawng, Khawmawi, Satawm, Sanmyo, Ruantlang, Haimual and the remaining in-migrated from Lungzarhtum, Thangte, Lianhna, Siaha, Kolasib, Khuangleng, Seling, Sekan, Khampat, Kawlkuh, Samthang, Saichal, Kanan, Hnahlan, Rawthloh, Haiheng, Phunte, Ngaizawl, East Lungdar, N. Khawbung, Dawihkhel, Churachandpur, Mualveng, Bualte, Muallungthu, and Mandalay. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, it was found that 8% of the households in Zochachhuah are the original inhabitants while 13% in-migrated from Parva-II, Murihwah, 12% from T Dumzau, 8.3% in-migrated from Sabual, Sabualtlang, 3.3% in-migrated from Myanmar, and the remaining small percent in-migrated from Vaseikai, Sikulkai, Semanasori, Sekulkai, Ramrikawn, Pakaumah, Manipur, Lunghauka, Hlimzawl, Dumzautlang, Dumzau and Bondukranga

Table 4.6 : In-migration status of the study villages

Thingsai			Zokhawthar						Zochachhuah			Lungbun		
People in-migrated from	N	%	People in-migrated from	N	%	People in-migrated from	N	%	People in-migrated from	N	%	People in-migrated from	N	%
No Migration	0	0	No Migration	68	20.1	Mandalay	1	0.3	No Migration	11	18	No Migration	35	38.9
Aizawl	3	2	Aizawl	8	2.4	Melbuk	5	1.5	Bondukranga	1	1.7	Halkha	1	1.1
Bungkhua	31	20.4	Bualte	1	0.3	Muallungthu	1	0.3	Dumzau	1	1.7	Chiu ral	5	5.6
Bungkhua, Fangkah, Thingsai	1	0.7	Bungzung, Chekawn, Chawhte	3	0.9	Mualveng	1	0.3	Dumzautlang	1	1.7	Chakhai, Siaha	1	1.1
Bungtlang	3	2	Champhai	7	2.1	Myanmar	6	1.8	Hlimzawl	1	1.7	Karimganj, Assam	1	1.1
Cherhlun	1	0.7	Churachanpur	1	0.3	Myohla	3	0.9	Lunghauka	1	1.7	Lobo	15	16.7
Cherhlun, Thingsai	1	0.7	Dawihkhel	1	0.3	Myolah	9	2.7	Manipur	1	1.7	Lunglei	2	2.2
Dawn, Bungkhua	1	0.7	Dawikhal	3	0.9	N.Khawbung	1	0.3	Murihwah	8	13	Lungzarhtum	5	5.6
Fungkah	4	2.6	East Lungdar	1	0.3	Ngaizawl	1	0.3	Myanmar	2	3.3	Manipur	1	1.1
Halkha	2	1.3	Falam	2	0.6	Phunte	1	0.3	Pakaumah	1	1.7	Myanmar	6	6.7
Khuafo	2	1.3	Farkawn	5	1.5	Pingkhung	5	1.5	Parva II	8	13	Niawhtlang	1	1.1
Lawklung	5	3.3	Haiheng	1	0.3	Ramthlah	1	0.3	Ramrikawn	1	1.7	Ram tluang	1	1.1
Leisen	9	5.9	Haikhawl	2	0.6	Rawthloh	1	0.3	Parva II, Vaseikai	1	1.7	Siaha	2	2.2
Leisen, Fungkah, Thingsai	1	0.7	Haimual	4	1.2	Rihkhawdar	15	4.4	Parva II, Sabualtlang	1	1.7	Thangte	1	1.1
Lunglei	7	4.6	Hnahlan	1	0.3	Ruantlang	4	1.2	Sabual	5	8.3	Tluangram	6	6.7
Lunglei, Thingsai	1	0.7	Hruaikawn	5	1.5	Saek	9	2.7	Sabualtlang	5	8.3	Vawngtu	1	1.1
Ngharchhip	1	0.7	Kanan	1	0.3	Saichal	1	0.3	Sekulkai	1	1.7	Vuangtu	5	5.6
Ngharchhip, Thingsai	1	0.7	Kawlkulh	1	0.3	Salawm, Sazep	3	0.9	Semasora	1	1.7	Zaphai, Myanmar	1	1.1
Niawhtlang	1	0.7	Kelkang	2	0.6	Samthang	1	0.3	Sikulikai	1	1.7			
Ruabuk	1	0.7	Khampat	1	0.3	Sanmyo	4	1.2	T. Dumzau	7	12			

Thingsai			Zokhawthar						Zochachhuah			Lungbun		
People in-migrated from	N	%	People in-migrated from	N	%	People in-migrated from	N	%	People in-migrated from	N	%	People in-migrated from	N	%
Serchhip	1	0.7	Khawmawi	4	1.2	Satawm	4	1.2	Vaseikai	1	1.7			
Sihhmuh	1	0.7	Khawthlir	3	0.9	Sekan	1	0.3						
Thantlang	13	8.6	Khawzawl	7	2.1	Seling	1	0.3						
Thingsai	48	31.6	Khuangleng	2	0.6	Sesih, Vaphai	6	1.8						
Thingsai, Bungkua	2	1.3	Kolasib	1	0.3	Siaha	1	0.3						
Thingsai, Bungtlang	2	1.3	Leilet, Tuingo	11	3.3	simdihai, Zimte	6	1.8						
Thingsai, Leisen	1	0.7	Leisenzo	1	0.3	Tahan, zotlang, Tuichhir	50	14						
Thlantlang	3	2	Letpanchawng	4	1.2	Thangte	1	0.3						
Vambai	1	0.7	Lianhna	3	0.9	Thingchang	5	1.5						
Vanzang	2	1.3	Lui var	1	0.3	Tiddim, Tlangzawl	9	2.7						
Vanzang, Bungkua	1	0.7	Lungzarhtum	1	0.3	Tlangsam, vuangtu	11	3.3						
Zatlang	1	0.7	Tuichirh	4	1.2	Zokhawthar	1	0.3						
Total	152	100	Vangchhia	11	3.3	Total	338	100	Total	60	100	Total	90	100

#### 4.6 Cultivation of Crops

According to Table 4.7, with respect to cultivation of crops, in the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar village, 44.1% of families did not cultivate any crops in Thingsai village, 31.6% of all households cultivated both rice and vegetables, 17.8% of all households cultivated just vegetables, and the remaining households cultivated fruits, rice, and tea. In Zokhawthar village, 86.1% of homes did not grow any crops, 11.8% households grow only vegetables, merely 0.6% households grew both vegetables and fruits, and the remaining households dealt with the growth of rice, maize, and teak. in the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun and village about 8.3% of households do engage in crop cultivation in Zochachhuah village. However, 43.3% households grow both rice and vegetables, 30% grow only vegetables, and 18.3% grow only rice. In Lungbun village, 66.7% families claim they did not involve in any crop cultivation, 20% grow only vegetables, 6.7% grow both vegetables and rice, 2.2% claimed to be growing only fruits, and the remaining houses claimed to be growing rice, vegetables, maize and coffee.

Table 4.7 Households involved in cultivation of crops

Crops	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Cultivation	67	44.1	291	86.1	5	8.3	60	66.7
Coffee	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.1
Corn	0	0	1	0.3	0	0	1	1.1
Fruits	4	2.6	0	0	0	0	2	2.2
Rice	1	0.7	1	0.3	11	18.3	1	1.1
Rice, Vegetables	48	31.6			26	43.3	1	1.1
Teak	0	0	1	0.3	0	0		
Vegetables only	27	17.8	40	11.8	18	30	18	20
Vegetables, Fruits	4	2.6	2	0.6	0	0	6	6.7
Vegetables, Tea	1	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.7 Landholdings per Households

Table 4.8 shows that with respect to landholdings in the eastern part of Mizoram which borders Myanmar, at Thingsai village, 52.6% of households had no landholdings, 28.9% had a landholding of two hectares or less, 16.4% had a landholding of one hectare or less, 1.3% had a landholding of four hectares, and just 0.6% had a landholding of three hectares. In Zokhawthar village, 87.9% of families lacked any land holdings, 10.1% had one hectare or less, 1.5% had two hectares, and just 0.3% had three

and four hectares, respectively. Zochachhuah village, 31.7% of households had no land holdings, 26.6% had holdings of two hectares or less, 21.7% had holdings of one hectare or less, 11.7% had holdings of three hectares, 5% had holdings of four hectares, and just 1.7% had holdings of five and six hectares, respectively. In Lungbun village, 57.8% of households reported having no landholdings, 26.6% reported having 2 hectares of land, 7.8% reported having a land area of 1 hectare or less, 6.6% reported having 3 hectares of land, and the final 1.1% reported having 4 hectares of land.

Table 4.8 :Landholdings per households

Land holdings per Households (Hectare)	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Landholdings	80	52.6	297	87.9	19	31.7	52	57.8
1 hectare and below	25	16.4	34	10.1	13	21.7	7	7.8
2 hectare	44	28.9	5	1.5	16	26.6	24	26.6
3 hectare	1	0.6	1	0.3	7	11.7	6	6.6
4 hectare	2	1.3	1	0.3	3	5	1	1.1
5 hectare	0	0	0	0	1	1.7	0	0
6 hectare	0	0	0	0	1	1.7	0	0
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.8 Level of Household Production

Table 4.9 reveals the household level production, majority 77.6% of the households in Thingsai village had no production, 6.5% of the total households had production between `2000-3000, 5.2% had production between `4001-5000 and `7001-8000, 2.6% had production between `6001-7000, and only 0.6% had production between `3001-4000, `5001-6000, and `8001 to 9000. In Zokhawthar village, 97.3% of households had no production, 0.9% of all households produced between `4001-5000, 0.3% produced between `3001-4000, 0.3% produced between `5001-6000, 0.3% produced between `6001-7000, and merely just 0.3% produced between `7001-8000. In the southern border of Mizoram 50% of households in Zochachhuah village produced between `2000-3000, 26.7% produced between `7001-8000, and the remaining 23.3% between produced `4001-5000. In Lungbun village, 83.3% of families had no production, 4.4% had output production between `4001-5000, 2.2% had production between `3001-4000, and the remaining few households falls between `5001-6000, `6001-7000 and `8001-9000.



Table 4.9 :Household level production

Production	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No production	118	77.6	329	97.3			75	83.3
2000-3000	10	6.5	2	0.6	30	50		
3001-4000	1	0.6	1	0.3			2	2.2
4001-5000	8	5.2	3	0.9	14	23.3	4	4.4
5001-6000	1	0.6	1	0.3			1	1.1
6001-7000	4	2.6	1	0.3			1	1.1
7001-8000	8	5.2	1	0.3	16	26.7		
8001-9000	1	0.6					1	1.1
10000 and above	1	0.6					6	
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.9 Types of Livestock

Regarding the different types of livestock raising as shown in table 4.10, in the eastern part of Mizoram which border Myanmar about 39.5% of the households in Thingsai village were involved in poultry farming, 34.9% do not involve in any livestock rearing, 11.2% were involved in both piggery and poultry farming, 6.6% involved in piggery, 2.6% were involved in dog breeding farms, 2.0% were involved in both dog breeding farms and poultry farming, and only 1.3% were engaged in rearing goat. Nonetheless, 0.7% of all households engaged in cattle and poultry. The remaining 0.7% households' practices both in piggery and dog breeding farm. In Zokhawthar village, 79% of households had no practices of livestock rearing practices, 10.4% engaged in piggery, 8.6% practiced poultry farming, 1.2% practiced both piggery and poultry farming, and 0.3% practices both cattle and poultry farming. Yet, only 0.3% of all households own both piggery and goat farming. In the southern part of Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Zochachhuah village, 40% of households does not engage in livestock rearing, 31.7% involved in piggery, 15% engaged in rearing goat, 5% had only poultry, 3.3% had both piggery and poultry farming, 1.7% own cattle and poultry, another 1.7% own only dogs, and the remaining 1.7% own both piggery and goat. In Lungbun village, 34.4% of households had no livestock rearing practices, 30% involved in piggery, 20% own poultry farming, 14.4% had both pig and poultry, and only 1.1% own three types of livestock rearing such as piggery.

Table 4.10 Types of livestock and their numbers

Type	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhua h		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No livestock	53	34.9	267	79	24	40	31	34.4
Cattle, Poultry	1	0.7	1	0.3	1	1.7	0	0
Dog	4	2.6	0	0	1	1.7	0	0
Goat	2	1.3	0	0	9	15	0	0
Piggery	10	6.6	35	10.4	19	31.7	27	30
Piggery, Dog	1	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Piggery, goat	0	0	1	0.3	1	1.7	0	0
Piggery, Poultry	17	11.2	4	1.2	2	3.3	13	14.4
Piggery, Poultry, Dog	1	0.7	0	0	0	0	1	1.1
Poultry	60	39.5	30	8.6	3	5	18	20
Poultry, Dog	3	2.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.10 Feeding / Grazing

Table 4.11 shows the practice of grazing/feeding of livestock of the study villages and in the eastern Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Thingsai village, 38.8% of the households did not engage in feeding and grazing, 36.8% were involved in poultry feed, 7.2% were feeding vegetables, another 7.2% were feeding both vegetables and poultry feed, 4.6% were feeding only rice, 1.3% were feeding waste food, 0.7% were feeding grass, 0.7% were feeding both meat and waste foods, 0.7% were feeding rice and vegetables, and the remaining 0.7% were feeding waste food, vegetables, and poultry feed. In Zokhawthar village, 79.6% of families did not engage in stall, feeding, or grazing. And 15.7% fed on waste food, while 3.8% fed chickens feed, just 0.6% fed maize and the remaining 0.3% fed on grass. In the southern Mizoram, in Zochachhua village majority (55%) of households did not engage in feeding and grazing, 13.3% fed grass, 10% had chaff, another 10% fed vegetables, 3.3% fed only rice, 1.7% fed rice and vegetables, 1.7% fed chaff and vegetables, and the remaining 1.7% fed both vegetables and grass. 44.4% of households in Lungbun village did not engage in feeding and grazing, while 15.6% feed grass only, and another 15.6% were involved in pig feed, 10% feed vegetables, 3.3% feed only rice, 1.7% feed both rice and vegetables, 1.7% feed both chaff and vegetables, and the remaining 1.7% feed both vegetables and grass.

Table 4.11 Feeding / Grazing

Stall, feeding and grazing	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No involvement	59	38.8	269	79.6	33	55	40	44.4
Chaff					6	10		
Chaff, Vegetables					1	1.7		
Chicken feed			13	3.8				
Corn			2	0.6			2	2.2
Corn, Rice							1	1.1
Corn, Vegetables							1	1.1
Grass	1	0.7			8	13.3		
Grass			1	0.3				
Meat, waste food	1	0.7						
Pig feed							14	15.6
Pig feed, Corn, Rice							1	1.1
Pig feed, Poultry feed							1	1.1
Pig feed, Rice							2	2.2
Poultry feed	56	36.8					1	1.1
Poultry feed, waste food	2	1.3					1	1.1
Rice	7	4.6			2	3.3	14	15.6
Rice, Vegetables	1	0.7			1	1.7	3	3.3
Vegetables	11	7.2			6	10	9	10
Vegetables, Grass					1	1.7		
Vegetables, Poultry feed	11	7.2						
Vegetables, poultry feed, waste food	1	0.7						
waste food	2	1.3	53	15.7				
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.11 Income from livestock

Table 4.12 shows the earnings levels from raising cattle in the four villages of Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah, and Lungbun. . In the eastern border of Mizoram with the earnings levels from raising cattle in the two villages of Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, about 37.5% of households made less than `1000 from raising livestock, 32.9% made between `1500-2000, 23% made between `5001-10,000, 5.3% made between `1001-5,000, and only 0.7% made between `10001-15,000 from raising livestock. The remaining 0.7% made between `20001-25000 from raising livestock. In Zokhawthar village, with regard to the role of livestock income, 95.9% of households had monthly income of `1,000 or less, 2.4% make between `1001-5000, 0.9% between `15001-20000, and just 0.3% had an income between `25001-30000 through livestock rearing/farming, 0.3% between `45001-

50000, and the final 0.3% make between `60001 and above. By and large in the southern border of Mizoram, 66.7% of households in Zochachhuah village, make less than `1,000 per month through livestock farming, 15% earn between `5001 and Rs10000 through livestock farming, 8.3% between `10001-15000 through livestock farming, 3.3% between `55001 and `60000, 1.7% between `1001-5000 through livestock farming, 1.7% earn between `15001-20000 through livestock farming, 1.7% earn between `45001-50000 and the other 1.7% earn `60001 and above through livestock farming. In the southern border of Mizoram, in Lungbun village, majority (80%) of households earn less than `1,000 per month through livestock farming, while 6.6% earn between `5001-10,000 through livestock farming, 3.3% between `1001-5000, 3.3% between `45001-50000, 2.2% between `15001-20000 through livestock farming, 2.2% earns between `55001-60000 through livestock farming, and only 1.1% earns between `25001-30000 and the remaining 1.1% earns `6,001 or more through livestock farming.

Table 4.12 Income from livestock

Income group	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Below 1000	57	37.5	324	95.9	40	66.7	72	80
1001-5000	8	5.3	8	2.4	1	1.7	3	3.3
5001-10000	35	23.0			9	15	6	6.6
10001-15000	1	0.7			5	8.3		
15001-20000	50	32.9	3	0.9	1	1.7	2	2.2
20001-25000	1	0.7						
25001-30000			1	0.3			1	1.1
30001-35000								
35001-40000								
40001-45000								
45001-50000			1	0.3	1	1.7	3	3.3
50001-55000								
55001-60000					2	3.3	2	2.2
60001 and above			1	0.3	1	1.7	1	1.1
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.12 Involvement in tourism

From table 4.13 it can be seen that pertaining to availability of services to tourist, it was found that in both eastern and southern part of Mizoram which borders Myanmar viz. Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages reported they did not involve in

tourist services. However, in Thingsai village 99.3% of the households involved in providing services to tourists while the remaining 0.7% did not involve in providing services to tourist. It can be inferred from table 4.13 that all respondents of Zokhawthar village and Zochachhuah village did not take part in offering services to tourists.1.1% of the households in Lungbun village provided services to tourists, whereas 98.9% of households do not participate in providing services to tourists.

Table 4.13 Providing services to tourist

PEOPLE INVOLVED IN PROVIDING SERVICES TO TOURIST	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Yes	1	99.3					1	1.1
No	151	0.7	338	100	60	100	89	98.9
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.13 Household Assets of case study villages

As regards to household assets in the eastern Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Thingsai village there are total of 318 assets owned by all households, out of which 97.4% of the households has owned smartphone, 46.7% owned television, 39.5% owned refrigerator, 11.8% owned bicycle, 5.9% owned washing machine, 2.6% owned two-wheeler, 2.6% own car. Nonetheless, 1.3% of all households owned sumo vehicle. In Zokhawthar village, there are a total of 1170 assets owned by all households. Among these, 93.2% households have owned smartphone, 85.8% have owned television, 79.6% have owned a refrigerator, 69.8% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, 7.1% have own truck vehicle, 6.8% have owned car, and only 2.1% have owned sumo vehicle. In the southern border of Mizoram there are 96 assets in total possessed by all households in Zochachhuah village. Among them, 73.3% households owned smartphone, 45% owned radio, 20% owned television, 11.7% owned refrigerator, 5% owned rice mill, 1.7% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, another 1.7 owned a car and the remaining 1.7% owned computer/laptop. The total number of assets in Lungbun village is 252 and of which 93.3% of households have smartphones, 68.9% have owned television, 51.1% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, 40% of Lungbun village have owned refrigerator, 12.2% have owned washing machine, 6.7% have owned radio, 3.3% have owned car, and merely 2.2% have owned 2.2% truck and 1.1% have owned pickup vehicle and another 1.1% have owned sumo vehicle.

Table 4.14 Household assets

ASSETS	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bicycle	18	11.8	6	1.8				
Car	4	2.6	23	6.8	1	1.7	3	3.3
Laptop					1	1.7		
Pickup	1	0.7					1	1.1
Radio					27	45	6	6.7
Refrigerator	60	39.5	269	79.6	7	11.7	36	40
Rice mill					3	5		
Smartphone	148	97.4	315	93.2	44	73.3	84	93.3
Sumo	2	1.3	7	2.1			1	1.1
Television	71	46.7	290	85.8	12	20	62	68.9
Truck	1	0.7	24	7.1			2	2.2
Two-wheeler	4	2.6	236	69.8	1	1.7	46	51.1
Washing Machine	9	5.9					11	12.2
Total	318		1170		96		252	

#### 4.14 Type of house/settlement

According to table 4.15, with reference to the type of house/settlement among the households family of Thingsai village majority (51.3%) settled in pucca type house, 20.4% settled in rented house, 11.2% settled in hut, 7.9% settled in kutcha house and the remaining 5.9% settled in mansion/RCC house. 42.3% of households in Zokhawthar village lives in a rented house, 38.5% lives in pucca house, 10.1% lives in mansion/RCC, and the remaining 4.1% lives in kutcha house. In Zochachhuah village, 56.7% of the respondents families resides in kutcha house and the remaining 28.3% resides in a pucca type house. 63.3% of family respondents in Lungbun village settled in pucca house, 16.7% settled in kutcha house and 11.1% settled in mansion/RCC house, 4.4% settled in rented house and the remaining 1.1 settled in a hut.

Table 4.15 Type of house

Types of House/ settlement	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Rented	31	20.4	143	42.3	0	0	4	4.4
Hut	17	11.2	0	0	0	0	1	1.1
Kutcha	12	7.9	14	4.1	34	56.7	15	16.7
Pucca	78	51.3	130	38.5	17	28.3	57	63.3
Mansion/RCC	9	5.9	34	10.1	0	0	10	11.1
Total	147	96.7	321	95	51	85	87	96.6

#### 4.15 Marital status of the case study villages

Looking at table 4.16 pertinent to marital status of the case study areas of the eastern and southern border of Mizoram, in eastern border Mizoram of Thingsai village and Zokhawthar village 88.8% and 74% are married respectively. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, 95% and 91% are married respectively. Hence, we can infer from the table that majority of the households marriage occurs within the same tribe or community among the community residents of Thingsai village. However, just 3.3% among the respondents of Thingsai village are married to other tribes.

Out of the 338 households in Zokhawthar village, 250 respondents (74%) are married, and 73.7% are married to the same tribe. So, it can be justified that the majority of respondents in Zokhawthar village does not engage in marrying outside their own tribe or ethnic group. However, few of the respondents merely 0.3% are married to other tribes. Again we can say that 57 (95%) of the 60 households in Zochchhuah village are married, and 95% of them are married to their own tribe. Furthermore, it is evident from table 16 that all respondents that in Zochachhuah village 95% of the community members are married to the same tribe. Among the 90 Lungbun households, 82 (91.1%) are married, and 77.8% of them married their own tribe. Table 4.16 also shows that majority of the respondents in Lungbun village married the same tribe. Whereas 13.3% are married outside the same tribe.

Table 4.16 Marital status

Marriage Status	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Total married	135	88.8	250	74	57	95	82	91.1
Married to same tribe	130	85.5	249	73.7	57	95	70	77.8

#### 4.16 Relationship of the case study villages with Myanmar

According to table 4.17, with regard to relationship of Mizoram border with Myanmar among the respondents of Thingsai village, 57.9% households have relationship with Myanmar and the remaining 42.1% did not have any relationship with Myanmar. In Zokhawthar village, 80.8% households maintain a cordial relationship with Myanmar, while 19.2% claims to have no relationship with Myanmar. In Zochachhuah village, 95% of the total respondents claimed to have a close tie with

Myanmar, while 5% claimed to have no relationship with Myanmar. In Lungbun village, 86.7% households said they did not have a relationship with Myanmar, while 13.3% said they have a relationship.

Table 4.17 Relationship with Myanmar

Relationship with Myanmar	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	64	42.1	65	19.2	3	5	78	86.7
Yes	88	57.9	273	80.8	57	95	12	13.3
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.17 Year of settlement within the case study villages

Table 4.18 indicates that with regard to year of settlement within the case study villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, 50% of the households settled in the year 2001 and later, 30.9% settled between the year 1901-1950, 17.1% settled between the year 1951-2000 and the remaining 2% settled before the year 1900. 59.2% of households of Zokhawthar village have settled in the year 2001 and later, and 38.5% between 1951 and 2000, 1.8% between 1901 and 1950, and the rest 0.6% before settled much before the year 1900. In the Zochachhuah demography survey, 45.1% households settled in the year 2001 and later, whereas 40.1% settled between 1951 and 2000, and 8.3% settled between 1901 and 1950, and the remaining 6.7% settled before 1900. 70% of survey households in Lungbun village have settled between 2001 and later, 24.4% between 1951 and 2000, 3.3% between 1901 and 1950, and only 2.7% of households settled before 1900. Hence, from all the four villages of the case study areas, it can be justified that most of the respondents have settled in the year 2001 and beyond.

Table 4.18 People settled within villages

Year	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1900 and earlier	3	2	2	0.6	4	6.7	2	2.2
1901-1950	47	30.9	6	1.8	5	8.3	3	3.3
1951-2000	26	17.1	130	38.5	24	40.1	22	24.4
2001 and Later	76	50.0	200	59.2	27	45.1	63	70
TOTAL	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100



#### **4.18 Migration status of the case study villages**

Table 4.19 indicates about migration status, in Thingsai village, 27.6% of the households are the original inhabitants, while 21.3 % migrated from Bungkhua. 7.9 % migrated from Thantlang and 7.2 % migrated from Aizawl and the rest of the households migrated from Leisen, Lunglei, Fungkah Dawn, Vanzang, Vambai, Zatlang, Serchhip, Ngharchhip, Sihmuh, Halkha, Lawklung etc. In Zokhawthar village, 22.2% of the households are the original inhabitants, and 9.2 % are immigrants from Tahan. 4.1% of the population in Zokhawthar village migrated from Thantlang, and 7.2% migrated from Aizawl and the rest of the households migrated from Tuingo, Tuivar , Vangchhia, Vaphai, Myohla Rih, Seling, Sesih, Bualte, Bulfekzawl, Bungzung, Burma, Champhai, Chawhte, Chawngtlai, Chekan, Dawihkhel, East Lungdar, Falam, Farkawn, Haihena, Haikhawl, Haimual, Hnahlan, Hruaikawn, Kannan, Kawlkulh, Kelkang, Khampat, Khawbung Khawmawi, Khawthlir, Khawzawl, Khuangleng, Kolasib, Leilet, Leisenzo, Letpanchhawng, Lianhna, Mandalay, Manipur, Melbuk, Muallungthu, Mualveng, Myanmar, Myohla, Ngaizawl, North Khawbung, Phunte, Pingkhung, Ramthlo, Rih, Rihkhawdar, Ruantlang, Saek, Saichal, Saiha, Samthang, Satawas, Satawm, Sazep, Sekan, Simdihai, Taunfzalat, Tiddim, Thingchang, Tlangsam, Tlangzawl, Tuichirh. In Zochachhuah village, 30 % of the households are the original inhabitants and 13.3 % are immigrants from Parva II. 11.7% of the population came from T. Dumzau and another 11.7 are immigrants of Muriwah. The rest of the small percentage of households have migrated from Sabual, Sabual Tlang, Simanasora, Betseoi, Bondukranga, Churachandpur, Dakawwah, Hlimzawl, Kawlchaw, Tripura and Tuichawng Tlang. In Lungbun village, 70 % are the original inhabitants and 7.8 % are immigrants from Tlangnuam. The rest of the households migrated from Vuangtu, Lungzarhtum, Zaphai, Vuangtu, Chakhai, Cheural, Halkha and Karimganj.

Table 4.19: Migrated from which village

Thingsai			Zokhawthar						Zochachhuah			Lungbun		
Migrated from which village	F	%	Migrated from which village	F	%	Migrated from which village	F	%	Migrated from which village	F	%	Migrated from which village	F	%
No Migration			No Migration	75	22.2	Khuangleng	2	0.6	No Migration	18	30	No Migration	63	70
Aizawl	11	7.2	Aizawl	8	2.4	Kolasib	1	0.3	Betsei	1	1.7	Chakhai, Siaha	1	1.1
Bungkhua	32	21.1	Bualte	1	0.3	Leilet	4	1.2	Bondukranga	1	1.7	Chiuralh	1	1.1
Bungtlang	4	2.6	Bulfekzawl	1	0.3	Leisenzo	1	0.3	Churachanpur	1	1.7	Haika	1	1.1
Cherhlun	2	1.3	Bungzung	2	0.6	Letpanchhawng	5	1.5	Dakawwah	1	1.7	Karimganj, Assam	1	1.1
Dawn	2	1.3	Burma	6	1.8	Lianhna	3	0.9	Hlimzawl	1	1.7	Lochei, Myanmar	1	1.1
Fungkah	6	3.9	Champhai	6	1.8	Mandalay, Manipur	2	0.6	Kawlchaw	1	1.7	Lunglei	1	1.1
Hakha	1	0.7	Chawhte, Chawngtlai, Chekan	3	0.9	Melbuk, Mualveng	6	1.8	Murihwah	7	11.7	Lungzartum	2	2.2
Halkha	2	1.3	Dawihkhel	3	0.9	Muallungthu	3	0.9	Parva II	8	13.3	Manipur	1	1.1
Khuafo	1	0.7	East Lungdar	1	0.3	Myanmar	6	1.8	Sabual	3	5	Myanmar	1	1.1
Lawklung	5	3.3	Falam	6	1.8	Myohla	9	2.7	Sabual, T. Dumzau	1	1.7	New Laty	1	1.1
Leisen	9	5.9	Farkawn	5	1.5	Ngaizawl	1	0.3	Sabualtlang	3	5	No-Ao-Tla	1	1.1
Leidsen, Fungkah	1	0.7	Haihena	1	0.3	North Khawbung	1	0.3	Sikulkai	1	1.7	Siaha	2	2.2
Lengbang	1	0.7	Haimual, Haikhawl	7	3.1	Phunte	1	0.3	Simanasora	2	3.3	Thianria	1	1.1
Lunglei	8	5.3	Hnahlan, Sazep	4	1.2	Pingkhung	6	1.8	Sobual	1	1.7	Tluangram	7	7.8
Ngharchhip	2	1	Hruaikawn	6	1.8	Ramthlo, Satawm	6	1.8	T. Dumzau	7	11.7	Vawngtu	1	1.1

Thingsai			Zokhawthar						Zochachhuah			Lungbun		
Migrated from which village	F	%	Migrated from which village	F	%	Migrated from which village	F	%	Migrated from which village	F	%	Migrated from which village	F	%
Ruabuk	1	0.7	Kelkang, Sekan	3	0.9	Rihkhawdar	8	2.4	Tuichawngtlang	1	1.7	Zaphai, Myanmar	1	1.1
Serchhip	1	0.7	Khampat, Khawbung	2	0.6	Ruantlang	4	1.2	Vasekai	1	1.7			
Sihhmuh	1	0.7	Khawmawi	3	0.9	Saek	9	2.7						
Thantlang	12	7.9	Khawthlir	3	0.9	Saichal, Saiha	2	0.6						
Thingsai	42	27.6	Khawzawl	7	2.1	Samthang	1	0.3						
Thlantlang	3	2	Tedim, Thingchang	8	2.4	Sanmyo, Satawas	5	1.5						
Vambai	1	0.7	Tahan, Taunfzalat	32	9.2	Tlangsam, Simdihai	11	3.3						
Vanzang	2	1.3	Tlangzawl, Tuichirh	7	2.1	Vangchhia, vaphai	12	3.6						
Zatlang	1	0.7	Tuingo, tuivar	14	4.1	Zimte, zotlang	5	1.5						
Total	152	100	Vangchhia, vaphai	12	3.6	Total	338	100	Total	60	100	Total	90	100

#### 4.19 Status in the society among the respondents of the case study villages

In pertinent to status in the society, in Thingsai village 15.1% of households have higher social position in society, 84.9% of household were found to have poor social status. Whereas in Zokhawthar village 86.7% of the households were found to have no social status as compared to 13.3% of the families with better social status. 26.7% of households in the community of Zochachhuah village have good social status whereas 73.3% of households have low social status. In Lungbun village, 72.2% of homes have no social standing, nevertheless, 27.8% of households were found to have good social status as shown in table 4.20.

Table.4.20 Status in the society

Status in the society	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	129	84.9	293	86.7	44	73.3	65	72.2
Yes	23	15.1	45	13.3	16	26.7	25	27.8
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.20 Usage of similar language among the households of case study villages

With respect to similarity of same language spoken, 73% of households in Thingsai village did not speak the same language, while 27% of household speaks the same language. 91.4 % of households in Zokhawthar village speaks the same language and only 8.6 % of households did not speak the same language. 61.7% of households from Zochachhuah village did not speak the same language but however, 38.3% of households speaks same language. In Lungbun village, 61.1% of households speaks the same language whereas 38.9% of them speak different languages.

Table 4.21 Usage of similar languages of people residing in border areas of Myanmar:

Do you speak same language	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	111	73	29	8.6	37	61.7	35	38.9
Yes	41	27	309	91.4	23	38.3	55	61.1
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.21 Participation in social activities among households of case study villages

From the given table 4.22, the study also found that 90.2% of households from Thingsai village have not participated in social activities, while 3.9% of households participated in social activities, 2% participates in village council, 1.3% of households are members of non-governmental organizations such as YMA and village council, block vice president of ruling party etc. 65.4% of households from Zokhawthar village do not participate in social activities, whereas 28.7% have actively participated, 1.5% engaged themselves in YMA section committee members, and the remaining households engage themselves in other social activities. 48.3% households in Zochachhuah village participates in social activities as compared to 45% who do not involve in social activities, and the remaining households have participate in other social activities. In Lungbun village, 53.3% of the households did not engage in social activities, as opposed to 41.1% who engaged actively in social activities and the remaining households engage in other social activities.

Table 4.22 Participation in social activities among households

Participation in Social activities	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	137	90.2	221	65.4	27	45	48	53.3
Yes	6	3.9	97	28.7	29	48.3	37	41.1
Block Vice President	1	0.7						
Ex- VC Member			1	0.3				
Games and Sports			1	0.3				
JAC (Treasurer)					1	1.7		
MNF committee member, Unit assistant	1	0.7						
MTP. KTP leader							1	1.1
MUP O.B			1	0.3				
Police pension			1	0.3				
Political party OB			1	0.3				
Retailer					1	1.7		
Section Treasurer			1	0.3				
Unit President							1	1.1
Village Council	3	2	4	0.9	1	1.7	3	3.3
YMA	1	0.7	1	0.3	1	1.7		
YMA committee member	2	1.3	4	0.9				
YMA committee members, Sec. committee member	1	0.7	5	1.5				
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.22 Participation of members in church activities

According to table 4.23, as to participation in church activities, 92.1% of households in Thingsai village did not participate in church activities, while 7.9% of the remaining households actively participated. 70.1% of households from Zokhawthar village did not participate in any religious activities whereas 29.9% of households has actively participated. 53.3% of households from Zochachhuah village did not participate in any religious activities as compared to 46.7% households who have participated. 55.6% of households from Lungbun village did not participate in religious activities whereas 44.4% of all households have actively participated.

Table 4.23 participation in church activities

Participation in church activities	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	140	92.1	237	70.1	32	53.3	50	55.6
Yes	12	7.9	101	29.9	28	46.7	40	44.4
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.23 People perception in terms of social services

Table 4.24 shows that out of 152 households of Thingsai village, 73% of households reported that their neighbours did not look at their family for their utility in terms of social services. While the remaining 27% reported that their neighbours did look at their family for their utility in terms of social services. From 338 households in Zokhawthar village, 60.4% have justified that their neighbours did not consider their family to be useful in terms of social services. The remaining 39.6% proclaimed that their neighbours did consider their family to be a source of social service. In Zochachhuah village, out of 60 household's majority of the households i.e. 51.7% reported that their neighbours did not find their family to be helpful in terms of social services. For the remaining 48.3%, their neighbours allegedly did view their family as a social assistance resource. Out of 90 households in Lungbun village, 56.7% stated that their neighbours did find their family to be social service-oriented. The neighbours of the remaining 43.3% did not see their family as a source of social service.

Table 4.24 Perception of people in terms of social services

People perception in terms of social services	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	111	73.0	204	60.4	31	51.7	39	43.3
yes	41	27.0	134	39.6	29	48.3	51	56.7
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.24 Language spoken in the case study villages

With reference to language spoken by the repondents it can be seen from table 4.25 that in Thingsai village, 57.9% of the households use Lushai, 20.4% can use both Lai and Lushai, 14% use only Lai, 2.1% can speak Lai, Lushai, kawl, 0.7% use Lai, Kawl, Lushai, and another 0.7% use Lushai, English, Kawl and the remaining households uses Lushai, Leisen, Lai, Kawl, Malay, Chinese, English. In Zokhawthar village, 91.1% of households use Lushai only, 3.6% can speak Lushai, Lai, Kawl, Malay, Chinese, English, 2.1% can speak both Lushai and Falam, 1.5% can speak both Lai and lushai, 0.9% use both Lushai and Paihte, 0.6% can speak only Falam, and the remaining 0.3% can only use Tedim as means of communication. 76.7% of household in Zochachhuah village speaks Bru, while 1.7% are fluent in Arakan, 1.7% in Lushai, remaining 1.7% can speak both Bru and Lushai, 1.7% speaks Chakma and the remaining 1.7% use Mok. In Lungbun with reference to language spoken, 71.1% of households speaks only Mara; 10% speak just Hawthai; 6.7% speak both Lai and Lushai; 6.7% can speak Vuangtu; 4.4% speaks only Lushai; and the remaining 1.1% use both Mara and Lushai languages.

Table 4.25 Language spoken in the case study areas

Languages	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Arakan					1	1.7		
Bru					46	76.7		
Bru, Lushai					1	1.7		
Burmese	2	1.3						
Chakma					1	1.7		
Falam			2	0.6				
Hawthai							9	10
Lai	22	14						
Lai, Kawl, Lushai	3	2.1						
Lai, Lushai	31	20.4	5	1.5			6	6.7
Leisen, Lushai	1	0.7						
Lushai	88	57.9	308	91.1	1	1.7	4	4.4
Lushai, English	1	0.7						
Lushai, English, Kawl	1	0.7						
Lushai, Falam			7	2.1				
Lushai, Hindi	1	0.7						
Lushai, Lai, Kawl, Malay, Chinese,English	1	0.7	12	3.6				
Lushai, Leisen	1	0.7						
Lushai, Paihte			3	0.9				
Mara							64	71.1
Mara, Lushai							1	1.1
Mok					1	1.7		
Rakhain					9	15		
Tedim			1	0.3				
Vuangtu							6	6.7
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.25 Festivals celebrated in the case study villages

From Table 4.26 with reference to festivals celebration in both eastern and southern border of Mizoram, in Thingsai village, 68.4% households are celebrating chapchar kut festival, while 14.5 % celebrated CND. 7.9% of the households do not celebrate any festival, while 4.6 % celebrates festivals Lai Miphun Ni, Thopuai and the rest of the households celebrates christmas and Chin national. Out of 338 households in Zokhawthar, 59.5% does not have any major festival, while the remaining 40.5% are celebrating christmas as their main festival. Among the 60 households in Zochachhuah



village, 78.3% celebrate christmas as a main event. 13.3 % accepts saingrain as major festival. 6.7 % are engage with Bihu festival while the remaining 7% celebrate MCHP day. 92.2% of Lungbun households regard christmas as a major festival, and the remaining 7.8 % marked MCHP Day as their main event.

Table 4.26 Festivals celebrated in the case study areas

Major Festivals	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bihu					4	6.7		
Budda Purnima					1	1.7		
C, N, D	22	14.5						
ChapcharKut	104	68.4						
Chin National Day	1	0.7						
Christmas	2	1.3	137	40.5	47	78.3	83	92.2
Lai Miphun Ni	3	2.0						
Lai Miphun Ni, ChapcharKut	1	0.7						
Lai Miphun Ni, Thopuai	7	4.6						
MCHP Day							7	7.8
No Festival	12	7.9	201	59.5				
Saingrain					8	13.3		
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.26 Rituals and ceremony observed by the residents of the case study villages

In respect of rituals and ceremony observed by the households of the four villages viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages of Mizoram which border Mynamar, table 4.27 shows that 75.7 % of households residing in Thingsai village do not engage in any ritual ceremony while 19.7 of them are engaging themselves in church service.0.7 % are Khawhring and another 0.7 % are found to be ramhuai hlau. In Zokhawthar village, 60.4 % of residents do not participate in any ceremonial and other 39.6% household are unknown to ritual ceremonies. 46.7 % of households residing in Zochachhuah village do not take part in any rituals, while 31.7 % residents of Zochachhuah celebrate christmas as their main event.15% celebrates saingrain,while another 5% take part in Bihu.1.7 % of them are observing Good Friday etc. People living in Lungbun village do not participate in any other ceremonial while 36.7% are celebrating Christmas as their main event.

Table 2.27 Rituals and ceremony practiced

Types of rituals/ceremony	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bihu					3	5		
Christmas					19	31.7	33	36.7
Church service	30	19.7						
Good Friday, Christmas					1	1.7		
Khawhring (hnam) hlau	1	0.7						
No	115	75.7	204	60.4	28	46.7		
other			134	39.6			57	63.3
Ramhuaihlah	1	0.7						
Saingrain					9	15		
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.27 Religion practiced by households of case study villages

In pertinent to religion practiced by households of the four villages viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages of Mizoram which border Myanmar, table No.4.28 shows that out of 152 households, 99.3 % of the households residing in Thingsai village are christians, while only 0.7% belong to other religion. 96.4% of the households who live in the Zokhawthar village are christians, with only 3.6 % of them being having no religion. In the southern border 0.4% of households residing in the Zochachhuah village are christians, while 23.3% of them are Buddhists. With only 6.6% of them identifying as not having religion in Zokhawthar village. And in Lungbun village, 87.7% of households in Lungbun village are Christians, while 7.8% are not having any religion. And only 3.3% are lobo while merely 1.1% are Muslims.

Table 4.28 Religion practiced by households of case study villages

Type of religion	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Christian	151	99.3	326	96.4	42	70	79	87.7
Other	1	0.7	12	3.6	2	3.3	7	7.8
Zochachhuah					2	3.3		
Buddhist					14	23.3		
Lobo							3	3.3
Muslim							1	1.1
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### **4.28 Food habit of people in the case study villages**

With regard to the food habits, it was discovered that individuals living in the border region primarily consume rice, vegetables, and meat when it comes to their eating habits in Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah, and Lungbun, which are located on Mizoram's eastern and southern borders. People who live in the Mizoram-Myanmar border region often consume rice as their major source of sustenance. Compared to Indian food, Mizo cuisine utilises fewer spices and includes meats including chicken, hog, beef, and dog meat. Table 4.29 have given detail reports of the food habits of the case study villages viz. Thingsai, Lungbun, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages. The result shows that 78.9% of households from the Thingsai village are taking main staple foods such as rice, vegetables and meat. 19.1 % only eat rice and vegetables and does not take meat product. 25.6 % of them are also eating only vegetables, other 0.7 % can eat both vegetables and meat.

According to table 4.29, rice, vegetables, and meat were the three main dietary groups consumed by 49.4% of households living in Zokhawthar area. 46.4 % rely on Mizo dishes, 4.1 percent did not mention any particular food habits. 76.6 % of households from the Zochachhuah village did not mention any particular food habits, 20% eats only vegetables and 3.3% of the households were having food habits of both rice and vegetables. In the Lungbun region, 58.9 of survey participants eat vegetables, while 25.6 % of the households do not mention any specific food habits. 4.4 % of them are eating Pork, while 3.3% of them are eating both vegetables and eggs. And 2.2 % can eat both pork and chicken.

#### 4.29 Food habits of people residing in the case study villages

Type of food items	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Beef							1	1.1
Chicken							1	1.1
Mizo chaw			157	46.4				
Other	1	0.7	14	4.1	46	76.6	23	25.6
Pork							4	4.4
Pork, Beef							1	1.1
Pork, Chicken							2	2.2
Rice, Vegetables	29	19.1			2	3.3		
Rice, vegetables,meat	120	78.9	167	49.4				
Vegetables	1	0.7			12	20	53	58.9
Vegetables, Egg							3	3.3
Vegetables, Fish							1	1.1
Vegetables, Meat	1	0.7						
Vegetables, Pork							1	1.1
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.29 Type of Dress

In terms of apparel, it was discovered that 95.4% of households in Thingsai village wear Mizo clothing and that only 0.7% do so in a western style. Additionally, 92.9% of the households in the Zokhawthar village dressed in western attire, while 4.7% did not define their style of clothing and the remaining 2.7 did so in Mizo traditional attire. In the Zochachhuah village, 58.3% of the households wore western clothing, whereas 21.7% did so in Mizo garb, and 20% did not specify their clothing preference. In the community of Lungbun, 57.8% of households' wear Mara clothing, while 33.3% did not indicate their preferred style. Only 2.2% of people wore western clothing, compared to 6.6% who dressed in Mizo attire.

Table 4.30 Type of dress

Dress/Style	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Mizo	145	95.4	8	2.4	13	21.7	6	6.7
Western	1	0.7	314	92.9	35	58.3	2	2.2
Others	6	3.9	16	4.7	12	20	30	33.3
Mara							52	57.8
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.30 Type of Crafts practice by the case study area

Table 4.31 shows that, with regard to type of craft, In Thingsai village, 67.8% of households refrain from engaging in crafts, 11.2% of people work with bamboo to make crafts. 5.9% of them fish in their local area. 3.9% of people work in carpentry, and 3.3% are Mistiris. 2.6% of people work in the tailoring industry, whereas 1.3% knit, 0.7% enjoys cooking, 0.7% weave, etc. Of the 338 responders from Zokhawthar, 55% do not perform any crafts. 32.2% of households are engaged in other activities. 4.1% of the population works as a tailor, 1.8% as a mistiri, 1.2% as a mechanic, and 0.9% as a mechanic. The rest of the households work as cobblers, beauticians, drivers, weavers, etc. 53.3% of the 60 Zochachhuah families reported having no crafts-related tasks. 45% of households are engaged in other activities.

Table 4.31 Type of Crafts practice by the case study area

Types of crafts	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Baking			2	0.5			1	1.1
Bamboo Craft	17	11.2						
Barber			1	0.3			1	1.1
beautician			1	0.3				
Carpentry	6	3.9	1	0.3	1	1.7	3	3.3
Cement Mistiri	2	1.3						
Cement Mistiri	1	0.7						
Cobbler			1	0.3				
Cooking	1	0.7	1	0.3				
Driving			6	1.8			3	3.3
Driving, Carpentry			1	0.3				
Electrician			3	0.9			1	1.1
Farming			1	0.3				
Knitting	2	1.3						
Local Fishing	9	5.9						
Mechanic			4	1.2			3	3.3
Mistiri	5	3.3						
Mistiri			6	1.8				
No	103	67.8	186	55	32	53.3	9	10
Others			109	32.2	27	45	67	74.4
Sports	1	0.7						
Tailoring	4	2.6						
Tailoring			14	4.1			2	2.2
Weaving	1	0.7						
Weaving			1	0.3				
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.31 Lifestyle of people residing in the case study villages

Table 4.32 shows that in respect to lifestyle of the people living in the eastern and southern border of Mizoram-Myanmar, it was discovered that 86.2% of the 152 residents in the Thingsai village followed a Lushai tribal lifestyle, 10.5% a Lai tribal lifestyle, and 3.3% a lifestyle that was unidentified. Additionally, 91.1% of people in Zokhawthar village live a Lushai lifestyle, while 8.9% lead an undefined lifestyle. 80% of the 60 houses in the Zochachhuah village live as Lushai way of life, while 20% of them did not indicate their lifestyle. It was also found that of the 90 families in the Lungbunvillage, 65.6% live an undeclared lifestyle. While 34.4% lead a Lushai way of life.

Table 4.32 Lifestyle of people residing in the case study villages

Living style	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Lai	16	10.5						
Lushai	131	86.2						
Good			308	91.1	48	80	31	34.4
No	5	3.3	30	8.9	12	20	59	65.6
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.32 Art practices by residents of people residing in the case study areas:

According to table 4.33, Regarding practicing of arts in the case study areas of Mizoram which borders Myanmar, 71.05% of people in Thingsai village lacked any specialised expertise. 10.5% of families engage in bamboo crafts. 5.9% were local fisherman. Carpenters make up 3.3% of the population, while mistiris make up another 3.3%. 2.6% of persons are employed in the tailoring sector, compared to 0.7% who like to cook, 0.7% who work as mechanics, etc. 60.1% of the 338 Zokhawthar respondents are involved in several projects. 37.9% of families lacked any specialised knowledge on the arts. 0.3% of people hold jobs such as bakers, beauticians, drivers, carpenters, etc. No specific genre was indicated, although 53.3% of the 60 Zochachhuah households were said to be artistically talented. There was no specialised art knowledge or skills in 45% of houses. An operator employs 1.7% of the population. In Lungbun village, 88.9% of the 90 families lacked specialised art skills and expertise. 11.2% of respondents demonstrated artistic ability without identifying a specific skill set.

Table 4.33 Art practices by residents

Art skills	Art							
	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	108	71.05	128	37.9	27	45	80	88.9
Yes	1	0.7	203	60.1	32	53.3	10	11.2
Baking			1	0.3				
Bamboo Craft	16	10.5						
Beautician			1	0.3				
Carpentry	5	3.3	1	0.3				
Cement Mistiri	1	0.7						
Cooking	1	0.7						
Driving, Carpentry			1	0.3				
Electrician			2	0.6				
Local Fishing	9	5.9						
Mechanic, Carpentry	1	0.7						
Mistiri	5	3.3						
Operator					1	1.7		
Sports	1	0.7						
Tailoring	4	2.6						
Tailoring			1	0.3				
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

### 4.33 Music and instruments

Mizoram is well known as a haven for ethno-musicians and the innate musicality of people everywhere is combined with the influence of the church and missionary education, which has opened doors to the west, to create the richness of western music. Drums made from hollow tree trunks accompany the traditional music of Mizoram. Other crucial accompaniments include brass cymbals similar to those in Myanmar. Numerous wind and stringed instruments are used to enhance the sound. The vocals cover a variety of subjects such as including hunting (Bawh Hla and Hlado), religious rites (Thiam Hla and Dawi Hla), and of course, exquisite love melodies (Lengzem Zai). Regarding the music instrumental talents of the people living in the eastern and southern border of Mizoram, it was found that in Thingsai Village, 90.03 percent of residents lack any special musical abilities, and just 2.7% of them can play keyboard, guitar, and drums. Another 1.3% and 1.3% can play guitar and keyboard separately. 1.3% of people can play the guitar and the drums, 0.7% can play the drums exclusively, and 0.4% can play the keyboard and the drums. According to Table 4.34, the 338 households in the village of Zokhawthar had a 96.15% musical aptitude deficit. Only 1.5% of persons can play guitar. 0.6% of individuals have stronger vocal abilities, 0.3% of people can only play the drums, and 1.2% of people can play the

piano.

98.3% of households in Zochachhuah village are musically incompetent. Only 1.7% of the families claimed to be musically skilled, and they did not specify any specific skill sets. 97.8% of the 90 Lungbun responders (of 90) lacked any musical aptitude. Only 1.1% of households have a musical preference, and only 1.1% of persons can play the piano, which makes no mention of any specific skill sets.

Table 4.34 Music and instruments

Instrument	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	137	90.03	325	96.15	59	98.3	88	97.8
Yes	2	1.3			1	1.7	1	1.1
Drums	1	0.7	1	0.3				
Guitar	2	1.3	5	1.5				
Guitar, Drums	2	1.3						
Guitar, Keyboard, Drum	1	0.7						
Keyboard	2	1.3	4	1.2			1	1.1
Keyboard, Drums	1	0.7						
Keyboard, Guitar, Drums	3	2						
Singing			2	0.6				
Trumpet			1	0.3				
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.34 International Trade at border areas legal/illegal

Considering the information in table 4.35, out of 152 households in the Thingsai village, 2% reported engaging in legal commerce, while the remaining 0.7% engaged in illicit trade over the international border between Mizoram and Myanmar. Of these, 97.4% did neither legal nor illegal trade. Of the 338 families in the Zokhawthar village, 64.2% reported engaging in international trade near the Myanmar border; 12.4% reported doing so illegally. 23.4% more households didn't participate in foreign trade. According to the given data in Zochachhuah, 73.3% of households used illegal means of trade, while the remaining 26.7% did not engage in international trade. 60 % of the households did trading illegally, while 32.2 % of the households do legal trade under the law, another 7.8% did not involve in trading.



Table 4.35 International Trade at border areas

Boarder trade legal/ illegal	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Illegal	1	0.7	42	12.4	44	73.3	54	60
No international trade	148	97.4	79	23.4	16	26.7	7	7.8
Legal	3	2	217	64.2			29	32.2
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.35 Items imported from Myanmar

Table 4.36 shows that due to Mizoram's economy's dependence on imports, a steady flow of border trade is essential. Though trade has been flowing continuously for over a decade, growth along this trade corridor is still sluggish. From the present study it was found that 98.02 of the people living in Thingsai village stated to have no imports from Myanmar. Items imported from Myanmar include food products (1.3%) and livestock (0.7%). In the town of Zokhawthar, 39.6% of residents claimed to import groceries, while 10.5% objected to doing so. 5.9% of people just imported food, 8.3% only imported groceries and apparel, and 9.8% imported clothing. 5.6% of people imported both food and fruits and vegetables at the same time. Betel nut and groceries were imported by 0.6% of homes. A minor percentage of households are engaged in the importation of goods like produce, auto parts, building supplies, and cosmetics. In the 60 houses that comprised the base of the Zochachhuah population area, 48.3% of the households imported food, 48.3% imported nothing at all, 1.7% imported apparel, and 1.7% imported both groceries and clothing. A survey of 90 homes in the Lungbun village revealed that 60 percent imported nothing from Myanmar, 37.8% imported cattle, goats, and other animals, 1.1% imported foodstuffs, and 1.1% imported kenbo 125 (motorcycle manufactured in China).

Table 4.36 Items imported from Myanmar

Imported item	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Betel nut	0	0	1	0.3			0	0
Bike Parts	0	0	1	0.3			0	0
Cattle, Goat, etc					0		34	37.8
Cattles	1	0.7			0			
Cloth	0	0	4	1.2			0	0
Clothing	0	0	29	8.6	1	1.7	0	0
Clothing, Betel nut	0	0	2	0.6			0	0
Clothing, Betel nut, Vegetables	0	0	1	0.3			0	0
Clothing, Food	0	0	2	0.6			0	0
Clothing, Groceries	0	0	3	0.9	1	1.7	0	0
Clothing, Vegetables	0	0	2	0.6	0		0	0
Construction goods	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Construction goods, Food	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Cosmetics	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Fertilizer	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Fertilizer, Hair, Food, etc	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Food	0	0	20	5.9	0		0	0
Food, clothing	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Food, Goods	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Groceries	2	1.3	134	39.6	29	48.3	1	1.1
Groceries, Betel Nut	0	0	1	0.3	0			
Groceries, clothing	0	0	5	1.5	0			
Groceries, Clothing	0	0	20	5.9	0			
Groceries, Vegetables	0	0	19	5.6	0			
Hardware	0	0	1	0.3	0			
Kenbo (125) part					0		1	1.1
No	149	98.02	35	10.4	29	48.3	54	60
Vegetables	0		1	0.3	0	0		
Vegetables, Clothing	0		2	0.6	0			
Vehicle parts	0		1	0.3	0			
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.36 Items exported from Mizoram

According to table 4.37, in terms of goods exported from Mizoram to Myanmar, 99.34% of the residents in Thingsai village had no exports to Myanmar, while 0.7% had exported chicken to Myanmar. 60.9% of the 338 houses in the Zokhawthar village reported having no exports in contrast to the 14.8% exported fertilizer, 6.5% exported groceries, 4.7% who had exported food, 2.1% exported fertilizer and medication, and 1.5% who had exported apparel. 1.5% of homes exported clothing and groceries, while

0.9% simultaneously exported food, hair, medication, and fertilizers. Moreover, 0.9% exports both hair and fertilizer. Additionally, the remaining minor households are involved in exporting good items including hair, fertiliser, food, and cosmetics. Only 1.7% of the 60 homes in the village of Zochachhuah exported both rice and vegetables, while 51.7% of the 60 houses selling vegetables had no export to Myanmar. Survey results from 90 houses in the Lungbun village demography revealed that 92.2% had exported nothing, 4.4% had exports cigarettes, 1.1% exported goods, and still another 1.1% exported salt.

Table 4.37 Items exported from Mizoram

Exported item	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Clothing	0	0	5	1.5	0		0	0
Clothing, Food	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Clothing, Groceries	0	0	2	0.6	0		0	0
Clothing, Vegetables	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Cosmetics	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Fertilizer	0	0	50	14.8	0		0	0
Fertilizer, Groceries	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Fertilizer, Hair	0	0	3	0.9	0		0	0
Fertilizer, Hair, etc	0	0	3	0.9	0		0	0
Fertilizer, Medicines	0	0	7	2.1	0		0	0
Food	0	0	16	4.7	0		0	0
Food, Fertilizer, Hair, Medicines, etc	0	0	3	0.9	0		0	0
Groceries	0	0	22	6.5	0		0	0
Groceries	0	0	0	0			1	1.1
Groceries, Clothing	0	0	3	0.9	0		0	0
Groceries, Fertilizer, Medicines	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Hair, Fertilizer	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
Medicines	0	0	9	2.7	0		0	0
Medicines, Fertilizer, Hair	0	0	1	0.3	0		0	0
No	151	99.34	206	60.9	28	46.7	83	92.2
Rice, Vegetables	0	0	0	0	1	1.7	0	0
Salt	0	0	0	0			1	1.1
Tobacco	0	0	0	0			4	4.4
Vegetables	0	0	1	0.3			0	0
Vegetables	0	0	0	0	31	51.7	0	0
Yes	0	0	1	0.3			0	0
Yes, Poultry	1	0.7			0	0	0	0
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

#### 4.37 Mode of transportation of goods

Table 4.38 reveals that in Thingsai village, which is in the eastern part of Mizoram that borders Myanmar, it was discovered that 99.34% of residents lacked a means of transporting their products. Bicycles are only used by 0.7% of them for transportation. Additionally, 45% of the 338 families in Zokhawthar reported using a car to deliver goods. 12.7% of people commute by car and on foot. 10.1% of the population lacks transportation. Also, 2.7% said they have transported items on foot. In the southern part of Mizoram. Out of the 60 families in Zochachhuah village, it was reported that 56.7% of their items were transported by boat whereas 43.3.7% of homes reveals that there is no transit available. Of the 90 homes in Lungbun, 64.4% do not identify any form of transportation and 34.4% of households said they had transported by car.

Table 4.38 Mode of transportation of goods

Mode of transportation	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	151	99.34	34	10.1	26	43.3	58	64.4
Bike	1	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boat	0	0	0	0	34	56.7	0	0
By foot	0	0	9	2.7	0	0	0	0
Vehicle	0	0	152	45	0	0	31	34.4
Vehicle, By foot	0	0	43	12.7	0	0	0	0
Vehicle, Boat, Bike	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.1
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	0	100

#### 4.38 Purpose of visiting Myanmar

According to table 4.39, in pertinent purpose of visit to Myanmar by the respondents living in the border areas of Mizoram, the study also found that the majority of households (61.18%) in Thingsai village does not have any specific reason for visiting Myanmar. Visiting family was described by 27% of households. The households' primary reason for travelling was 6.6%, while 2.6% visited Myanmar mainly for fishing, and 2.1% visited Myanmar for one of three different reasons: to visit a church, go grazing, or go fishing or see family (0.7 % each from each categories). 32.5% households' in Zokhawthar had travelled to Myanmar mainly for shopping. 7.7% of households travelled to Myanmar for leisure and shopping as compared to 13.6% of the families who had never visited Myanmar and 8.9% of the households claims to have visited occasionally. 7.1% had gone to see family there. 1.2% visited Myanmar merely as a tourist, 0.9% visited for business purpose, 0.6% travelled seeking place of employment, and 0.3% travelled to buy commodities. About 66.7% of households in

Zochachhuah village inhabitants said they had never travelled to Myanmar, while 16.7% said they were travelling there for an irrational reason. Only 5% of them went shopping there. Out of the 90 homes in Lungbun, 47.8% claimed they had never been to Myanmar and 20% had gone there to go fishing. Only 1.1% of them claimed to have visited for employment, although 12.2% claimed to have done so.

Table 4.39 Purpose of visiting Myanmar

Major purpose of visiting Myanmar	Thingsai		Zokhawthar		Zochachhuah		Lungbun	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	93	61.182	46	13.6	40	66.6	43	47.8
Yes			67	19.8	10	16.7	11	12.2
Yes, Family visit	41	27	24	7.1	0	0	0	0
Yes, Job	0	0	1	0.3	0	0	0	0
Yes, looking for a job	0	0	2	0.6	0	0	0	0
Yes, Merchant	0	0	3	0.9	0	0	0	0
Yes, Rarely	0	0	30	8.9	0	0	0	0
Yes, Shopping	0	0	110	32.5	3	5	0	0
Yes, Shopping goods	0	0	1	0.3	0	0	0	0
Yes, Shopping, travels	0	0	26	7.7	0	0	0	0
Yes, Travels	0	0	4	1.2	0	0	0	0
Yes, Church	1	0.7	338	100	0	0	0	0
Yes, Fishing	4	2.6	0	0	0	0	18	20
Yes, Fishing, Family visit	1	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yes, Grazing	1	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yes, Travels	10	6.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yes, Travels and getting supply	1	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yes, Feh	0	0	0	0	7	11.7	0	0
Yes, farming	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.1
Yes, Fishing, Travels	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5.6
Yes, Piggery	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.1
Yes, Travels	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	11.1
Yes, work	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.1
Total	152	100	338	100	60	100	90	100

## CHAPTER-5

### Suggestions, Findings and Conclusions

The purpose of the present research is to comprehend the geopolitics of India and Myanmar and how they affect the socio-economic development of those who live in the eastern and southern borders, namely Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah, and Lungbun villages of Mizoram, which are situated on the Indian side. By putting bordering communities at the centre of the analysis, the socio-cultural and economic ties and links between the residents of the bordering villages in Mizoram and Myanmar help to understand how communities react to the formalization of border trade. It also dwells into the subjective perception of its impacts and implications. With reference to the significant research issues raised in the study, it has been attempted to analyze and summarize findings under this section:

#### **5.1 Summary of findings on geopolitical dynamics of India and Myanmar**

A democratic government in Myanmar may potentially suit India's long-term strategic interests better. To avoid offending the military regime, the Indian government must continue to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy and support the development of democratic institutions in Myanmar. The solution to weaning the military administration away from authoritarian practices is constructive engagement through official and diplomatic channels—not conflict. India's strategic and security considerations legitimately exceed its own internal concerns in favour of Myanmar's return to democracy. The solution rests in seeking to influence the governing military dictatorship towards democracy through regional engagement engaging all stakeholders rather than in trying to export democracy to Myanmar. Myanmar and India relations Relationships between nations appear to be under transition. It is possible that Delhi will have fresh possibilities to pursue its objectives and avoid the dangers and problems that have dogged its policy towards Myanmar for many years as a result of the political changes in Myanmar and its apparent willingness to diversify its foreign policy. The "enlightened national interest" underlies Narendra Modi's pragmatic and non-dogmatic foreign policy approach, which has a strong emphasis on India's near neighbours, especially Myanmar. 2014 (Haidar). Only if New Delhi

demonstrates a significant rise in popular recognition for the importance of the bilateral relationship will it be possible to boost India's political influence in Myanmar.

The Look East Policy has also been discussed in relation to Mizoram in the thesis. LEP has implications for the State of Mizoram starting with the building of the necessary infrastructure to implement LEP. Additionally, this directly affects the border commerce between Myanmar and India. It is common knowledge that no place can become wealthy or flourish without trade and commerce. In recent years, the Indian government has sought to improve ties with its neighbours to the east. As a result, it has made the Look East Policy (LEP) one of its foreign policy goals. In this case, the development of commercial ties between India and Myanmar is crucial for the LEP's success. The LEP includes the border trade agreement, the opening of the Zokhawthar-Rih sector border trade point in Mizoram, and the agreement on the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP), a commercial route linking Myanmar. Mizoram will serve as a gateway to its eastern neighbour and beyond after the KMMTTP is finished. This corridor in the southern region of Mizoram would enable brisk trade between India and Myanmar. Additionally, Sittwe port will provide Mizoram residents with access to the Indian Ocean. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project would encourage the growth of border trade between India and Myanmar in the southern region of Mizoram. Mizoram is meant to serve as the entryway to the eastern nations through the Zokhawthar-Rih sector and KMMTTP, the second Indo-Myanmar border commerce. These are all elements of the Look East Policy, which will greatly affect Mizoram. A sizeable portion of the State has unfavourable views on the KMMTTP on the grounds that the Mizos would be absorbed by wealthier nations and the identity of the Mizos will eventually get lost. The KMMTTP has been the subject of extensive media debate in Mizoram. They worry that non-Mizos will receive the majority of the economic gains from the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. However, KMMTTP will permanently change how Mizoram is seen. More people will go to the State, and it will be simpler to export and import items across international borders. The Mizos' outlook will change for the better during this process. The border commerce between India and Myanmar that passes through Mizoram is so important that many lives in Mizoram would be disrupted without it. Myanmar is the source of many imported commodities that are utilized domestically. These products are easily accessible in the Mizoram marketplaces. Many

individuals benefit from the underground economy on the otherside of the border by finding work through shady Indo-Myanmar border commerce. Therefore, the State of Mizoram in the Indian Union has seen a substantial impact on its socio-economic fabric. Act East Policy (AEP) has given India's relations with ASEAN and East Asia more energy in light of the quickly shifting geopolitical circumstances. India's senior officials travel, which reflects this. As a result, in addition to economic connections, relations with ASEAN and East Asia have expanded to include collaboration in the areas of security, strategy, politics, counter terrorism, and defense. Cooperation to combat terrorism has taken precedence, particularly in light of the Islamic state's growing influence. Targeting key industries including technology transfer, civilian nuclear cooperation, defense, and innovation is crucial.

## **5.2 Summary of findings on socio economic development of the villages located along the borderlands of Mizoram**

1. With reference to the family size among the households of Thingsai village, 4 - 6 members comprised of 45.3%, and 1 - 3 members comprised of 38.2%, 7 - 9 members comprised of 15.8% while family with 10-12 members comprises only 0.7% households whereas in Zokhawthar village with regard to family size of households, 4 - 6 members constituted 47.9% and 1-3 members constituted 40.5 %, 7 to 9 members constituted 10.8%. Only 0.9% of family households in Zokhawthar village constituted of 10 - 12 members. Therefore, it can be suggested that in the eastern border area of Mizoram viz. Zokhawthar and Thingsai villages family members between 4 - 6 are more prevalent. The percentage of households with 4 - 6 members at Zochachhuah village comprises of 48.3%, 1-3 members comprises of 36.6% households and 7 - 9 members comprises of 15% households. In Zochachhuah village, no family household has family members with 10 - 12 members. In Lungbun village, majority of households has 4 - 6 members which makes up to 60%, 7 - 9 members makes up to 35.6% households, 1-3 members makes up only 4.4% households. So, it can be inferred from the above table 4.1 that the majority of families from various demographic areas has member between 4 and 6. The least member of families in each of the four communities had between 10 and 12 members. Accordingly, in the southern border areas viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun, majority of the households has a family member ranging between 4-6 members.



Therefore, it can be suggested that people residing in rural villages have contributed to greater fertility rates, which have led to a bigger family size, as a result of clan dominance, the joint family structure, and homogeneity.

Sex ratios are assessments of the proportion of men to women and it was found that out of 152 households there are 666 family members from Thingsai village in which 343 (51.5%) comprised of female while 323 (48.5%) comprised of male. Hence, female members are higher than male in Thingsai village. Out of the total 336 households in Zokhawthar village, 724 (52.1%) are female while 665 (47.9%) consists of male. Hence, it was found that, there are more female as compared to male in Zokhawthar village. At Zochachhuah village the total number of households consists of 257, and of those, 129 (50.2%) are male and 128 (49.8%) are female. Therefore, it can be concluded that Zochachhuah workforce predominately consisted of male. Out of the 167 households in Lungbun village, 273(53.4) are female while 238(46.6%) are male. Members of Lungbun village has a greater number of males as compared to female. Information about sex ratio is important social indicator to measure the socio-economic well-being.

2. With regard to educational level, out of 152 households in Thingsai village, 40.1% had completed secondary level of education, 30.3% completed middle level of education, 26.3% had graduated while only 3.3% completed primary level of education. In Zokhawthar village, out of 336 households, 31% completed middle level of education, 28.6% completed Secondary level, 25.9% completed primary level, 8% were graduated, 3% had completed higher secondary level of education, whereas 2.4% were uneducated and only 0.60% completed their post-graduation level of education. Accordingly, it can be suggested that population of Thingsai village and Zokhawthar village which lies in the eastern border of Mizoram had completed secondary level and middle level of education respectively. On the other hand, out of 60 households at Zochachhuah, 75% had completed primary level of education, 11.70% had completed middle level of education, 6.7% were found to graduate while only 5% had completed secondary level of education. In Lungbun village, out of 90 households, 31.1% had completed middle level of education, 26.7% had completed primary level of education, 25.6% had completed secondary level, 10% were found to be uneducated, 3.3% had completed higher secondary level of education, and only 2.2% are graduated. Therefore, it can be suggested that population of Zochachhuah village and Lungbun village which lies in the southern border of Mizoram had completed primary level and

middle level of education respectively.

3. Occupational structure refers to the number of workers who are engaged in different types of economic ventures. In the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, about 38% of the households were farmer and majority (58.9%) of households are found to be daily labourer respectively. In Thingsai village, while 16% were unemployed, 13% were daily labourer and the rest of the households are working as merchants, mistiri, carpenters, teachers, working in police department, and drivers and the remaining small percentage worked as village council, tower maintainer, reverend, pig farmer, pensioner, and army. In Zokhawthar village, while 16.6% were merchant, 5% were driver, 2.7% worked as teacher, 2.4% were tailor, 1.8% were private teacher, and another 1.8% were farmer, 1.5 of the total households were carpenter, 1.2% owns a tea stall, 0.9% owns motor rental, 0.9% had no occupation while another 0.9% are mistiri, 0.6% runs wholesale shop, 0.6% were vendor, 0.6% owns motor workshop, another 0.6% were pharmacy, and the remaining small numbers includes baker, cement mistiri, civil pensioner, commercial vehicle, electrician, meat shop, mechanic, pensioner, police, restaurant, and two-wheeler workshop. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, about 51.7% of the households are farmers and 36% of households are found to be unemployed respectively. In Zochachhuah village, while 38.3% are unemployed, 6.7% work as merchant, 1.7% are Assam Rifle porter, and the remaining 1.7% work as a driver. With regard to the households' family of Lungbun, while 12.2% were teachers, and another 12.2% were farmer, 7.8% worked as merchant, 6.7% were daily labourer, 4.4% were fisherman, 3.3% were driver, 2.2% were police, and the remaining small percentage includes vendor, tourism, tailor, poultry farmer, pig farmer, public health engineering, peon, pensioner, mechanic, jcb operator, electrician, baker and army.

4. With respect to income, in the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar, majority (81%) of the 152 families in Thingsai village have an income that falls within the category of Rs. 14499 or less. Just 4.1% of the families' income falls into the ₹46000-₹149999 category, whereas 15% of the households' income falls into the ₹14500-₹45999 range. Out of 338 homes in Zokhawthar, 62.7% had income between ₹46,000 and ₹149,000. Just 21.6% of the families in the homes had incomes between ₹150,000 and ₹200,000, while 13.5% of the households had incomes of

₹14,499 or less. Whereas 5.1% of the households' income is in the range of ₹14,500 to ₹459,99. Of the 60 Zochachhuah households, 36.7% had yearly incomes of ₹14,499 or less, and 35% had annual incomes of ₹14,500 to ₹14,999 and 20% of households' households had an annual income of ₹14500-45999. Nevertheless, only 8.4% of the households' total income is in the range of ₹150000 to ₹2000,000. Of the 90 families in Lungbun, 63.3% had yearly incomes of less than ₹14499, 25.3% had annual incomes between ₹14500 and ₹45999, and 9.9% had annual incomes between ₹46,000 and ₹149,999. Yet, the household income only represents 1.1% of the range of income between ₹150,000 and ₹200,000 in Zochachhuah village.

5. With regard to in-migration status of case study areas of the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, 31.6% are the original inhabitant of Thingsai village whereas 20.4% people had migrated from Bungkhua, 8.6% in-migrated from Thantlang, 5.9% in-migrated from Leisen, , 3.3% in-migrated from Lawklung, 2.6% in-migrated from Fungkah, 2% in- migrated from Thantlang, 2% in-migrated from Aizawl, another 2% in-migrated from Bungtlang, 1.3% from Halkha, 1.3% from Khuafu, 1.3% from Bungtlang, and the remaining in-migrated from Fangkah, Cherhlun, Dawn, Ngharchhip, Niawhtlang, Rawlbuk, Serchhip, Sihmuh and Vambai. In Zokhawthar village, it was found that 20.1% of people are the original inhabitants while 14% of the households in-migrated from Tahan, Zotlang, Tuichhir, 4.4% in-migrated from Rihkhawdar, 3.3% in-migrated from Leilet, Tuingo, Vangchhia, Tlangsam, Vuangtu, and 2.7% in-migrated from Tiddim, Tlangzawl, Saek, Myohlah and another 2.1% in- migrated from Khawzawl and Champhai, 1.8% in-migrated from Simdihai, Zimte and Myanmar, 1.5% from Melbuk, Farkawn, Hruaikawn and Thingchang, merely 1.2% in-migrated from Letpanchhawng, Khawmawi, Satawm, Sanmyo, Ruantlang, Haimual and the remaining in-migrated from Lungzarhtum, Thangte, Lianhna, Siaha, Kolasib, Khuangleng, Seling, Sekan, Khampat, Kawkulh, Samthang, Saichal, Kanan, Hnahlan, Rawthloh, Haiheng, Phunte, Ngaizawl, East Lungdar, N. Khawbung, Dawihkhel, Churachandpur, Mualveng, Bualte, Muallungthu, and Mandalay. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, it was found that 8% of the households in Zochachhuah are the original inhabitants while 13% in-migrated from Parva-II, Murihwah, 12% from T Dumzau, 8.3% in-migrated from Sabual, Sabualtlang, 3.3% in-migrated from Myanmar, and the remaining small percent in- migrated from

Vaseikai, Sikulkai, Semanasori, Sekulkai, Ramrikawn, Pakaumah, Manipur, Lunghauka, Hlimzawl, Dumzautlang, Dumzau and Bondukranga.

6. With respect to cultivation of crops, in the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar village, 44.1% of families did not cultivate any crops in Thingsai village, 31.6% of all households cultivated both rice and vegetables, 17.8% of all households cultivated just vegetables, and the remaining households cultivated fruits, rice, and tea. In Zokhawthar village, 86.1% of homes did not grow any crops, 11.8% households grow only vegetables, merely 0.6% households grew both vegetables and fruits, and the remaining households dealt with the growth of rice, maize, and teak. in the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun and village about 8.3% of households do engage in crop cultivation in Zochachhuah village. However, 43.3% households grow both rice and vegetables, 30% grow only vegetables, and 18.3% grow only rice. In Lungbun village, 66.7% families claim they did not involve in any crop cultivation, 20% grow only vegetables, 6.7% grow both vegetables and rice, 2.2% claimed to be growing only fruits, and the remaining houses claimed to be growing rice, vegetables, maize and coffee.

7. With regard to landholdings in the eastern part of Mizoram which borders Myanmar, at Thingsai village, 52.6% of households had no landholdings, 28.9% had a landholding of two hectares or less, 16.4% had a landholding of one hectare or less, 1.3% had a landholding of four hectares, and just 0.6% had a landholding of three hectares. In Zokhawthar village, 87.9% of families lacked any land holdings, 10.1% had one hectare or less, 1.5% had two hectares, and just 0.3% had three and four hectares, respectively. Zochachhuah village, 31.7% of households had no land holdings, 26.6% had holdings of two hectares or less, 21.7% had holdings of one hectare or less, 11.7% had holdings of three hectares, 5% had holdings of four hectares, and just 1.7% had holdings of five and six hectares, respectively. In Lungbun village, 57.8% of households reported having no landholdings, 26.6% reported having 2 hectares of land, 7.8% reported having a land area of 1 hectare or less, 6.6% reported having 3 hectares of land, and the final 1.1% reported having 4 hectares of land.

8. With regard to household level production, majority 77.6% of the households in Thingsai village had no production, 6.5% of the total households had production between ₹ 2000-3000, 5.2% had production between ₹4001-5000 and ₹7001-8000,

2.6% had production between ₹6001-7000, and only 0.6% had production between ₹3001-4000, ₹5001-6000, and ₹8001 to 9000. In Zokhawthar village, 97.3% of households had no production, 0.9% of all households produced between ₹4001-5000, 0.3% produced between ₹3001-4000, 0.3% produced between ₹5001-6000, 0.3% produced between ₹6001-7000, and merely just 0.3% produced between ₹7001-8000. In the southern border of Mizoram 50% of households in Zochachhuah village produced between ₹2000-3000, 26.7% produced between ₹7001-8000, and the remaining 23.3% produced between ₹4001-5000. In Lungbun village, 83.3% of the families had no production, 4.4% had output production between ₹4001-5000, 2.2% had production between ₹3001-4000, and the remaining few households falls between ₹5001-6000, ₹6001-7000 and ₹8001-9000.

9. Regarding the different types of livestock raising in the eastern part of Mizoram which border Myanmar about 39.5% of the households in Thingsai village were involved in poultry farming, 34.9% do not involve in any livestock rearing, 11.2% were involved in both piggery and poultry farming, 6.6% involved in piggery, 2.6% were involved in dog breeding farms, 2.0% were involved in both dog breeding farms and poultry farming, and only 1.3% were engaged in rearing goat. Nonetheless, 0.7% of all households engaged in cattle and poultry. The remaining 0.7% households' practices both in piggery and dog breeding farm. In Zokhawthar village, 79% of households had no practices of livestock rearing practices, 10.4% engaged in piggery, 8.6% practiced poultry farming, 1.2% practiced both piggery and poultry farming, and 0.3% practices both cattle and poultry farming. Yet, only 0.3% of all households own both piggery and goat farming. In the southern part of Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Zochachhuah village, 40% of households does not engage in livestock rearing, 31.7% involved in piggery, 15% engaged in rearing goat, 5% had only poultry, 3.3% had both piggery and poultry farming, 1.7% own cattle and poultry, another 1.7% own only dogs, and the remaining 1.7% own both piggery and goat. In Lungbun village, 34.4% of households had no livestock rearing practices, 30% involved in

piggery, 20% own poultry farming, 14.4% had both pig and poultry, and only 1.1% own three types of livestock rearing such as piggery.

10. With regard to grazing/feeding of livestock in the eastern Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Thingsai village, 38.8% of the households did not engage in feeding and grazing, 36.8% were involved in poultry feed, 7.2% were feeding vegetables, another 7.2% were feeding both vegetables and poultry feed, 4.6% were feeding only rice, 1.3% were feeding waste food, 0.7% were feeding grass, 0.7% were feeding both meat and waste foods, 0.7% were feeding rice and vegetables, and the remaining 0.7% were feeding waste food, vegetables, and poultry feed. In Zokhawthar village, 79.6% of families did not engage in stall, feeding, or grazing. And 15.7% fed on waste food, while 3.8% fed chickens feed, just 0.6% fed maize and the remaining 0.3% fed on grass. In the southern Mizoram, in Zochachhuah village majority (55%) of households did not engage in feeding and grazing, 13.3% fed grass, 10% had chaff, another 10% fed vegetables, 3.3% fed only rice, 1.7% fed rice and vegetables, 1.7% fed chaff and vegetables, and the remaining 1.7% fed both vegetables and grass. 44.4% of households in Lungbun village did not engage in feeding and grazing, while 15.6% feed grass only, and another 15.6% were involved in pig feed, 10% feed vegetables, 3.3% feed only rice, 1.7% feed both rice and vegetables, 1.7% feed both chaff and vegetables, and the remaining 1.7% feed both vegetables and grass.

11. In the eastern border of Mizoram with the earnings levels from raising cattle in the two villages of Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, about 37.5% of households made less than ₹1000 from raising livestock, 32.9% made between ₹1500-2000, 23% made between ₹5001-10,000, 5.3% made between ₹1001-5,000, and only 0.7% made between ₹10001-15,000 from raising livestock. The remaining 0.7% made between ₹20001-25000 from raising livestock. In Zokhawthar village, with regard to the role of livestock income, 95.9% of households had monthly income of ₹1,000 or less, 2.4% make between ₹1001-5000, 0.9% between ₹15001-20000, and just 0.3% had an income between ₹25001-30000 through livestock rearing/farming, 0.3% between ₹45001-50000, and the final 0.3% make between ₹60001 and above. By and large in the southern border of Mizoram, 66.7% of households in Zochachhuah village, make less than ₹1,000 per month through livestock farming, 15% earn between ₹5001 and ₹10000 through livestock farming, 8.3% between ₹10001-15000 through

livestock farming, 3.3% between ₹55001 and ₹60000, 1.7% between ₹1001-5000 through livestock farming, 1.7% earn between ₹15001-20000 through livestock farming, 1.7% earn between ₹45001-50000 and the other 1.7% earn ₹60001 and above through livestock farming. In the southern border of Mizoram, in Lungbun village, majority (80%) of households earn less than ₹1,000 per month through livestock farming, while 6.6% earn between ₹5001-10,000 through livestock farming, 3.3% between ₹1001-5000, 3.3% between ₹45001-50000, 2.2% between ₹15001-20000 through livestock farming, 2.2% earns between ₹55001-60000 through livestock farming, and only 1.1% earns between ₹25001-30000 and the remaining 1.1% earns ₹6,001 or more through livestock farming.

12. Pertaining to availability of services to tourist, it was found that in both eastern and southern part of Mizoram which borders Myanmar viz. Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages reported they did not involve in tourist services. However, in Thingsai village 99.3% of the households involved in providing services to tourists while the remaining 0.7% did not involve in providing services to tourist. It can be inferred from table 4.13 that all respondents of Zokhawthar village and Zochachhuah village did not take part in offering services to tourists. 1.1% of the households in Lungbun village provided services to tourists, whereas 98.9% of households do not participate in providing services to tourists.

13. As regards to household assets in the eastern Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Thingsai village there are total of 318 assets owned by all households, out of which 97.4% of the households has owned smartphone, 46.7% owned television, 39.5% owned refrigerator, 11.8% owned bicycle, 5.9% owned washing machine, 2.6% owned two-wheeler, 2.6% own car. Nonetheless, 1.3% of all households owned sumo vehicle. In Zokhawthar village, there are a total of 1170 assets owned by all households. Among these, 93.2% households have owned smartphone, 85.8% have owned television, 79.6% have owned a refrigerator, 69.8% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, 7.1% have own truck vehicle, 6.8% have owned car, and only 2.1% have owned sumo vehicle. In the southern border of Mizoram there are 96 assets in total possessed by all households in Zochachhuah village. Among them, 73.3% households owned smartphone, 45% owned radio, 20% owned television, 11.7% owned refrigerator, 5% owned rice mill, 1.7% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, another 1.7 owned a car and the remaining 1.7% owned computer/laptop. The total number of assets in Lungbun village is 252 and of which 93.3% of households have smartphones, 68.9% have owned television, 51.1% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, 40% of Lungbun village

have owned refrigerator, 12.2% have owned washing machine, 6.7% have owned radio, 3.3% have owned car, and merely 2.2% have owned truck and 1.1% have owned pickup vehicle and another 1.1% have owned sumo vehicle.

14. With reference to the type of house/settlement among the households family of Thingsai village majority (51.3%) settled in pucca house, 20.4% settled in rentedhouse, 11.2% settled in hut, 7.9% settled in kutcha house and the remaining 5.9%settled in mansion/RCC house. 42.3% of households in Zokhawthar village livesin a rented house, 38.5% lives in pucca house, 10.1% lives in mansion/RCC, and the remaining 4.1% lives in kutcha house. In Zochachhuah village, 56.7% of the respondants families resides in kutcha house and the remaining 28.3% resides in a pucca house. 63.3% of family repondents in Lungbun village settled in pucca house, 16.7% settled in kutcha house and 11.1% settled in mansion/RCC house, 4.4% settled in rented house and the remaining 1.1 settled in a hut.

15. Pertinent to marital status of the case study areas of the eastern and southern border of Mizoram, in eastern border Mizoram of Thingsai village and Zokhawthar village 88.8% and 74% are married respectively. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, 95% and 91% are married respectively.

16. With regard to relationship of Mizoram border with Myanmar among the respondents of Thingsai village, 57.9% households have relationship with Myanmar and the remaining 42.1% did not have any relationship with Myanmarese. In Zokhawthar village, 80.8% households maintain a cordial relationship with Myanmarese, while 19.2% claims to have no relationship with Myanmarese. In Zochachhuah village, 95% of the total respondents claimed to have a close tie with Myanmar, while 5% claimed to have no relationship with Myanmarese. In Lungbun village, 86.7% households said they did not have a relationship with Myanmarese, while 13.3% said they have a relationship.



17. With regard to year of settlement within the case study villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, 50% of the households settled in the year 2001 and later, 30.9% settled between the year 1901-1950, 17.1% settled between the year 1951-2000 and the remaining 2% settled before the year 1900. 59.2% of households of Zokhawthar village have settled in the year 2001 and later, and 38.5% between 1951 and 2000, 1.8% between 1901 and 1950, and the rest 0.6% before settled much before the year 1900. In the Zochachhuah demography survey, 45.1% households settled in the year 2001 and later, whereas 40.1% settled between 1951 and 2000, and 8.3% settled between 1901 and 1950, and the remaining 6.7% settled before 1900. 70% of survey households in Lungbun village have settled between 2001 and later, 24.4% between 1951 and 2000, 3.3% between 1901 and 1950, and only 2.7% of households settled before 1900. Hence, from all the four villages of the case study areas, it can be justified that most of the respondents have settled in the year 2001 and beyond.

18. Regarding migration status, in Thingsai village, 27.6% of the households are the original inhabitants, while 21.3 % migrated from Bungkhua, 7.9 % migrated from Thantlang and 7.2 % migrated from Aizawl and the rest of the households migrated from Leisen, Lunglei, Fungkah Dawn, Vanzang, Vambai, Zatlang, Serchhip, Ngharchhip, Sihmuh, Halkha, Lawklung etc. In Zokhawthar village, 22.2% of the households are the original inhabitants, and 9.2 % are immigrants from Tahan. 4.1% of the population in Zokhawthar village migrated from Thantlang, and 7.2% migrated from Aizawl and the rest of the households migrated from Tuingo, Tuivar, Vangchhia, Vaphai, Myohla Rih, Seling, Sesih, Bualte, Bulfekzawl, Bungzung, Burma, Champhai, Chawhte, Chawngtlai, Chekan, Dawihkhel, East Lungdar, Falam, Farkawn, Haihena, Haikhawl, Haimual, Hnahlan, Hruaikawn, Kannan, Kawlkuh, Kelkang, Khampat, Khawbung Khawmawi, Khawthlir, Khawzawl, Khuangleng, Kolasib, Leilet, Leisenzo, Letpanchhawng, Lianhna, Mandalay, Manipur, Melbuk, Muallungthu, Mu Alveng, Myanmar, Myohla, Ngaizawl, North Khawbung, Phunte, Pingkhung, Ramthlo, Rih, Rihkhawdar, Ruantlang, Saek, Saichal, Saiha, Samthang, Satawas, Satawm, Sazep, Sekan, Simdihai, Taunfzalal, Tedim, Thingchang, Tlangsam, Tlangzawl, Tuichirh. In Zochachhuah village, 30 % of the households are the original inhabitants and 13.3 % are immigrants from Parva II. 11.7% of the

population came from T.Dumzau, and another 11.7 are immigrant of Muriwah . The rest of the small percentage of households have migrated from Sabual, Sabual Tlang, Simanasora. Betseoi, Bondukranga, Churachandpur, Dakawwah, Hlimzawl, Kawlchaw, Tripura and Tuicahwng Tlang. In Lungbun village, 70 % are the original inhabitants and 7.8 % are immigrants from Tlangnuam. The rest of the households migrated from Vuangtu, Lungzarhtum, Zaphai, Vuangtu, Chakhai, Cheural, Haika and Karimganj.

19. In pertinent to status in the society, in Thingsai village 15.1% of households have higher social position in society, 84.9% of household were found to have poor social status. Whereas in Zokhawthar village 86.7% of the households were found to have no social status as compared to 13.3% of the families with better social status. 26.7% of households in the community of Zochachhuah village have good social status whereas 73.3% of households have low social status. In Lungbun village, 72.2% of homes have no social standing, nevertheless, 27.8% of households were found to have good social status.

20. With respect to similarity of same language spoken, 73% of households in Thingsai village did not speak the same language, while 27% of household speaks the same language. 91.4 % of households in Zokhawthar village speaks the same language and only 8.6 % of households did not speak the same language. 61.7% of households from Zochachhuah village did not speak the same language but however, 38.3% of households speaks same language. In Lungbun village, 61.1% of households speaks the same language whereas 38.9% of them speak different languages.

21. The study also found that 90.2% of households from Thingsai village have not participated in social activities, while 3.9% of households participated in social activities, 2% participates in village council, 1.3% of households are members of non-governmental organizations such as YMA and village council, block vice president of ruling party etc. 65.4% of households from Zokhawthar village have not participated in social activities, whereas 28.7% have actively participated, 1.5% engaged themselves in YMA section committee members, and the remaining households engage themselves in other social activities. 48.3% households in Zochachhuah village participates in social activities as compared to 45% who do not involve in social

activities, and the remaining households have participated in other social activities. In Lungbun village, 53.3% of the households did not engage in social activities, as opposed to 41.1% who engaged actively in social activities and the remaining households engage themselves in other social activities.

22. As to participation in church activities, 92.1% of households in Thingsai village did not participate in church activities, while 7.9% of the remaining households actively participated. 70.1% of households from Zokhawthar village did not participate in any religious activities whereas 29.9% of households has actively participated. 53.3% of households from Zochachhuah village did not participate in any religious activities as compared to 46.7% households who have participated. 55.6% of households from Lungbun village did not participate in religious activities whereas 44.4% of all households have actively participated.

23. In Thingsai village, 73% of households reported that their neighbours did not look at their family for their utility in terms of social services. While the remaining 27% reported that their neighbours did look at their family for their utility in terms of social services. From 338 households in Zokhawthar village, 60.4% have justified that their neighbours did not consider their family to be useful in terms of social services. The remaining 39.6% proclaimed that their neighbours did consider their family to be a source of social service. In Zochachhuah village, out of 60 households majority of the households i.e. 51.7% reported that their neighbours did not find their family to be helpful in terms of social services. For the remaining 48.3%, their neighbours allegedly did view their family as a social assistance resource. Out of 90 households in Lungbun village, 56.7% stated that their neighbours did find their family to be social service-oriented. The neighbours of the remaining 43.3% did not see their family as a source of social service.

24. With reference to language spoken by the respondents it can be seen that in Thingsai village, 57.9% of the households use Lushai, 20.4% can use both Lai and Lushai, 14% use only Lai, 2.1% can speak Lai, Lushai, kawl, 0.7% use Lai, Kawl, Lushai, and another 0.7% use Lushai, English, Kawl and the remaining households uses Lushai, Leisen, Lai, Kawl, Malay, Chinese, English. In Zokhawthar village, 91.1% of households use Lushai only, 3.6% can speak Lushai, Lai, Kawl, Malay, Chinese, English, 2.1% can speak both Lushai and Falam, 1.5% can speak both Lai and Lushai, 0.9% use both Lushai and Paihte, 0.6% can speak only Falam, and the remaining 0.3%

can only use Tedim as means of communication. 76.7% of household in Zochachhuah village speaks Bru, while 1.7% are fluent in Arakan, 1.7% in Lushai, remaining 1.7% can speak both Bru and Lushai, 1.7% speaks chakma and the remaining 1.7% use Mok. In Lungbun with reference to language spoken, 71.1% of households speaks only Mara; 10% speak just Hawthai; 6.7% speak both Lai and Lushai; 6.7% can speak Vuangtu; 4.4% speaks only Lushai; and the remaining 1.1% use both Mara and Lushai languages.

25. In respect of festivals celebration in both eastern and southern border of Mizoram, in Thingsai village, 68.4% households are celebrating Chapchar Kut festival, while 14.5 % celebrated CND. 7.9% of the households do not celebrate any festival, while 4.6 % celebrates festivals Lai Miphun Ni, Thopuai and the rest of the households celebrates christmas and Chinnational. Out of 338 households in Zokhawthar, 59.5% does not have any major festival, while the remaining 40.5% are celebrating christmas as their main festival. Among the 60 households in Zochachhuah village, 78.3% celebrate christmas as a main event. 13.3 % accepts saingrain as major festival. 6.7 % are engage with Bihu festival while the remaining 7% celebrate MCHP day. 92.2% of Lungbun households regard christmas as a major festival, and the remaining 7.8 % marked MCHP Day as their main event.

26. In respect of rituals and ceremony observed by the households of the four villages viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages of Mizoram which border Mynamar, 75.7 % of households residing in Thingsai village do not engage in any ritual ceremony while 19.7 of them are engaging themselves in church service. 0.7 % are Khawhring and another 0.7 % are found to be ramhuai hlau. In Zokhawthar village, 60.4.% of residents do not participate in any ceremonial and other 39.6% household are unknown to ritual ceremonies. 46.7 % of households residing in Zochachhuah village do not take part in any rituals, while 31.7 % residents of Zochachhuah celebrate christmas as their main event. 15% celebrates saingrain, while another 5% take part in Bihu. 1.7 % of them are observing Good Friday etc. People living in Lungbun village do not participate in any other ceremonial while 36.7% are celebrating Christmas as their main event.

27. In pertinent to religion practiced by households of the four villages viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages of Mizoram which border Myanmar, 99.3 % of the households residing in Thingsai village are christians, while only 0.7%

belong to other religion. 96.4% of the households who live in the Zokhawthar village are christians, with only 3.6 % of them being having no religion. In the southern border 0.4% of households residing in the Zochachhuah village are christians, while 23.3% of them are Buddhists. With only 6.6% of them identifying as not having religion in Zokhawthar village. And in Lungbun village, 87.7% of households in Lungbun village are Christians, while 7.8% are not having any religion. And only 3.3% are lobo while merely 1.1% are Muslims.

28. With regard to the food habits, it was discovered that individuals living in the border region primarily consume rice, vegetables, and meat when it comes to their eating habits in Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah, and Lungbun, which are located on Mizoram's eastern and southern borders. People who live in the Mizoram-Myanmar border region often consume rice as their major source of sustenance. Compared to Indian food, Mizo cuisine utilises fewer spices and includes meats including chicken, hog, beef, and dog meat.

29. In terms of apparel, it was discovered that 95.4% of households in Thingsai village wear Mizo clothing and that only 0.7% do so in a western style. Additionally, 92.9% of the households in the Zokhawthar village dressed in western attire, while 4.7% did not define their style of clothing and the remaining 2.7 did so in Mizo traditional attire. In the Zochachhuah village, 58.3% of the households wore western clothing, whereas 21.7% did so in Mizo garb, and 20% did not specify their clothing preference. In the community of Lungbun, 57.8% of households wear Mara clothing, while 33.3% did not indicate their preferred style. Only 2.2% of people wore western clothing, compared to 6.6% who dressed in Mizo attire.

30. With regard to type of craft, In Thingsai village, 67.8% of households refrain from engaging in crafts, 11.2% of people work with bamboo to make crafts. 5.9% of them fish in their local area. 3.9% of people work in carpentry, and 3.3% are Mistiris. 2.6% of people work in the tailoring industry, whereas 1.3% knit, 0.7% enjoys cooking, 0.7% weave, etc. Of the 338 responders from Zokhawthar, 55% do not perform any crafts. 32.2% of households are engaged in other activities. 4.1% of the population works as a tailor, 1.8% as a mistiri, 1.2% as a mechanic, and 0.9% as a mechanic. The rest of the households work as cobblers, beauticians, drivers, weavers, etc. 53.3% of the 60 Zochachhuah families reported having no crafts-related tasks. 45% of households are engaged in other activities.

31. In respect to lifestyle of the people living in the eastern and southern border of Mizoram- Myanmar, it was discovered that 86.2% of the 152 residences in the Thingsai village followed a Lushai tribal lifestyle, 10.5% a Lai tribal lifestyle, and 3.3% a lifestyle that was unidentified. Additionally, 91.1% of people in Zokhawthar village live a Lushai lifestyle, while 8.9% lead an undefined lifestyle. 80% of the 60 houses in the Zochachhuah region live as Lushai Nuns, while 20% of them did not indicate their lifestyle. It was also found that of the 90 families in the Lungbun village, 65.6% live an undeclared lifestyle. While 34.4% lead a Lushai way of life.

32. Regarding practicing of arts in the case study areas of Mizoram which borders Myanmar, 71.05% of people in Thingsai village lacked any specialised expertise. 10.5% of families engage in bamboo crafts. 5.9% were local fisherman. Carpenters make up 3.3% of the population, while mistiris make up another 3.3%. 2.6% of persons are employed in the tailoring sector, compared to 0.7% who like to cook, 0.7% who work as mechanics, etc. 60.1% of the 338 Zokhawthar respondents are involved in several projects. 37.9% of families lacked any specialised knowledge on the arts. 0.3% of people hold jobs such as bakers, beauticians, drivers, carpenters, etc. No specific genre was indicated, although 53.3% of the 60 Zochachhuah households were said to be artistically talented. There was no specialised art knowledge or skills in 45% of houses. An operator employs 1.7% of the population. In Lungbun village, 88.9% of the 90 families lacked specialised art skills and expertise. 11.2% of respondents demonstrated artistic ability without identifying a specific skill set.

33. Mizoram is well known as a haven for ethno-musicians and the innate musicality of people everywhere is combined with the influence of the church and missionary education, which has opened doors to the west, to create the richness of western music. Drums made from hollow tree trunks accompany the traditional music of Mizoram. Other crucial accompaniments include brass cymbals similar to those in Myanmar. Numerous wind and stringed instruments are used to enhance the sound. The vocals cover a variety of subjects such as including hunting (Bawh Hla and Hlado), religious rites (Thiam Hla and Dawi Hla), and of course, exquisite love melodies (Lengzem Zai). Regarding the music instrumental talents of the people living in the eastern and southern border of Mizoram, it was found that In Thingsai Village, 90.03 percent of residents lack any special musical abilities, and just 2.7% of them can play keyboard,

guitar, and drums. Another 1.3% and 1.3% can play guitar and keyboard separately. 1.3% of people can play the guitar and the drums, 0.7% can play the drums exclusively, and 0.4% can play the keyboard and the drums. According to the survey study, the 338 households in the village of Zokhawthar had a 96.15% musical aptitude deficit. Only 1.5% of persons were guitar players. 0.6% of individuals have stronger vocal abilities, 0.3% of people can only play the drums, and 1.2% of people can play the piano. 98.3% of households in Zochachhuah village are musically incompetent. Only 1.7% of the families claimed to be musically skilled, and they did not specify any specific skill sets. 97.8% of the 90 Lungbun responders (of 90) lacked any musical aptitude. Only 1.1% of households have a musical preference, and only 1.1% of persons can play the piano, which makes no mention of any specific skill sets.

34. Out of 152 households in the Thingsai village, 2% reported engaging in legal commerce, while the remaining 0.7% engaged in illicit trade over the international border between Mizoram and Myanmar. Of these, 97.4% did neither legal nor illegal trade. Of the 338 families in the Zokhawthar village, 64.2% reported engaging in international trade near the Myanmar border; 12.4% reported doing so illegally. 23.4% more households didn't participate in foreign trade. According to the given data in Zochachhuah, 73.3% of households used illegal means of trade, while the remaining 26.7% did not engage in international trade. 60% of the households did trading illegally, while 32.2% of the households do legal trade under the law, another 7.8% did not involve in trading.

35. Due to Mizoram's economy's dependence on imports, a steady flow of border trade is essential. Though trade has been flowing continuously for over a decade, growth along this trade corridor is still sluggish. From the present study it was found that 98.02% of the people living in Thingsai village stated to have no imports from Myanmar. Items imported from Myanmar include food products (1.3%) and livestock (0.7%). In the town of Zokhawthar, 39.6% of residents claimed to import groceries, while 10.5% objected to doing so. 5.9% of people just imported food, 8.3% only imported groceries and apparel, and 9.8% imported clothing. 5.6% of people imported both food and fruits and vegetables at the same time. Betelnut and groceries were imported by 0.6% of homes. A minor percentage of households are engaged in the importation of goods like produce, auto parts, building supplies, and cosmetics. In the 60 houses that comprised the base of the Zochachhuah population area, 48.3% of the households imported food,

48.3% imported nothing at all, 1.7% imported apparel, and 1.7% imported both groceries and clothing. A survey of 90 homes in the Lungbun zone revealed that 60 percent imported nothing from Myanmar, 37.8% imported cattle, goats, and other animals, 1.1% imported foodstuffs, and 1.1% imported kenbo 125 (motorcycle manufactured in China).

36. In terms of goods exported from Mizoram to Myanmar, 99.34% of the residents in Thingsai village had no exports to Myanmar, while 0.7% had exported chicken to Myanmar. 60.9% of the 338 houses in the Zokhawthar village reported having no exports in contrast to the 14.8% exported fertilizer, 6.5% exported groceries, 4.7% who had exported food, 2.1% exported fertilizer and medication, and 1.5% who had exported apparel. 1.5% of homes exported clothing and groceries, while 0.9% simultaneously exported food, hair, medication, and fertilizers. Moreover, 0.9% exports both hair and fertilizer. Additionally, the remaining minor households are involved in exporting good items including hair, fertiliser, food, and cosmetics. Only 1.7% of the 60 homes in the village of Zochachhuah exported both rice and vegetables, while 51.7% of the 60 houses selling vegetables had no export to Myanmar. Survey results from 90 houses in the Lungbun village demographic zone revealed that 92.2% had exported nothing, 4.4% had exports cigarettes, 1.1% exported goods, and still another 1.1% exported salt.

37. In Thingsai region, which is in the eastern part of Mizoram that borders Myanmar, it was discovered that 99.34% of residents lacked a means of transporting their products. Bicycles are only used by 0.7% of them for transportation. Additionally, 45% of the 338 families in Zokhawthar reported using a car to deliver goods. 12.7% of people commute by car and on foot. 10.1% of the population lacks transportation. Also, 2.7% said they have transported items on foot. In the southern part of Mizoram. Out of the 60 families in Zochachhuah village, it was reported that 56.7% of their items were transported by boat whereas 43.3.7% of homes reveal that there is no transit available. Of the 90 homes in Lungbun, 64.4% do not identify any form of transportation and 34.4% of households said they had transported by car.

38. The study also found that the majority of households (61.18%) in Thingsai village does not have any specific reason for visiting Myanmar. Visiting family was described by 27% of households. The households' primary reason for travelling was 6.6%, while 2.6% visited mainly for fishing, and 2.1% visited Myanmar for one of three



different reasons: to visit a church, go grazing, or go fishing or see family (0.7 % each from each categories). 32.5% of people in Zokhawthar said they travelled to Myanmar mostly for shopping. 19.8% of the replies merely appear out of randomly. 7.7% of households travelled to Myanmar for leisure and shopping, compared to 13.6% of families who never make it there and 8.9% of households who visit sometimes. 7.1% had gone to see family there. 1.2% of tourists only came for travel, 0.9% came to do business, 0.6% travelled seeking place of employment, and 0.3% travelled to buy commodities. About 66.7% of households in Zochachhuah village's inhabitants said they had never travelled to Myanmar, while 16.7% said they were travelling there for an irrational reason. Only 5% of them went shopping there. Out of the 90 homes in Lungbun, 47.8% claimed they had never been to Myanmar and 20% had gone there to go fishing. Only 1.1% of them claimed to have visited for employment, although 12.2% claimed to have done so.

39. There was no boundary dispute between India and Myanmar on a government to government level. The two countries settled disputes of a tribes living in the border areas. The boundary was based on natural frontiers and defined in provincial notification in the pre-independence period.

40. The border trade and economy are beneficial to each other. Efforts should be made to develop the border areas of India and Myanmar. Establishment of fair border trade is necessary for the development of economy of the people because most of the border areas have difficult terrain, isolation and lack of infrastructure.

41. Border trade is also governed by the kinds of human groups living in border areas. By this, we mean the ethnic composition on both sides of the boundary.

42. The economy of the border areas is always of supplementary and complimentary nature and this aspect of economy should always be kept in mind while promoting the border trade.

### **5.3 Suggestion of appropriate policy for socio-economic development of borderlands:**

Cross-border areas have emerged along India and Myanmar's shared borders as a result of India's policy and economic focus shifting from "Look East" to "Act East." The state administration of Mizoram is eager to ease border commerce in line with the overall purpose and objective of the Indian federal government in New Delhi, according to an assessment of border trade at the Zokhawthar-Rih borders. However, there are three main barriers to cross-border economic collaboration, the first of which is the Sino-Indian conflict in Myanmar. India and China are competing to exert influence over Myanmar's border regions for geopolitical, economic, and strategic reasons. Second, China offered to create the BCIM economic corridor as part of the BRI with the primary goal of facilitating commerce. India has been uninterested or reticent to participate in the BRI because of open border disputes. Third, border trade might face difficulties and risks due to insurgency actions in India's northeastern borders because of their poor infrastructure and socioeconomic development.

The present study has a few implications and suggestions of appropriate policy for socio-economic development of borderlands in Mizoram:

- 1) The study suggests an openness of borders for free trade and travel as fundamental components of border management, with utmost regard for freedom and human rights. However, borders should be closed to any illegal activity that threatens regional stability. Migrants can roam freely without being properly monitored for their health under the unrestricted Movement Regime (FMR), which allows for unrestricted movement up to 16 kilometres on both sides of the border. Meat imports into Mizoram are mostly made via unmanned channels and are essentially uncontrolled and dependent on Myanmar. Public health problems are further hampered by the lack of infrastructural resources like testing laboratories. Mizoram has repeatedly prohibited the import of pigs and piglets from Myanmar owing to the development of bovine disease, adopting strict measures including barring border crossings and trading activities. Throughout Myanmar's border area, issues with smuggling of all types, illegal migration, terrorism, and organized crime must be tackled. To streamline the ongoing illegal trade, items of third country origin might be

brought under the Indo- Myanmar border trade agreement provisions or under the clearance of third country origin goods vide Luggage Rule 1944.

- 2) To foster a friendly relationship and preserve shared interests, border management and the border guards force work in uninterrupted synchronization. This would facilitate information sharing for coordinated activities including precise intelligence.
- 3) Border management facilitators need to be deployed between India and Myanmar to help with people-to-people interactions, assistance alongside controlling the inflow and outflow of people, cultural exchange, conventional border interactions, visits to religious sites, educational exchange programmes, and the exchange of artificial intelligence for coordinated actions against criminal, insurgent, and secessionist organizations.
- 4) The beginning of border commerce has created opportunities for wage employment. It absorbed effort that gave these two border villages their distinctive flavour. The majority of the population is reliant on commerce, performing labor-intensive jobs such being drivers and porters. The conditions of their employment provide occupational health risks. Their dependence on drugs and other substances to deal with their suffering impairs their health, which has negative effects on both their immediate environment and their ability to earn a living. Alcoholics are becoming more prevalent which resulted in health hazards among the inhabitants of borderlands of Mizoram.
- 5) Building the community through generating assets and enhancing access to resources is a crucial stage in socio-economic development. To effect a good change, the community must be prepared to react to both economic and non-economic rewards.
- 6) Concentrating on education is another important area of action for socio-economic development. The dropout rate among school-age children is rising in the borderlands as a result of the availability of low-skill jobs such as portering and other wage jobs based on trades. The rate of higher education

enrolment is low when compared to the local population and number of educational institutions. Therefore, it is suggested that children of school age should go to school and learn for the betterment of the nation as a whole.

- 7) There is a cry need of community leadership training, capacity building, understanding of border trade policy, and other associated laws and regulations. Leaders must be cognizant of key fundamental concepts in conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, and communicative action. Despite being in a heavily militarized area, the border allows for cross-border movement of persons and commodities. Additionally, the movement of commodities across the border became the focal point of friction between diverse groups, which occasionally resulted in violence between distinct groups created solely as a result of border commerce. There are several stories of conflicts between various groups in the borderlands. The wage earners who had to rely on commerce as their primary source of income were the most severely impacted. Henceforth, to arbitrate through disagreements and conflicts, local/community leaders' capacity in the field of conflict management and should act as a border management facilitator and resolution must be built. And this necessitates effective communication techniques. The symbolic character of border practices, which determine identity and a sense of belonging, must be understood from the nuance of the economic, socio-cultural, and political domain.
- 8) In the Mizoram-Myanmar border region, particularly in the village of Zokhawthar, intensive land usage and forest removal have accelerated soil erosion, land degradation, and loss of vegetation. Another important component is the development work done by households, the governmental sector, and the commercial sector. For the production of firewood and charcoal for home and commercial needs, the agricultural lands are converted into settlement due to growth of population and forest trees are chopped down in vast quantities. Environmental protection and awareness policy must be initiated both at the government and non-governmental level.
- 9) Many of Indo-Myanmar's ecosystems and animals' futures are in jeopardy.

Nearly 37% of the region's most important biodiversity regions are not officially protected, and just 5% of the region's natural ecosystem is thought to be still in pristine condition. Many endangered species, some of which have only rarely been observed by human eyes, may be found in Indo-Myanmar borderlands. Loss of habitat and illicit wildlife trading are two threats to this species. Lack of political will, funding, and incentives for efficient law enforcement, conservation planning, and action, further worsen the problem. Gains result from protecting and safeguarding these hotspots for the environment, as well as for human communities and economy. The creation of all sorts of commodities and services depends on healthy ecosystems, which also provide 'nature-based solutions' cheap, dependable defenses against natural disasters that also support long-term sustainability.

- 10) A sustainable form of transportation is essential for every nation's economy. The lack of reliable mobility is the main cause of the north-east India's relative backwardness, despite the region's rich natural resources. Even now, seven decades after India gained its freedom, the communication network's surface is marked by crumbling roads and highways. Poor roads may be found in many mountainous and border locations. Governmental action and policy must be made to improve transport infrastructure, especially in the borderlands of India and Myanmar.

### **Conclusion**

The India-Myanmar borderland is exceptional because it is not only home to a diverse population made up of numerous ethnic groups with diverse cultural ethos, but there also appears to be widespread segregation of ethnic groups due to an imposed boundary because traditional villages were not upheld during the demarcation of the boundary. As administrative convenience based on the selection of natural divides was then a revered practice of the British in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is evident that the opinion and aspirations of the residents were the least of the British concerns in the process of demarcation. Disputes of a private nature involving the tribes in the border were amicably settled by the two countries. Since 1952, border meetings used to take place between India and Myanmar to discuss about matters of 'mutual interest', like the settlement of

border disputes which were not relating to boundary.

India and Myanmar had been all along very cautious about the solution of their border problem. If border questions could be approached in this manner, perhaps there would be no border dispute between the two countries except a few adjustments here and there. Such an adjustment was in fact, made in the case of the Light House on the Table Island in the Bay of Bengal. In June 1952, the Myanmarese expressed her desire to take over the administration of the Light House. But India requested Myanmar to lease it for a period of another 25 years as the Light House was of a considerable importance to navigation in the Bay of Bengal. India, therefore, did not deny the Myanmarese ownership of the Island. Even the Kabaw Valley, which the Rajahs of Manipur requested for reversion after the Indian Independence Act of 1947, had been declared to be 'an integral part of Myanmar', by India. A spirit of understanding and accommodation between India and Myanmar was thereby indicated.

Border, though isolated in one sense, the region had never been devoid of socio-cultural and economic relations with its neighbors. A flourishing border trade did exist here. There is a need to revive and strengthen it in the changed situation for the benefit of the border people. The borders have their own natural and human environment which influenced the trade, taking place between them. Economic linkages developed naturally between people of two borders, for both have spatial proximity and both are far away from the mainland or production centres of their respective country. Therefore, surplus products are bartered or purchased by each other to maintain their survival. Such a trade is most strong and necessary where borders are in different topographic units or ecosystem, example hills and plains, also in the borders occupied by more or less similar people. Though the traditional border trade has been affected by formation of old and new international boundaries, even the trade goes on as a necessity of the border people. Plans should be made to further encourage and strengthen the border trade, so that the economy of the border people gets a boost. This will definitely bring development and prosperity among the border people. The border trade and economy are beneficial to each other. Hence all efforts should be made to develop both. Establishment of 'fair' border trade is necessary for the development of economy of the people

because most of the border areas have difficult terrain, isolation and lack of infrastructure. The border people face insurmountable problems in selling their products, especially the perishable agro-horticultural products. Therefore, the planners, politicians, administrators and academicians have to pay attention towards the development of trade and economy of the border people. So that peace, tranquility, and prosperity can usher in the border to strengthen the country as a whole. The following conclusions are drawn:

- 1) Border trade and economic development in border areas are interdependent, as border trade leads to economic development which through secondary effects increases border trade many folds. The process of globalization and liberalization has opened up the economy of northeast India. As a result, our trade relation with the neighboring countries will grow and diversify.
- 2) The Indo-Myanmar boundary will probably remain peaceful in the future, but the India-China and India-Pakistan borders may continue to cause trouble, because the Chinese Communist Philosophy of expansionism and war is radically different from India's democratic, secular principle of peaceful co-existence. India and Pakistan also differ in their philosophical and political attitudes.
- 3) Since the two countries' independence soon after World War II, relations between India and Myanmar have been cordial. With India's active assistance, Myanmar has successfully sealed its border to prevent the unauthorized infiltration of insurgent groups like the Mizo and Naga tribesmen. The boundary is defined by the boundary agreement that was signed on March 10th, 1968. However, industrialization and technical development have improved relations between India and Myanmar more than ever before, and the future of their cordial ties appeared promising.

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**GEOPOLITICS OF INDIA AND MYANMAR : ITS IMPACT ON  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MIZORAM**

**By**

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**Sumitted**

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## **Introduction**

Geopolitics is the generic term for the study of how geographical considerations affect political systems. It refers to a nation's politics as influenced by its location. Between the two world wars, Germany developed the political use of this geographic idea. The phrase geopolitics originates from the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1898) in which he introduced five phrases to label key features of the state. The other four did not strike root but geopolitics did. With this term, pointed at three geographical features of a state, namely, the location of a state in relation to other states, the form of the territory of a state and the surface and the physical characteristics of this territory.

It is impossible to study international relations without a solid understanding of geography. Throughout recorded history, populations have increased and decreased, natural resources have been discovered and used up, political systems have frequently changed, empires and states have risen and fallen, and technologies have developed and devolved. However, the locations of continents, islands, seas, and oceans have not changed significantly. Great nations who do not understand geography do so at their peril. Since the state is seen as a living entity, its boundaries are changeable. They evolve throughout the state's existence. In other words, when a state's strength is increasing at the expense of an older state that is declining, the state expands its area. The evolution of the political organism is determined by its environment.

Throughout the seventeenth century, there was a substantial shift in the geopolitics and geo-economics of Asian history. Geopolitics is a subject that requires explanation in terms of its background, development, present trends, and applicability to the task at hand. This is true since the concept underwent alteration during World War II and has really seen a revival since 1980. However, as Hepple (1986) accurately points out in his essay titled "The Revival of Geopolitics," "geopolitical analysis of both global and regional problems has become more prevalent" during the course of the previous 10 years. There must logically be a decline from an earlier phase of activity before any resurrection. to investigate the idea of geopolitics in light of its emergence, fall, and revival, and to combine all of these.

North East India is one of India's most strategically significant and vulnerable areas, and its strategic position is a key geopolitical tenet. Borderland or a frontier is an area that is located on the perimeter of a nation and offers protection while allowing for trade. Every border consists of three zones: two are on the edges of the neighbouring states, and the third is in the middle, known as the borderland, where the two nations mix. The length of India's land borders is roughly 15,200 km, of which North East India shares 5200 km with China, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Assam borders Bhutan, Arunachal Pradesh borders both China and Bhutan, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram border Myanmar, and Meghalaya and Tripura border Bangladesh since all seven North Eastern states are border states. North East India holds a particularly vital position due to its extraordinarily lengthy land border. A small foothills-filled passage in North Bengal connects it to the Indian continent. This corridor is around 33 km wide on the eastern side and 21 km wide on the western side, and the link occasionally has delays because of severe rain and flooding. One of the main reasons for alienation of its inhabitants is the region's terrestrial position, which transforms it into an isolated enclave.

North East India has tertiary mountains and hills as its topography. The area is a remote area made up of Archaean plateaus, river valleys, mountain basins, etc. The Brahmaputra River, numerous rivers, and the region's extensive monsoon forests are only a few examples of the terrain features that have a significant impact on the geopolitics of the area. The Brahmaputra River, numerous rivers, and the region's extensive monsoon forests are only a few examples of the terrain features that have a significant impact on the geopolitics of the area. A predisposition towards separatism among the populace is favoured by the region's arid physical terrain and its incredibly inadequate transportation and communication infrastructure. In composite Assam, there has really been a long history of hostility between the hill and lowland tribes.

The Mizoram-Myanmar border region is uncontested and quiet. With the Mizo hills, Manipur, and Naga hills on the Indian side and the Chin hills, Kachin state, etc. on the Myanmar side, the boundary line of this border travels through densely wooded mountainous regions. The Yandaboo Treaty of 1826 required the British to draw this border. With rice as the primary crop, agriculture is practised on a shifting basis.

Mizoram's border region is hilly. The 404 km boundary is entirely made up of trees. Rice and tea are both grown on certain hill slopes. The government must provide the underdeveloped frontiers of North East India immediate attention. Smuggling and the influx of unauthorised foreigners have been frequent occurrences near the border between Myanmar and Mizoram. The region's remote position appears to be impeding industrialization and urbanisation. The traditional residents of the area had seen the formation of a centripetal force as a result of topography as well as history. It turned into a linguistic melting pot for several ethnic groups, including Tibeto-Chinese, Austro-Asiatic, and others, and a form of Mongoloid civilization emerged there.

**Scope of the Study:** The surrounding geography serves as a representation of the area's overall natural state. The combined study of geology, relief characteristics, drainage, soil, climatic conditions, and plant cover can be referred to as the physical environment. Despite the fact that man has the ability to drastically modify the physical landscape, the environment places some limitations on how man may live. Understanding how physical elements and human habitation interact becomes important as a result. In order to understand the nature of the physical framework in relation to location, geology, topography, climate, soil and plant cover, and associated phenomena in a spatial context, comprehensive examination is required.

However, the agriculturally based economies of the British era were unable to facilitate extensive cross-border cooperation. Additionally, the British placed a higher priority on security than regional development. After the independence from British, the security perception of India and Myanmar did not give room for border trade agreement although cross border trade was going on in the borderland between the two countries due to its socio-cultural linkage. However, with the conclusion of the Cold War and the growth of East Asian nations, the situation altered. This was also the beginning of globalisation. Therefore, border regions are seen as an economic corridor and a space for expansion and development. The Indo-Myanmar Border Trade Agreement, which was signed on January 21, 1994 by the governments of the Republic of India and the Union of Myanmar with the intention of formalising border trade practises, was a significant step towards engaging the Myanmar Junta both politically

and economically in light of the enormous trade prospects between the two countries (Bezbaruah 2007).

Focusing on the geopolitics of India and Myanmar and its impact on the socio economic development of the border areas of Mizoram which lies immediately adjacent to Myanmar, the principle objective of the study is to highlight the geopolitical dynamics of India and Myanmar and its relevance to Mizoram.

The study also aimed to suggest appropriate policy for socio-economic development of the borderlands of Mizoram-Myanmar. India and Myanmar have the potential for commerce because of their strong sociocultural and economic ties and shared geography.

**Objectives of the Study:** The study has been undertaken with the following objectives:

- 1) To study the geopolitical dynamics of India and Myanmar and its relevance to Mizoram.
- 2) To examine the impact of geopolitics on socio-economic development of the villages located along the borderlands of Mizoram.
- 3) To suggest an appropriate policy for socio-economic development of border lands.

**The Study Area:** For the present study fieldwork was conducted in the borderlands of Mizoram along Myanmar viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah & Lungbun villages. The areas have been chosen due to its location factors as the four villages are in border areas of Mizoram-Myanmar and carry out border trade activities. The areas also provides a comparative study in their types and nature of goods traded as the two towns have a significant tribal concentration but under different resource distribution and geographical setting - the former being a plain and the latter being a hilly area. The current study examines a few of the concerns emphasised in the objectives in this context.

**Methodology:** The methods used for the present study include household schedules through which preliminary data on socio-economic background of each household was

collected. For collecting household data, simple random sampling technique was used in which 30 percent were drawn from the four villages of Mizoram viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah & Lungbun villages which borders Myanmar. The data collected includes family member's name, age, sex, education, family size, monthly income, migration, means of livelihood, livestock, service sector, assets, types of house, social structure, culture and custom and trans-border trade between Mizoram and Myanmar.

Table: Sample size of the study area

Area	Thingsai	Zokhawthar	Zochachhuah	Lungbun
Total household	461	728	89	167
Household study	152	336	60	90
Simple random sampling of 30%	32.97%	46.42%	67.41%	53.89%

**Sources of Data:** Both primary and secondary data were used for the present study. Socio-economic scale was developed by the investigator to find out the socio-economic development of the villages located along the borderlands of Mizoram. In cases where they are relevant to the research's objectives, secondary sources such as books, periodicals, articles, journals, census reports, government papers, and others have been studied.

**Data Analysis:** The primary goal of data analysis is to make judgements about certain data. These findings help researchers formulate conclusions about their research. For the present study, descriptive and qualitative method was employed using percentage.

## **Conclusions: Findings and Suggestions**

Summary of findings is given based on the research objectives as follows:

### **5.1 Summary of findings on geopolitical dynamics of India and Myanmar**

A democratic government in Myanmar may potentially suit India's long-term strategic interests better. To avoid offending the military regime, the Indian government must continue to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy and support the development of democratic institutions in Myanmar. The solution to weaning the military administration away from authoritarian practices is constructive engagement through official and diplomatic channels—not conflict. India's strategic and security considerations legitimately exceed its own internal concerns in favour of Myanmar's return to democracy. The solution rests in seeking to influence the governing military dictatorship towards democracy through regional engagement engaging all stakeholders rather than in trying to export democracy to Myanmar. Myanmar and India relations Relationships between nations appear to be under transition. It is possible that Delhi will have fresh possibilities to pursue its objectives and avoid the dangers and problems that have dogged its policy towards Myanmar for many years as a result of the political changes in Myanmar and its apparent willingness to diversify its foreign policy. The "enlightened national interest" underlies Narendra Modi's pragmatic and non-dogmatic foreign policy approach, which has a strong emphasis on India's near neighbours, especially Myanmar. 2014 (Haidar). Only if New Delhi demonstrates a significant rise in popular recognition for the importance of the bilateral relationship will it be possible to boost India's political influence in Myanmar.

The Look East Policy has also been discussed in relation to Mizoram in the thesis. LEP has implications for the State of Mizoram starting with the building of the necessary infrastructure to implement LEP. Additionally, this directly affects the border commerce between Myanmar and India. It is common knowledge that no place can become wealthy or flourish without trade and commerce. In recent years, the Indian government has sought to improve ties with its neighbours to the east. As a result, it has made the Look East Policy (LEP) one of its foreign policy goals. In this case, the development of commercial ties between India and Myanmar is crucial for the LEP's



success. The LEP includes the border trade agreement, the opening of the Zokhawthar-Rih sector border trade point in Mizoram, and the agreement on the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP), a commercial route linking Myanmar. Mizoram will serve as a gateway to its eastern neighbour and beyond after the KMMTTP is finished. This corridor in the southern region of Mizoram would enable brisk trade between India and Myanmar. Additionally, Sittwe port will provide Mizoram residents with access to the Indian Ocean. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project would encourage the growth of border trade between India and Myanmar in the southern region of Mizoram. Mizoram is meant to serve as the entryway to the eastern nations through the Zokhawthar-Rih sector and KMMTTP, the second Indo-Myanmar border commerce. These are all elements of the Look East Policy, which will greatly affect Mizoram. A sizeable portion of the State has unfavourable views on the KMMTTP on the grounds that the Mizos would be absorbed by wealthier nations and the identity of the Mizos will eventually get lost. The KMMTTP has been the subject of extensive media debate in Mizoram. They worry that non-Mizos will receive the majority of the economic gains from the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. However, KMMTTP will permanently change how Mizoram is seen. More people will go to the State, and it will be simpler to export and import items across international borders. The Mizos' outlook will change for the better during this process. The border commerce between India and Myanmar that passes through Mizoram is so important that many lives in Mizoram would be disrupted without it. Myanmar is the source of many imported commodities that are utilized domestically. These products are easily accessible in the Mizoram marketplaces. Many individuals benefit from the underground economy on the other side of the border by finding work through shady Indo-Myanmar border commerce. Therefore, the State of Mizoram in the Indian Union has seen a substantial impact on its socio-economic fabric. Act East Policy (AEP) has given India's relations with ASEAN and East Asia more energy in light of the quickly shifting geopolitical circumstances. India's senior officials travel, which reflects this. As a result, in addition to economic connections, relations with ASEAN and East Asia have expanded to include collaboration in the areas of security, strategy, politics, counter terrorism, and defense. Cooperation to combat terrorism has taken precedence, particularly in light of

the Islamic state's growing influence. Targeting key industries including technology transfer, civilian nuclear cooperation, defense, and innovation is crucial.

## **5.2 Summary of findings on socio economic development of the villages located along the borderlands of Mizoram**

1. With reference to the family size among the households of Thingsai village, 4 - 6 members comprised of 45.3%, and 1 - 3 members comprised of 38.2%, 7 - 9 members comprised of 15.8% while family with 10-12 members comprises only 0.7% households whereas in Zokhawthar village with regard to family size of households, 4 - 6 members constituted 47.9% and 1-3 members constituted 40.5 %, 7 to 9 members constituted 10.8%. Only 0.9% of family households in Zokhawthar village constituted of 10 - 12 members. Therefore, it can be suggested that in the eastern border area of Mizoram viz. Zokhawthar and Thingsai villages family members between 4 - 6 are more prevalent. The percentage of households with 4 - 6 members at Zochachhuah village comprises of 48.3%, 1-3 members comprises of 36.6% households and 7 - 9 members comprises of 15% households. In Zochachhuah village, no family household has family members with 10 - 12 members. In Lungbun village, majority of households has 4 - 6 members which makes up to 60%, 7 - 9 members makes up to 35.6% households, 1-3 members makes up only 4.4% households. So, it can be inferred from the above table 4.1 that the majority of families from various demographic areas has member between 4 and 6. The least member of families in each of the four communities had between 10 and 12 members. Accordingly, in the southern border areas viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun, majority of the households has a family member ranging between 4-6 members.

Therefore, it can be suggested that people residing in rural villages have contributed to greater fertility rates, which have led to a bigger family size, as a result of clan dominance, the joint family structure, and homogeneity.

Sex ratios are assessments of the proportion of men to women and it was found that out of 152 households there are 666 family members from Thingsai village in which 343 (51.5%) comprised of female while 323 (48.5%) comprised of male. Hence, female members are higher than male in Thingsai village. Out of the total 336 households in

Zokhawthar village, 724 (52.1%) are female while 665 (47.9%) consists of male. Hence, it was found that, there are more female as compared to male in Zokhawthar village. At Zochachhuah village the total number of households consists of 257, and of those, 129 (50.2%) are male and 128 (49.8%) are female. Therefore, it can be concluded that Zochachhuah workforce predominately consisted of male. Out of the 167 households in Lungbun village, 273(53.4) are female while 238(46.6%) are male. Members of Lungbun village has a greater number of males as compared to female. Information about sex ratio is important social indicator to measure the socio-economic well-being.

2. With regard to educational level, out of 152 households in Thingsai village, 40.1% had completed secondary level of education, 30.3% completed middle level of education, 26.3% had graduated while only 3.3% completed primary level of education. In Zokhawthar village, out of 336 households, 31% completed middle level of education, 28.6% completed Secondary level, 25.9% completed primary level, 8% were graduated, 3% had completed higher secondary level of education, whereas 2.4% were uneducated and only 0.60% completed their post-graduation level of education. Accordingly, it can be suggested that population of Thingsai village and Zokhawthar village which lies in the eastern border of Mizoram had completed secondary level and middle level of education respectively. On the other hand, out of 60 households at Zochachhuah, 75% had completed primary level of education, 11.70% had completed middle level of education, 6.7% were found to graduate while only 5% had completed secondary level of education. In Lungbun village, out of 90 households, 31.1% had completed middle level of education, 26.7% had completed primary level of education, 25.6% had completed secondary level, 10% were found to be uneducated, 3.3% had completed higher secondary level of education, and only 2.2% are graduated. Therefore, it can be suggested that population of Zochachhuah village and Lungbun village which lies in the southern border of Mizoram had completed primary level and middle level of education respectively.

3. Occupational structure refers to the number of workers who are engaged in different types of economic ventures. In the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, about 38% of the households were farmer and majority (58.9%) of households are found to be daily labourer respectively. In Thingsai village,

while 16% were unemployed, 13% were daily labourer and the rest of the households are working as merchants, mistiri, carpenters, teachers, working in police department, and drivers and the remaining small percentage worked as village council, tower maintainer, reverend, pig farmer, pensioner, and army. In Zokhawthar village, while 16.6% were merchant, 5% were driver, 2.7% worked as teacher, 2.4% were tailor, 1.8% were private teacher, and another 1.8% were farmer, 1.5 of the total households were carpenter, 1.2% owns a tea stall, 0.9% owns motor rental, 0.9% had no occupation while another 0.9% are mistiri, 0.6% runs wholesale shop, 0.6% were vendor, 0.6% owns motor workshop, another 0.6% were pharmacy, and the remaining small numbers includes baker, cement mistiri, civil pensioner, commercial vehicle, electrician, meat shop, mechanic, pensioner, police, restaurant, and two-wheeler workshop. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, about 51.7% of the households are farmers and 36% of households are found to be unemployed respectively. In Zochachhuah village, while 38.3% are unemployed, 6.7% work as merchant, 1.7% are Assam Rifle porter, and the remaining 1.7% work as a driver. With regard to the households' family of Lungbun, while 12.2% were teachers, and another 12.2% were farmer, 7.8% worked as merchant, 6.7% were daily labourer, 4.4% were fisherman, 3.3% were driver, 2.2% were police, and the remaining small percentage includes vendor, tourism, tailor, poultry farmer, pig farmer, public health engineering, peon, pensioner, mechanic, job operator, electrician, baker and army.

4. With respect to income, in the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar, majority (81%) of the 152 families in Thingsai village have an income that falls within the category of Rs. 14499 or less. Just 4.1% of the families' income falls into the ₹46000-₹149999 category, whereas 15% of the households' income falls into the ₹14500-₹45999 range. Out of 338 homes in Zokhawthar, 62.7% had income between ₹46,000 and ₹149,000. Just 21.6% of the families in the homes had incomes between ₹150,000 and ₹200,000, while 13.5% of the households had incomes of ₹14,499 or less. Whereas 5.1% of the households' income is in the range of ₹14,500 to ₹459,99. Of the 60 Zochachhuah households, 36.7% had yearly incomes of ₹14,499 or less, and 35% had annual incomes of ₹14,500 to ₹14,999 and 20% of households' households had an annual income of ₹14500-45999. Nevertheless, only 8.4% of the

households' total income is in the range of ₹150000 to ₹2000,000. Of the 90 families in Lungbun, 63.3% had yearly incomes of less than ₹14499, 25.3% had annual incomes between ₹14500 and ₹45999, and 9.9% had annual incomes between ₹46,000 and ₹149,999. Yet, the household income only represents 1.1% of the range of income between ₹150,000 and ₹200,000 in Zochachhuah village.

5. With regard to in-migration status of case study areas of the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, 31.6% are the original inhabitant of Thingsai village whereas 20.4% people had migrated from Bungkhua, 8.6% in-migrated from Thantlang, 5.9% in-migrated from Leisen, , 3.3% in-migrated from Lawklung, 2.6% in-migrated from Fungkah, 2% in-migrated from Thantlang, 2% in-migrated from Aizawl, another 2% in-migrated from Bungtlang, 1.3% from Halkha, 1.3% from Khuafu, 1.3% from Bungtlang, and the remaining in-migrated from Fangkah, Cherhlun, Dawn, Ngharchhip, Niawhtlang, Rawlbuk, Serchhip, Sihhmuh and Vambai. In Zokhawthar village, it was found that 20.1% of people are the original inhabitants while 14% of the households in-migrated from Tahan, Zotlang, Tuichhir, 4.4% in-migrated from Rihkhawdar, 3.3% in-migrated from Leilet, Tuingo, Vangchhia, Tlangsam, Vuangtu, and 2.7% in-migrated from Tiddim, Tlangzawl, Saek, Myohlah and another 2.1% in-migrated from Khawzawl and Champhai, 1.8% in-migrated from Simdihai, Zimte and Myanmar, 1.5% from Melbuk, Farkawn, Hruaikawn and Thingchang, merely 1.2% in-migrated from Letpanchhawng, Khawmawi, Satawm, Sanmyo, Ruantlang, Haimual and the remaining in-migrated from Lungzarhtum, Thangte, Lianhna, Siaha, Kolasib, Khuangleng, Seling, Sekan, Khampat, Kawlkulh, Samthang, Saichal, Kanan, Hnahlan, Rawthloh, Haiheng, Phunte, Ngaizawl, East Lungdar, N. Khawbung, Dawihkhel, Churachandpur, Mualveng, Bualte, Muallungthu, and Mandalay. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, it was found that 8% of the households in Zochachhuah are the original inhabitants while 13% in-migrated from Parva-II, Murihwah, 12% from T Dumzau, 8.3% in-migrated from Sabual, Sabualtlang, 3.3% in-migrated from Myanmar, and the remaining small percent in-migrated from Vaseikai, Sikulkai, Semanasori, Sekulkai, Ramrikawn, Pakaumah, Manipur, Lunghauka, Hlimzawl, Dumzautlang, Dumzau and Bondukranga.

6. With respect to cultivation of crops, in the eastern border of Mizoram viz. Thingsai and Zokhawthar village, 44.1% of families did not cultivate any crops in Thingsai village, 31.6% of all households cultivated both rice and vegetables, 17.8% of all households cultivated just vegetables, and the remaining households cultivated fruits, rice, and tea. In Zokhawthar village, 86.1% of homes did not grow any crops, 11.8% households grow only vegetables, merely 0.6% households grew both vegetables and fruits, and the remaining households dealt with the growth of rice, maize, and teak. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun village about 8.3% of households do engage in crop cultivation in Zochachhuah village. However, 43.3% households grow both rice and vegetables, 30% grow only vegetables, and 18.3% grow only rice. In Lungbun village, 66.7% families claim they did not involve in any crop cultivation, 20% grow only vegetables, 6.7% grow both vegetables and rice, 2.2% claimed to be growing only fruits, and the remaining houses claimed to be growing rice, vegetables, maize and coffee.

7. With regard to landholdings in the eastern part of Mizoram which borders Myanmar, at Thingsai village, 52.6% of households had no landholdings, 28.9% had a landholding of two hectares or less, 16.4% had a landholding of one hectare or less, 1.3% had a landholding of four hectares, and just 0.6% had a landholding of three hectares. In Zokhawthar village, 87.9% of families lacked any land holdings, 10.1% had one hectare or less, 1.5% had two hectares, and just 0.3% had three and four hectares, respectively. Zochachhuah village, 31.7% of households had no land holdings, 26.6% had holdings of two hectares or less, 21.7% had holdings of one hectare or less, 11.7% had holdings of three hectares, 5% had holdings of four hectares, and just 1.7% had holdings of five and six hectares, respectively. In Lungbun village, 57.8% of households reported having no landholdings, 26.6% reported having 2 hectares of land, 7.8% reported having a land area of 1 hectare or less, 6.6% reported having 3 hectares of land, and the final 1.1% reported having 4 hectares of land.

8. With regard to household level production, majority 77.6% of the households in Thingsai village had no production, 6.5% of the total households had production between ₹ 2000-3000, 5.2% had production between ₹4001-5000 and ₹7001-8000, 2.6% had production between ₹6001-7000, and only 0.6% had production between

₹3001-4000, ₹5001-6000, and ₹8001 to 9000. In Zokhawthar village, 97.3% of households had no production, 0.9% of all households produced between ₹4001-5000, 0.3% produced between ₹3001-4000, 0.3% produced between ₹5001-6000, 0.3% produced between ₹6001-7000, and merely just 0.3% produced between ₹7001-8000. In the southern border of Mizoram 50% of households in Zochachhuah village produced between ₹2000-3000, 26.7% produced between ₹7001-8000, and the remaining 23.3% produced between ₹4001-5000. In Lungbun village, 83.3% of the families had no production, 4.4% had output production between ₹4001-5000, 2.2% had production between ₹3001-4000, and the remaining few households falls between ₹5001-6000, ₹6001-7000 and ₹8001-9000.

9. Regarding the different types of livestock raising in the eastern part of Mizoram which border Myanmar about 39.5% of the households in Thingsai village were involved in poultry farming, 34.9% do not involve in any livestock rearing, 11.2% were involved in both piggery and poultry farming, 6.6% involved in piggery, 2.6% were involved in dog breeding farms, 2.0% were involved in both dog breeding farms and poultry farming, and only 1.3% were engaged in rearing goat. Nonetheless, 0.7% of all households engaged in cattle and poultry. The remaining 0.7% households' practices both in piggery and dog breeding farm. In Zokhawthar village, 79% of households had no practices of livestock rearing practices, 10.4% engaged in piggery, 8.6% practiced poultry farming, 1.2% practiced both piggery and poultry farming, and 0.3% practices both cattle and poultry farming. Yet, only 0.3% of all households own both piggery and goat farming. In the southern part of Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Zochachhuah village, 40% of households does not engage in livestock rearing, 31.7% involved in piggery, 15% engaged in rearing goat, 5% had only poultry, 3.3% had both piggery and poultry farming, 1.7% own cattle and poultry, another 1.7% own only dogs, and the remaining 1.7% own both piggery and goat. In Lungbun village, 34.4% of households had no livestock rearing practices, 30% involved in piggery, 20% own poultry farming, 14.4% had both pig and poultry, and only 1.1% own three types of livestock rearing such as piggery.

10. With regard to grazing/feeding of livestock in the eastern Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Thingsai village, 38.8% of the households did not engage in

feeding and grazing, 36.8% were involved in poultry feed, 7.2% were feeding vegetables, another 7.2% were feeding both vegetables and poultry feed, 4.6% were feeding only rice, 1.3% were feeding waste food, 0.7% were feeding grass, 0.7% were feeding both meat and waste foods, 0.7% were feeding rice and vegetables, and the remaining 0.7% were feeding waste food, vegetables, and poultry feed. In Zokhawthar village, 79.6% of families did not engage in stall, feeding, or grazing. And 15.7% fed on waste food, while 3.8% fed chickens feed, just 0.6% fed maize and the remaining 0.3% fed on grass. In the southern Mizoram, in Zochachhuah village majority (55%) of households did not engage in feeding and grazing, 13.3% fed grass, 10% had chaff, another 10% fed vegetables, 3.3% fed only rice, 1.7% fed rice and vegetables, 1.7% fed chaff and vegetables, and the remaining 1.7% fed both vegetables and grass. 44.4% of households in Lungbun village did not engage in feeding and grazing, while 15.6% feed grass only, and another 15.6% were involved in pig feed, 10% feed vegetables, 3.3% feed only rice, 1.7% feed both rice and vegetables, 1.7% feed both chaff and vegetables, and the remaining 1.7% feed both vegetables and grass.

11. In the eastern border of Mizoram with the earnings levels from raising cattle in the two villages of Thingsai and Zokhawthar villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, about 37.5% of households made less than ₹1000 from raising livestock, 32.9% made between ₹1500-2000, 23% made between ₹5001-10,000, 5.3% made between ₹1001-5,000, and only 0.7% made between ₹10001-15,000 from raising livestock. The remaining 0.7% made between ₹20001-25000 from raising livestock. In Zokhawthar village, with regard to the role of livestock income, 95.9% of households had monthly income of ₹1,000 or less, 2.4% make between ₹1001-5000, 0.9% between ₹15001-20000, and just 0.3% had an income between ₹25001-30000 through livestock rearing/farming, 0.3% between ₹45001-50000, and the final 0.3% make between ₹60001 and above. By and large in the southern border of Mizoram, 66.7% of households in Zochachhuah village, make less than ₹1,000 per month through livestock farming, 15% earn between ₹5001 and ₹10000 through livestock farming, 8.3% between ₹10001-15000 through livestock farming, 3.3% between ₹55001 and ₹60000, 1.7% between ₹1001-5000 through livestock farming, 1.7% earn between ₹15001-20000 through livestock farming, 1.7% earn between ₹45001-50000 and the other 1.7% earn ₹60001 and above through livestock farming.



In the southern border of Mizoram, in Lungbun village, majority (80%) of households earn less than ₹1,000 per month through livestock farming, while 6.6% earn between ₹5001-10,000 through livestock farming, 3.3% between ₹1001-5000, 3.3% between ₹45001-50000, 2.2% between ₹15001-20000 through livestock farming, 2.2% earns between ₹55001-60000 through livestock farming, and only 1.1% earns between ₹25001-30000 and the remaining 1.1% earns ₹6001 or more through livestock farming.

12. Pertaining to availability of services to tourist, it was found that in both eastern and southern part of Mizoram which borders Myanmar viz. Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages reported they did not involve in tourist services. However, in Thingsai village 99.3% of the households involved in providing services to tourists while the remaining 0.7% did not involve in providing services to tourist. It can be inferred from table 4.13 that all respondents of Zokhawthar village and Zochachhuah village did not take part in offering services to tourists. 1.1% of the households in Lungbun village provided services to tourists, whereas 98.9% of households do not participate in providing services to tourists.

13. As regards to household assets in the eastern Mizoram which border Myanmar, in Thingsai village there are total of 318 assets owned by all households, out of which 97.4% of the households has owned smartphone, 46.7% owned television, 39.5% owned refrigerator, 11.8% owned bicycle, 5.9% owned washing machine, 2.6% owned two-wheeler, 2.6% own car. Nonetheless, 1.3% of all households owned sumo vehicle. In Zokhawthar village, there are a total of 1170 assets owned by all households. Among these, 93.2% households have owned smartphone, 85.8% have owned television, 79.6% have owned a refrigerator, 69.8% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, 7.1% have own truck vehicle, 6.8% have owned car, and only 2.1% have owned sumo vehicle. In the southern border of Mizoram there are 96 assets in total possessed by all households in Zochachhuah village. Among them, 73.3% households owned smartphone, 45% owned radio, 20% owned television, 11.7% owned refrigerator, 5% owned rice mill, 1.7% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, another 1.7 owned a car and the remaining 1.7% owned computer/laptop. The total number of assets in Lungbun village is 252 and of which 93.3% of households have smartphones, 68.9% have owned television, 51.1% have owned two-wheeler vehicle, 40% of Lungbun village

have owned refrigerator, 12.2% have owned washing machine, 6.7% have owned radio, 3.3% have owned car, and merely 2.2% have owned truck and 1.1% have owned pickup vehicle and another 1.1% have owned sumo vehicle.

14. With reference to the type of house/settlement among the households family of Thingsai village majority (51.3%) settled in pucca house, 20.4% settled in rentedhouse, 11.2% settled in hut, 7.9% settled in kutcha house and the remaining 5.9%settled in mansion/RCC house. 42.3% of households in Zokhawthar village lives in a rented house, 38.5% lives in pucca house, 10.1% lives in mansion/RCC, and the remaining 4.1% lives in kutcha house. In Zochachhuah village, 56.7% of the respondants families resides in kutcha house and the remaining 28.3% resides in a pucca house. 63.3% of family repondents in Lungbun village settled in pucca house, 16.7% settled in kutcha house and 11.1% settled in mansion/RCC house, 4.4% settled in rented house and the remaining 1.1 settled in a hut.

15. Pertinent to marital status of the case study areas of the eastern and southern borderof Mizoram, in eastern border Mizoram of Thingsai village and Zokhawthar village 88.8% and 74% are married respectively. In the southern border of Mizoram viz. Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages, 95% and 91% are married respectively.

16. With regard to relationship of Mizoram border with Myanmar among the respondents of Thingsai village, 57.9% households have relationship with Myanmar and the remaining 42.1% did not have any relationship with Myanmarese. In Zokhawthar village, 80.8% households maintain a cordial relationship with Myanmarese, while 19.2% claims to have no relationship with Myanmarese. In Zochachhuah village, 95% of the total respondents claimed to have a close tie with Myanmar, while 5% claimed to have no relationship with Myanmarese. In Lungbun village, 86.7% households said they did not have a relationship with Myanmarese, while 13.3% said they have a relationship.

17. With regard to year of settlement within the case study villages, it was found that in Thingsai village, 50% of the households settled in the year 2001 and later, 30.9% settled between the year 1901-1950, 17.1% settled between the year 1951-2000 and the remaining 2% settled before the year 1900. 59.2% of households of

Zokhawthar village have settled in the year 2001 and later, and 38.5% between 1951 and 2000, 1.8% between 1901 and 1950, and the rest 0.6% before settled much before the year 1900. In the Zochachhuah demography survey, 45.1% households settled in the year 2001 and later, whereas 40.1% settled between 1951 and 2000, and 8.3% settled between 1901 and 1950, and the remaining 6.7% settled before 1900. 70% of survey households in Lungbun village have settled between 2001 and later, 24.4% between 1951 and 2000, 3.3% between 1901 and 1950, and only 2.7% of households settled before 1900. Hence, from all the four villages of the case study areas, it can be justified that most of the respondents have settled in the year 2001 and beyond.

18. Regarding migration status, in Thingsai village, 27.6% of the households are the original inhabitants, while 21.3 % migrated from Bungkhua. 7.9 % migrated from Thantlang and 7.2 % migrated from Aizawl and the rest of the households migrated from Leisen, Lunglei, Fungkah Dawn, Vanzang, Vambai, Zatlang, Serchhip, Ngharchhip, Sihmuh, Halkha, Lawklung etc. In Zokhawthar village, 22.2% of the households are the original inhabitants, and 9.2 % are immigrants from Tahan. 4.1% of the population in Zokhawthar village migrated from Thantlang, and 7.2% migrated from Aizawl and the rest of the households migrated from Tuingo, Tuivar, Vangchhia, Vaphai, Myohla Rih, Seling, Sesih, Bualte, Bulfekzawl, Bungzung, Burma, Champhai, Chawhte, Chawngtlai, Chekan, Dawihkhel, East Lungdar, Falam, Farkawn, Haihena, Haikhawl, Haimual, Hnahlan, Hruaikawn, Kannan, Kawlkulh, Kelkang, Khampat, Khawbung Khawmawi, Khawthlir, Khawzawl, Khuangleng, Kolasib, Leilet, Leisenzo, Letpanchhawng, Lianhna, Mandalay, Manipur, Melbuk, Muallungthu, Mualveng, Myanmar, Myohla, Ngaizawl, North Khawbung, Phunte, Pingkhung, Ramthlo, Rih, Rihkhawdar, Ruantlang, Saek, Saichal, Saiha, Samthang, Satawas, Satawm, Sazep, Sekan, Simdihai, Taunfzalat, Tedim, Thingchang, Tlangsam, Tlangzawl, Tuichirh. In Zochachhuah village, 30 % of the households are the original inhabitants and 13.3 % are immigrants from Parva II. 11.7% of the population came from T. Dumzau, and another 11.7 are immigrant of Muriwah. The rest of the small percentage of households have migrated from Sabual, Sabual Tlang, Simanasora. Betseoi, Bondukranga, Churachandpur, Dakawwah, Hlimzawl, Kawlchaw, Tripura and Tuicahwng Tlang. In Lungbun village, 70 % are the original

inhabitants and 7.8 % are immigrants from Tlangnuam. The rest of the households migrated from Vuangtu, Lungzarhtum, Zaphai, Vuangtu, Chakhai, Cheural, Haika and Karimganj.

19. In pertinent to status in the society, in Thingsai village 15.1% of households have higher social position in society, 84.9% of household were found to have poor social status. Whereas in Zokhawthar village 86.7% of the households were found to have no social status as compared to 13.3% of the families with better social status. 26.7% of households in the community of Zochachhuah village have good social status whereas 73.3% of households have low social status. In Lungbun village, 72.2% of homes have no social standing, nevertheless, 27.8% of households were found to have good social status.

20. With respect to similarity of same language spoken, 73% of households in Thingsai village did not speak the same language, while 27% of household speaks the same language. 91.4 % of households in Zokhawthar village speaks the same language and only 8.6 % of households did not speak the same language. 61.7% of households from Zochachhuah village did not speak the same language but however, 38.3% of households speaks same language. In Lungbun village, 61.1% of households speaks the same language whereas 38.9% of them speak different languages.

21. The study also found that 90.2% of households from Thingsai village have not participated in social activities, while 3.9% of households participated in social activities, 2% participates in village council, 1.3% of households are members of non-governmental organizations such as YMA and village council, block vice president of ruling party etc. 65.4% of households from Zokhawthar village have not participated in social activities, whereas 28.7% have actively participated, 1.5% engaged themselves in YMA section committee members, and the remaining households engage themselves in other social activities. 48.3% households in Zochachhuah village participates in social activities as compared to 45% who do not involve in social activities, and the remaining households have participated in other social activities. In Lungbun village, 53.3% of the households did not engage in social activities, as opposed to 41.1% who engaged actively in social activities and the remaining households engage themselves in other social activities.

22. As to participation in church activities, 92.1% of households in Thingsai village did not participate in church activities, while 7.9% of the remaining households actively participated. 70.1% of households from Zokhawthar village did not participate in any religious activities whereas 29.9% of households has actively participated. 53.3% of households from Zochachhuah village did not participate in any religious activities as compared to 46.7% households who have participated. 55.6% of households from Lungbun village did not participate in religious activities whereas 44.4% of all households have actively participated.

23. In Thingsai village, 73% of households reported that their neighbours did not look at their family for their utility in terms of social services. While the remaining 27% reported that their neighbours did look at their family for their utility in terms of social services. From 338 households in Zokhawthar village, 60.4% have justified that their neighbours did not consider their family to be useful in terms of social services. The remaining 39.6% proclaimed that their neighbours did consider their family to be a source of social service. In Zochachhuah village, out of 60 households majority of the households i.e. 51.7% reported that their neighbours did not find their family to be helpful in terms of social services. For the remaining 48.3%, their neighbours allegedly did view their family as a social assistance resource. Out of 90 households in Lungbun village, 56.7% stated that their neighbours did find their family to be social service-oriented. The neighbours of the remaining 43.3% did not see their family as a source of social service.

24. With reference to language spoken by the respondents it can be seen that in Thingsai village, 57.9% of the households use Lushai, 20.4% can use both Lai and Lushai, 14% use only Lai, 2.1% can speak Lai, Lushai, kawl, 0.7% use Lai, Kawl, Lushai, and another 0.7% use Lushai, English, Kawl and the remaining households uses Lushai, Leisen, Lai, Kawl, Malay, Chinese, English. In Zokhawthar village, 91.1% of households use Lushai only, 3.6% can speak Lushai, Lai, Kawl, Malay, Chinese, English, 2.1% can speak both Lushai and Falam, 1.5% can speak both Lai and Lushai, 0.9% use both Lushai and Paihte, 0.6% can speak only Falam, and the remaining 0.3% can only use Tedim as means of communication. 76.7% of household in Zochachhuah village speaks Bru, while 1.7% are fluent in Arakan, 1.7% in Lushai, remaining 1.7%

can speak both Bru and Lushai, 1.7% speaks chakma and the remaining 1.7% use Mok. In Lungbun with reference to language spoken, 71.1% of households speaks only Mara; 10% speak just Hawthai; 6.7% speak both Lai and Lushai; 6.7% can speak Vuangtu; 4.4% speaks only Lushai; and the remaining 1.1% use both Mara and Lushai languages.

25. In respect of festivals celebration in both eastern and southern border of Mizoram, in Thingsai village, 68.4% households are celebrating Chapchar Kut festival, while 14.5 % celebrated CND. 7.9% of the households do not celebrate any festival, while 4.6 % celebrates festivals Lai Miphun Ni, Thopuai and the rest of the households celebrates christmas and Chin national. Out of 338 households in Zokhawthar, 59.5% does not have any major festival, while the remaining 40.5% are celebrating christmas as their main festival. Among the 60 households in Zochachhuah village, 78.3% celebrate christmas as a main event. 13.3 % accepts saingrain as major festival. 6.7 % are engaged with Bihu festival while the remaining 7% celebrate MCHP day. 92.2% of Lungbun households regard christmas as a major festival, and the remaining 7.8 % marked MCHP Day as their main event.

26. In respect of rituals and ceremony observed by the households of the four villages viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages of Mizoram which border Mynamar, 75.7 % of households residing in Thingsai village do not engage in any ritual ceremony while 19.7 of them are engaging themselves in church service. 0.7 % are Khawhring and another 0.7 % are found to be ramhuai hlau. In Zokhawthar village, 60.4.% of residents do not participate in any ceremonial and other 39.6% household are unknown to ritual ceremonies. 46.7 % of households residing in Zochachhuah village do not take part in any rituals, while 31.7 % residents of Zochachhuah celebrate christmas as their main event. 15% celebrates saingrain, while another 5% take part in Bihu. 1.7 % of them are observing Good Friday etc. People living in Lungbun village do not participate in any other ceremonial while 36.7% are celebrating Christmas as their main event.

27. In pertinent to religion practiced by households of the four villages viz. Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah and Lungbun villages of Mizoram which border

Myanmar, 99.3 % of the households residing in Thingsai village are christians, while only 0.7% belong to other religion. 96.4% of the households who live in the Zokhawthar village are christians, with only 3.6 % of them being having no religion. In the southern border 0.4% of households residing in the Zochachhuah village are christians, while 23.3% of them are Buddhists. With only 6.6% of them identifying as not having religion in Zokhawthar village. And in Lungbun village, 87.7% of households in Lungbun village are Christians, while 7.8% are not having any religion. And only 3.3% are lobo while merely 1.1% are Muslims.

28. With regard to the food habits, it was discovered that individuals living in the border region primarily consume rice, vegetables, and meat when it comes to their eating habits in Thingsai, Zokhawthar, Zochachhuah, and Lungbun, which are located on Mizoram's eastern and southern borders. People who live in the Mizoram-Myanmar border region often consume rice as their major source of sustenance. Compared to Indian food, Mizo cuisine utilises fewer spices and includes meats including chicken, hog, beef, and dog meat.

29. In terms of apparel, it was discovered that 95.4% of households in Thingsai village wear Mizo clothing and that only 0.7% do so in a western style. Additionally, 92.9% of the households in the Zokhawthar village dressed in western attire, while 4.7% did not define their style of clothing and the remaining 2.7 did so in Mizo traditional attire. In the Zochachhuah village, 58.3% of the households wore western clothing, whereas 21.7% did so in Mizo garb, and 20% did not specify their clothing preference. In the community of Lungbun, 57.8% of households wear Mara clothing, while 33.3% did not indicate their preferred style. Only 2.2% of people wore western clothing, compared to 6.6% who dressed in Mizo attire.

30. With regard to type of craft, In Thingsai village, 67.8% of households refrain from engaging in crafts, 11.2% of people work with bamboo to make crafts. 5.9% of them fish in their local area. 3.9% of people work in carpentry, and 3.3% are Mistiris. 2.6% of people work in the tailoring industry, whereas 1.3% knit, 0.7% enjoys cooking, 0.7% weave, etc. Of the 338 responders from Zokhawthar, 55% do not perform any crafts. 32.2% of households are engaged in other activities. 4.1% of the population

works as a tailor, 1.8% as a mistiri, 1.2% as a mechanic, and 0.9% as a mechanic. The rest of the households work as cobblers, beauticians, drivers, weavers, etc. 53.3% of the 60 Zochachhuah families reported having no crafts-related tasks. 45% of households are engaged in other activities.

31. In respect to lifestyle of the people living in the eastern and southern border of Mizoram- Myanmar, it was discovered that 86.2% of the 152 residences in the Thingsai village followed a Lushai tribal lifestyle, 10.5% a Lai tribal lifestyle, and 3.3% a lifestyle that was unidentified. Additionally, 91.1% of people in Zokhawthar village live a Lushai lifestyle, while 8.9% lead an undefined lifestyle. 80% of the 60 houses in the Zochachhuah region live as Lushai Nuns, while 20% of them did not indicate their lifestyle. It was also found that of the 90 families in the Lungbun village, 65.6% live an undeclared lifestyle. While 34.4% lead a Lushai way of life.

32. Regarding practicing of arts in the case study areas of Mizoram which borders Myanmar, 71.05% of people in Thingsai village lacked any specialised expertise. 10.5% of families engage in bamboo crafts. 5.9% were local fisherman. Carpenters make up 3.3% of the population, while mistiris make up another 3.3%. 2.6% of persons are employed in the tailoring sector, compared to 0.7% who like to cook, 0.7% who work as mechanics, etc. 60.1% of the 338 Zokhawthar respondents are involved in several projects. 37.9% of families lacked any specialised knowledge on the arts. 0.3% of people hold jobs such as bakers, beauticians, drivers, carpenters, etc. No specific genre was indicated, although 53.3% of the 60 Zochachhuah households were said to be artistically talented. There was no specialised art knowledge or skills in 45% of houses. An operator employs 1.7% of the population. In Lungbun village, 88.9% of the 90 families lacked specialised art skills and expertise. 11.2% of respondents demonstrated artistic ability without identifying a specific skill set.

33. Mizoram is well known as a haven for ethno-musicians and the innate musicality of people everywhere is combined with the influence of the church and missionary education, which has opened doors to the west, to create the richness of western music. Drums made from hollow tree trunks accompany the traditional music



of Mizoram. Other crucial accompaniments include brass cymbals similar to those in Myanmar. Numerous wind and stringed instruments are used to enhance the sound. The vocals cover a variety of subjects such as including hunting (Bawh Hla and Hlado), religious rites (Thiam Hla and Dawi Hla), and of course, exquisite love melodies (Lengzem Zai). Regarding the music instrumental talents of the people living in the eastern and southern border of Mizoram, it was found that In Thingsai Village, 90.03 percent of residents lack any special musical abilities, and just 2.7% of them can play keyboard, guitar, and drums. Another 1.3% and 1.3% can play guitar and keyboard separately. 1.3% of people can play the guitar and the drums, 0.7% can play the drums exclusively, and 0.4% can play the keyboard and the drums. According to the survey study, the 338 households in the village of Zokhawthar had a 96.15% musical aptitude deficit. Only 1.5% of persons were guitar players. 0.6% of individuals have stronger vocal abilities, 0.3% of people can only play the drums, and 1.2% of people can play the piano. 98.3% of households in Zochachhuah village are musically incompetent. Only 1.7% of the families claimed to be musically skilled, and they did not specify any specific skill sets. 97.8% of the 90 Lungbun responders (of 90) lacked any musical aptitude. Only 1.1% of households have a musical preference, and only 1.1% of persons can play the piano, which makes no mention of any specific skill sets.

34. Out of 152 households in the Thingsai village, 2% reported engaging in legal commerce, while the remaining 0.7% engaged in illicit trade over the international border between Mizoram and Myanmar. Of these, 97.4% did neither legal nor illegal trade. Of the 338 families in the Zokhawthar village, 64.2% reported engaging in international trade near the Myanmar border; 12.4% reported doing so illegally. 23.4% more households didn't participate in foreign trade. According to the given data in Zochachhuah, 73.3% of households used illegal means of trade, while the remaining 26.7% did not engage in international trade. 60% of the households did trading illegally, while 32.2% of the households do legal trade under the law, another 7.8% did not involve in trading.

35. Due to Mizoram's economy's dependence on imports, a steady flow of border trade is essential. Though trade has been flowing continuously for over a decade, growth along this trade corridor is still sluggish. From the present study it was found

that 98.02 of the people living in Thingsai village stated to have no imports from Myanmar. Items imported from Myanmar include food products (1.3%) and livestock (0.7%). In the town of Zokhawthar, 39.6% of residents claimed to import groceries, while 10.5% objected to doing so. 5.9% of people just imported food, 8.3% only imported groceries and apparel, and 9.8% imported clothing. 5.6% of people imported both food and fruits and vegetables at the same time. Betelnut and groceries were imported by 0.6% of homes. A minor percentage of households are engaged in the importation of goods like produce, auto parts, building supplies, and cosmetics. In the 60 houses that comprised the base of the Zochachhuah population area, 48.3% of the households imported food, 48.3% imported nothing at all, 1.7% imported apparel, and 1.7% imported both groceries and clothing. A survey of 90 homes in the Lungbun zone revealed that 60 percent imported nothing from Myanmar, 37.8% imported cattle, goats, and other animals, 1.1% imported foodstuffs, and 1.1% imported kenbo 125 (motorcycle manufactured in China).

36. In terms of goods exported from Mizoram to Myanmar, 99.34% of the residents in Thingsai village had no exports to Myanmar, while 0.7% had exported chicken to Myanmar. 60.9% of the 338 houses in the Zokhawthar village reported having no exports in contrast to the 14.8% exported fertilizer, 6.5% exported groceries, 4.7% who had exported food, 2.1% exported fertilizer and medication, and 1.5% who had exported apparel. 1.5% of homes exported clothing and groceries, while 0.9% simultaneously exported food, hair, medication, and fertilizers. Moreover, 0.9% exports both hair and fertilizer. Additionally, the remaining minor households are involved in exporting good items including hair, fertiliser, food, and cosmetics. Only 1.7% of the 60 homes in the village of Zochachhuah exported both rice and vegetables, while 51.7% of the 60 houses selling vegetables had no export to Myanmar. Survey results from 90 houses in the Lungbun village demographic zone revealed that 92.2% had exported nothing, 4.4% had exports cigarettes, 1.1% exported goods, and still another 1.1% exported salt.

37. In Thingsai region, which is in the eastern part of Mizoram that borders Myanmar, it was discovered that 99.34% of residents lacked a means of transporting their products. Bicycles are only used by 0.7% of them for transportation. Additionally,

45% of the 338 families in Zokhawthar reported using a car to deliver goods. 12.7% of people commute by car and on foot. 10.1% of the population lacks transportation. Also, 2.7% said they have transported items on foot. In the southern part of Mizoram. Out of the 60 families in Zochachhuah village, it was reported that 56.7% of their items were transported by boat whereas 43.3% of homes reveal that there is no transit available. Of the 90 homes in Lungbun, 64.4% do not identify any form of transportation and 34.4% of households said they had transported by car.

38. The study also found that the majority of households (61.18%) in Thingsai village does not have any specific reason for visiting Myanmar. Visiting family was described by 27% of households. The households' primary reason for travelling was 6.6%, while 2.6% visited mainly for fishing, and 2.1% of visited Myanmar for one of three different reasons: to visit a church, go grazing, or go fishing or see family (0.7% each from each categories). 32.5% of people in Zokhawthar said they travelled to Myanmar mostly for shopping. 19.8% of the replies merely appear out of randomly. 7.7% of households travelled to Myanmar for leisure and shopping, compared to 13.6% of families who never make it there and 8.9% of households who visit sometimes. 7.1% had gone to see family there. 1.2% of tourists only came for travel, 0.9% came to do business, 0.6% travelled seeking place of employment, and 0.3% travelled to buy commodities. About 66.7% of households in Zochachhuah village's inhabitants said they had never travelled to Myanmar, while 16.7% said they were travelling there for an irrational reason. Only 5% of them went shopping there. Out of the 90 homes in Lungbun, 47.8% claimed they had never been to Myanmar and 20% had gone there to go fishing. Only 1.1% of them claimed to have visited for employment, although 12.2% claimed to have done so.

39. There was no boundary dispute between India and Myanmar on a government to government level. The two countries settled disputes of a tribes living in the border areas. The boundary was based on natural frontiers and defined in provincial notification in the pre-independence period.

40. The border trade and economy are beneficial to each other. Efforts should be made to develop the border areas of India and Myanmar. Establishment of fair border

trade is necessary for the development of economy of the people because most of the border areas have difficult terrain, isolation and lack of infrastructure.

41. Border trade is also governed by the kinds of human groups living in border areas. By this, we mean the ethnic composition on both sides of the boundary.

42. The economy of the border areas is always of supplementary and complimentary nature and this aspect of economy should always be kept in mind while promoting the border trade.

### **5.3 Suggestion of appropriate policy for socio-economic development of borderlands:**

Cross-border areas have emerged along India and Myanmar's shared borders as a result of India's policy and economic focus shifting from "Look East" to "Act East." The state administration of Mizoram is eager to ease border commerce in line with the overall purpose and objective of the Indian federal government in New Delhi, according to an assessment of border trade at the Zokhawthar-Rih borders. However, there are three main barriers to cross-border economic collaboration, the first of which is the Sino-Indian conflict in Myanmar. India and China are competing to exert influence over Myanmar's border regions for geopolitical, economic, and strategic reasons. Second, China offered to create the BCIM economic corridor as part of the BRI with the primary goal of facilitating commerce. India has been uninterested or reticent to participate in the BRI because of open border disputes. Third, border trade might face difficulties and risks due to insurgency actions in India's northeastern borders because of their poor infrastructure and socioeconomic development.

The present study has a few implications and suggestions of appropriate policy for socio-economic development of borderlands in Mizoram:

- 1) The study suggests an openness of borders for free trade and travel as fundamental components of border management, with utmost regard for freedom and human rights. However, borders should be closed to any illegal activity that threatens regional stability. Migrants can roam freely without being properly monitored for their health under the unrestricted Movement Regime (FMR), which allows for

unrestricted movement up to 16 kilometres on both sides of the border. Meat imports into Mizoram are mostly made via unmanned channels and are essentially uncontrolled and dependent on Myanmar. Public health problems are further hampered by the lack of infrastructural resources like testing laboratories. Mizoram has repeatedly prohibited the import of pigs and piglets from Myanmar owing to the development of bovine disease, adopting strict measures including barring border crossings and trading activities. Throughout Myanmar's border area, issues with smuggling of all types, illegal migration, terrorism, and organized crime must be tackled. To streamline the ongoing illegal trade, items of third country origin might be brought under the Indo-Myanmar border trade agreement provisions or under the clearance of third country origin goods vide Luggage Rule 1944.

- 2) To foster a friendly relationship and preserve shared interests, border management and the border guards force work in uninterrupted synchronization. This would facilitate information sharing for coordinated activities including precise intelligence.
- 3) Border management facilitators need to be deployed between India and Myanmar to help with people-to-people interactions, assistance alongside controlling the inflow and outflow of people, cultural exchange, conventional border interactions, visits to religious sites, educational exchange programmes, and the exchange of artificial intelligence for coordinated actions against criminal, insurgent, and secessionist organizations.
- 4) The beginning of border commerce has created opportunities for wage employment. It absorbed effort that gave these two border villages their distinctive flavour. The majority of the population is reliant on commerce, performing labor-intensive jobs such being drivers and porters. The conditions of their employment provide occupational health risks. Their dependence on drugs and other substances to deal with their suffering impairs their health, which has negative effects on both their immediate environment and their ability to earn a living. Alcoholics are becoming more prevalent which resulted in health hazards among the inhabitants of borderlands of Mizoram.

- 5) Building the community through generating assets and enhancing access to resources is a crucial stage in socio-economic development. To effect a good change, the community must be prepared to react to both economic and non-economic rewards.
- 6) Concentrating on education is another important area of action for socio-economic development. The dropout rate among school-age children is rising in the borderlands as a result of the availability of low-skill jobs such as portering and other wage jobs based on trades. The rate of higher education enrolment is low when compared to the local population and number of educational institutions. Therefore, it is suggested that children of school age should go to school and learn for the betterment of the nation as a whole.
- 7) There is a cry need of community leadership training, capacity building, understanding of border trade policy, and other associated laws and regulations. Leaders must be cognizant of key fundamental concepts in conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, and communicative action. Despite being in a heavily militarized area, the border allows for cross-border movement of persons and commodities. Additionally, the movement of commodities across the border became the focal point of friction between diverse groups, which occasionally resulted in violence between distinct groups created solely as a result of border commerce. There are several stories of conflicts between various groups in the borderlands. The wage earners who had to rely on commerce as their primary source of income were the most severely impacted. Henceforth, to arbitrate through disagreements and conflicts, local/community leaders' capacity in the field of conflict management and should act as a border management facilitator and resolution must be built. And this necessitates effective communication techniques. The symbolic character of border practices, which determine identity and a sense of belonging, must be understood from the nuance of the economic, socio-cultural, and political domain.
- 8) In the Mizoram-Myanmar border region, particularly in the village of Zokhawthar, intensive land usage and forest removal have accelerated soil erosion, land degradation, and loss of vegetation. Another important component is the development work done by households, the governmental sector, and the commercial sector. For the production of firewood and charcoal for home and commercial needs, the agricultural

lands are converted into settlement due to growth of population and forest trees are chopped down in vast quantities. Environmental protection and awareness policy must be initiated both at the government and non-governmental level.

- 9) Many of Indo-Myanmar's ecosystems and animals' futures are in jeopardy. Nearly 37% of the region's most important biodiversity regions are not officially protected, and just 5% of the region's natural ecosystem is thought to be still in pristine condition. Many endangered species, some of which have only rarely been observed by human eyes, may be found in Indo-Myanmar borderlands. Loss of habitat and illicit wildlife trading are two threats to this species. Lack of political will, funding, and incentives for efficient law enforcement, conservation planning, and action, further worsen the problem. Gains result from protecting and safeguarding these hotspots for the environment, as well as for human communities and economy. The creation of all sorts of commodities and services depends on healthy ecosystems, which also provide 'nature-based solutions' cheap, dependable defenses against natural disasters that also support long-term sustainability.
  
- 10) A sustainable form of transportation is essential for every nation's economy. The lack of reliable mobility is the main cause of the north-east India's relative backwardness, despite the region's rich natural resources. Even now, seven decades after India gained its freedom, the communication network's surface is marked by crumbling roads and highways. Poor roads may be found in many mountainous and border locations. Governmental action and policy must be made to improve transport infrastructure, especially in the borderlands of India and Myanmar.

## **Conclusion**

The India-Myanmar borderland is exceptional because it is not only home to a diverse population made up of numerous ethnic groups with diverse cultural ethos, but there also appears to be widespread segregation of ethnic groups due to an imposed boundary because traditional villages were not upheld during the demarcation of the boundary. As administrative convenience based on the selection of natural divides was then a revered practice of the British in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is evident that the opinion and aspirations of the residents were the least of the British concerns in the process of demarcation. Disputes of a private nature involving the tribes in the border were amicably settled by the two countries. Since 1952, border meetings used to take place between India and Myanmar to discuss about matters of 'mutual interest', like the settlement of border disputes which were not relating to boundary.

India and Myanmar had been all along very cautious about the solution of their border problem. If border questions could be approached in this manner, perhaps there would be no border dispute between the two countries except a few adjustments here and there. Such an adjustment was in fact, made in the case of the Light House on the Table Island in the Bay of Bengal. In June 1952, the Myanmarese expressed her desire to take over the administration of the Light House. But India requested Myanmar to lease it for a period of another 25 years as the Light House was of a considerable importance to navigation in the Bay of Bengal. India, therefore, did not deny the Myanmarese ownership of the Island. Even the Kabaw Valley, which the Rajahs of Manipur requested for reversion after the Indian Independence Act of 1947, had been declared to be 'an integral part of Myanmar', by India. A spirit of understanding and accommodation between India and Myanmar was thereby indicated.

Border, though isolated in one sense, the region had never been devoid of socio-cultural and economic relations with its neighbors. A flourishing border trade did exist here. There is a need to revive and strengthen it in the changed situation for the benefit of the border people. The borders have their own natural and human environment which influenced the trade, taking place between them. Economic linkages developed



naturally between people of two borders, for both have spatial proximity and both are far away from the mainland or production centres of their respective country. Therefore, surplus products are bartered or purchased by each other to maintain their survival. Such a trade is most strong and necessary where borders are in different topographic units or ecosystem, example hills and plains, also in the borders occupied by more or less similar people. Though the traditional border trade has been affected by formation of old and new international boundaries, even the trade goes on as a necessity of the border people. Plans should be made to further encourage and strengthen the border trade, so that the economy of the border people gets a boost. This will definitely bring development and prosperity among the border people. The border trade and economy are beneficial to each other. Hence all efforts should be made to develop both. Establishment of 'fair' border trade is necessary for the development of economy of the people because most of the border areas have difficult terrain, isolation and lack of infrastructure. The border people face insurmountable problems in selling their products, especially the perishable agro-horticultural products. Therefore, the planners, politicians, administrators and academicians have to pay attention towards the development of trade and economy of the border people. So that peace, tranquility, and prosperity can usher in the border to strengthen the country as a whole. The following conclusions are drawn:

- 1) Border trade and economic development in border areas are interdependent, as border trade leads to economic development which through secondary effects increases border trade many folds. The process of globalization and liberalization has opened up the economy of northeast India. As a result, our trade relation with the neighboring countries will grow and diversify.
- 2) The Indo-Myanmar boundary will probably remain peaceful in the future, but the India-China and India-Pakistan borders may continue to cause trouble, because the Chinese Communist Philosophy of expansionism and war is radically different from India's democratic, secular principle of peaceful co-existence. India and Pakistan also differ in their philosophical and political attitudes.

- 3) Since the two countries' independence soon after World War II, relations between India and Myanmar have been cordial. With India's active assistance, Myanmar has successfully sealed its border to prevent the unauthorized infiltration of insurgent groups like the Mizo and Naga tribesmen. The boundary is defined by the boundary agreement that was signed on March 10th, 1968. However, industrialization and technical development have improved relations between India and Myanmar more than ever before, and the future of their cordial ties appeared promising.